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Introduction
2Background 
In December 2005, the Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) was commissioned by the Australian High 
Tech Crime Centre (AHTCC) to conduct research into issues relating to key criminal justice issues 
concerning technology-enabled crime in the context of an evolving international and domestic legal  
and law enforcement framework.
As part of this research, the present resource materials were prepared to provide a general overview of 
information on technology-enabled crime to assist prosecutors and members of the judiciary who may  
be faced with proceedings involving technology-enabled crime.
This document should not, however, be viewed as an authority on technology-enabled crime or related 
prosecutions. Work on technology-enabled crime is ongoing and is a relatively new field. This 
compendium aims to present prosecutors with common terms, concepts, relevant legislation, and current 
debates in the academic literature affecting technology-enabled crime cases. The work profiled in this 
report does not necessarily represent best practice by law enforcement or the judiciary. As yet the work in 
this area is still in its infancy and standards have yet to be fully defined. Efforts are underway to develop 
more standardised, nationally-endorsed practices for computer forensics but this task will take time to 
complete. In the short term, computer forensic processes and practice will continue to evolve, driven by 
new technologies and software, and the intent nationally and internationally to standardise evidentiary 
processes and the science behind practice. Such dynamism will continue to generate subsequent 
challenges for practitioners and the judiciary, and compound the risk that research results will become 
rapidly outdated. These changes have fuelled ongoing debate about the perceived role of, and demands 
on, computer forensics police teams and court experts, given increasing use of computers in modern 
policing and in criminal activities.
The field of computer forensics is likely to be highly dynamic in many ways. In Australia, there is a lack of 
critical mass in prosecutions, especially in denial of service (DoS) attacks, to develop the necessary case 
law required to establish benchmarks. The work presented in this report, however, provides a useful 
summary, offering a solid basis on which to build greater understanding of technology-enabled crime 
cases and prosecutions that will serve to strengthen future work and policy debate in this field.
Terminology and definitions
There is currently a lack of consistency in terminology in the literature on aspects of computer crime with 
the following adjectives having been used to describe various aspects of computer-related crime:
virtual•	
online•	
cyber-•	
digital•	
high tech•	
computer-related•	
internet-related•	
telecommunications-related•	
computer-assisted•	
electronic•	
ICT-related•	
e- (as in e-crime).•	
3Clearly, there are different contexts in which each of these descriptive terms is more appropriate. For 
example, hacking into freestanding un-networked computer systems and databases preceded the advent 
of the internet in its current form, and so the terms internet crime or online crime are inappropriate to deal 
with these earlier forms of activity.
Even spelling and usage show variations, particularly with regard to the use of the prefix cyber. The 
literature contains references to cybercrime, cyber crime and cyber-crime, as well as more specific forms 
such as cyberterrorism (or cyber-terrorism), cyberstalking (or cyber-stalking) and so on. The same 
variability applies to terms such as e-crime (sometimes E-crime or eCrime) (see Smith, Grabosky & Urbas 
2004: 5-6 for a discussion of this issue). Traditionally, a distinction was drawn between crimes in which 
information and communications technologies were the object or the target of offending, and crimes in 
which technologies were the tool in the commission of the offence.
This latter category incorporated two levels of reliance on technologies: offences which were enabled  
by technologies (i.e. in which a computer was required for the commission of the offence); and offences 
which were enhanced by technologies (i.e. in which computers made it easier to commit an offence).
Examples of information and communications technologies which are the object or target of offending •	
include: illegal access/hacking; illegal interception of communications; data interference/viruses; 
system interference, denial of service/spam; misuse of devices/theft of services fraud (phreaking); and 
terrorism-related offences.
Examples of technology-enabled offending in which information and communications technologies  •	
are necessary to commit the offence include: manipulation of data to obtain a fraudulent payment; 
ATM fraud; using technologies to commit forgery; sharemarket manipulation; stealing intellectual 
property; cyberstalking; collection and dissemination of illicit online content, such as child 
pornography; and phishing.
Examples of technology-enhanced offending in which information and communications technologies •	
are used to support the commission of the offence include: recording payments for drugs; establishing 
databases of victims or potential victims; identity theft; extortion; communicating between offenders/
conspiracies; and encrypting secret information or using steganography to hide data.
These resource materials focus on technology-enabled crimes which are, arguably, the types of offending 
which are most directly related to misuse of ICT for criminal purposes. Where some specific forms of 
technology-enabled crime are discussed, the materials will use terms such as cybercrime, cyberstalking 
and so on in conformity with Australian legislation such as the Cybercrime Act 2001 (Cth) and 
international instruments such as the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime.
The focus is, however, on crimes that require ICT for their commission, rather than conventional crimes 
which may, incidentally have ICT involved in some way. To assist readers of these resource materials  
in understanding some of the technical jargon, a detailed glossary of key terms is included at the end  
of the report.
Brief historical background
Telecommunications technologies were first created in 1837, and criminal misuse occurred as early as 
1867 when an instance of illegal interception occurred (see Grabosky & Smith 1998). The 1960s saw a 
rapid expansion in the use of telephony services which corresponded with attempts to obtain services for 
free through ‘phreaking’ (which involved the use of devices such as whistles to simulate the frequency of 
a signal used by automated telephone systems to permit telephone services to be obtained dishonestly 
for free). The introduction of electronic funds transfer technologies such as ATM and EFTPOS led to the 
4use of such facilities to transfer funds illegally in the 1970s. This was followed by the widespread use of 
computer networks which corresponded with the commission of money laundering and hacking offences. 
The introduction of the internet in the late 1980s created an environment in which copyright could be 
infringed and offensive materials disseminated across international networks. Wireless technologies of the 
21st century have created new opportunities for misuse.
The last three decades of the 20th century produced numerous hacker groups devoted to finding ways  
of gaining unauthorised access to both freestanding computers and networked systems (HTCB no. 5,  
no. 6 and no. 7). The activities of these groups started to attract serious attention from law enforcement 
agencies when they succeeded in hacking into defence, government and university computers and 
altering data or leaving messages boasting of their exploits. The increasing use of computer records  
for storing information also provided opportunities for criminal exploitation of personal and financial 
information, facilitating new forms of fraud, extortion and theft.
The internet has also facilitated an explosion in the distribution of offensive or illegal content such as 
online child pornography. This has led increasingly to large scale international law enforcement operations 
directed at those responsible (HTCB no. 2 and no. 8; Forde & Patterson 1998; Grant, David & Grabosky 
1997; Krone 2005a).
Grabosky & Smith (1998: 14–17) identified the following among the types of telecommunications-related 
crime emerging in the digital age:
illegal interception of telecommunications•	
electronic vandalism and terrorism•	
stealing communications services•	
telecommunications piracy•	
pornography and other offensive content•	
telemarketing fraud•	
electronic funds transfer crime•	
electronic money laundering.•	
These categories can be seen to comprise two overlapping domains. The first includes illegal activities 
directed at, or perpetrated through, the use of computers. This can involve: theft of computers; wilful 
damage to computers or computer systems; unlawful access to, or interference with, the operations  
of computers; transmitting offensive or illegal content using computers; and committing fraud or other 
offences through the use of computers. In turn, it is possible to distinguish between computers and ICT 
as the object of offending, and computers and ICT as a tool for offending (HTCB no. 1). This area of 
criminality is naturally most amenable to regulation through laws specifically directed at computer use  
and misuse, such as the computer offences contained in the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) and other 
legislation discussed below.
A wider but related area is the protection of information, which in the digital age increasingly means the 
protection of computer data and networks supporting the communication of information such as 
telecommunications systems. Protection of information has been a concern of legal systems from well 
before the introduction of modern technologies of mass communication, but is brought into sharp focus 
by the development of global computer-based information networks such as the internet. Principal legal 
measures related to the protection of information from unlawful use, distribution or exploitation include 
intellectual property laws, privacy laws, laws relating to secrecy and national security, telecommunications 
laws, and laws relating to unfair commercial advantage.
5A useful analysis of the historical development of computer-related law is provided by Sieber (1998), who 
identified six waves of computer-related legislation beginning in the 1970s:
privacy protection laws (e.g. relating to data held in government computers)•	
economic crime laws (e.g. computer fraud)•	
intellectual property laws (e.g. copyright and patent protection for computers and software, database •	
protections)
illegal and harmful content laws (e.g. electronically distributed pornography and racist propaganda)•	
criminal procedural laws (e.g. relating to search and seizure of computers)•	
security law (e.g. use of access controls such as encryption to protect data).•	
More recent attention on security issues in the context of terrorist threats and the protection of critical 
infrastructure has, of course, given new impetus to the development of security laws including significantly 
expanded law enforcement powers with respect to computers and telecommunications.
Main types of technology-enabled crime
The range of technology-enabled crime is always evolving, both as a function of technological change 
and in terms of social interaction with new technologies. Broadly speaking, such crimes can be 
categorised (Smith, Grabosky & Urbas 2004) according to whether they are:
directed at computers and associated technologies such as computer intrusions (e.g. hacking and •	
unauthorised access), denial of service (DoS) attacks, distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks 
using botnets, cryptovirology/denial of resource attacks (e.g. the use of ransomware), the creation and 
distribution of malware (e.g. viruses, worms, Trojans and rootkits), and sabotage
using computers and associated technologies (e.g. online child exploitation, cyberstalking, extortion, •	
fraud and identity theft)
with ancillary uses of computers and associated technologies such as internet markets for illicit goods •	
and services, acquisition of high tech crime tools (HTCB no. 11 and no. 12), criminal uses of 
encryption or steganography to conceal activities and evidence.
Some criminal activities have emerged rapidly within recent times. For example, while phishing was 
unheard of just a few years ago, the public is now largely aware of the risks of answering unsolicited 
emails from senders purporting to be banks and other entities seeking confirmation of financial details. 
This is an example of a crime type that uses technology and exploitation of human behaviour to succeed 
(HTCB no. 9). Related activities include SMiShing (dissemination of phishing messages using short 
message services (SMS) on mobile phones) and vishing (dissemination of phishing messages using voice 
over internet protocols, or VoIP).
High-tech criminals rely increasingly on malicious code (also known as malware) such as viruses,  
worms, Trojan horses or rootkit programs to overcome security protections on computers or networks, 
and to harvest information such as passwords and financial details to facilitate fraud or identity theft 
(HTCB no. 10 and no. 11). These crimes represent more sophisticated and multidimensional evolutions 
from previously largely discrete areas of offending such as hacking and computer fraud, and are often 
referred to as blended threats. This includes spy-phishing, a form of phishing attack, involving the use of 
various malicious applications, typically Trojan horses and spyware, to perpetrate online information theft 
(Choo, Smith & McCusker 2007).
6Future trends
The discernible trends from past evolutions of technology-enabled crime that are likely to continue into 
the future include:
increased dependence of individuals and organisations on computer-based technologies for storage •	
and processing of information and communications
correspondingly increased opportunities for misuse of these technologies by motivated individuals and •	
criminal groups
emergence of new protective technologies, services and behaviours in response to perceived threats•	
exploitation of continuing technological vulnerabilities (syntactic attacks) and human vulnerabilities •	
(semantic attacks) by criminals.
The interaction of these trends can be seen as somewhat cyclical. For example, widespread adoption of 
internet banking provided new opportunities for criminal exploitation through hacking, account hijacking, 
so-called man-in-the-middle phishing attacks, manipulation of data, and fraud directed at both financial 
institutions and customers. Increased protection of bank computer systems against intrusion or internal 
misuse and better auditing of transactions data generally shifted the focus of criminal activity towards 
identity theft and fraud, which requires access to personal and financial details of customers. This led to 
phishing attacks whereby consumers were tricked through bogus emails and fake websites into revealing 
identifying information and passwords. As the risks became more widely understood, criminal activity 
again shifted to the use of malware to surreptitiously capture and transmit these details without the user 
having to be tricked, which has in turn led to an increased focus on technological protections such as 
firewalls, encryption and anti-virus and privacy software. 
One clear trend in technological development and social adaptation is the rapid and widespread uptake 
of portable devices such as mobile phones, wireless laptops, palm pilots and storage devices (including 
USB devices), which has resulted in new forms of exploitation such as war driving, theft of devices both 
as objects and as repositories of valuable information (Urbas & Krone 2006b), eavesdropping and sniffing 
of VoIP calls, man-in-the-middle attacks, denial of service (DoS) attacks, call interruption and making free 
calls on VoIP networks built over wireless local area networks, and malware exploiting vulnerabilities in 
mobile phones (Choo, Smith & McCusker 2007).
Prevalence and costs of technology-enabled crime
There are few reliable statistics on the prevalence of technology-enabled crime, at least in relation to 
some categories. For example, while specific incidents of unauthorised access or data modification 
(hacking) are periodically reported, there is no practical way of assessing how much of this type of activity 
occurs in general, in part because a significant proportion of incidents will not be reported, properly 
identified or even detected by victims. Similarly, while there are some quantitative estimates of the number 
of computers affected by particular viruses or other malicious programs that circulate through the internet, 
it is difficult to express this as a large number of discrete crimes committed by an individual offender, as 
opposed to a single crime with multiple victims.
Nonetheless, some indication of the prevalence of technology-enabled crime is given by surveys of 
industry groups and households. Based on a relatively small number of public and private organisations, 
the annual Australia’s National Commputer Emergency Response Team (AusCERT) survey of public and 
private sector organisations in Australia indicated that: 
42 percent of survey respondents in 2003 reported having experienced one or more electronic attacks •	
in the previous 12-month period
749% reported one or more electronic attacks in the 2004 survey•	
35% reported one or more electronic attacks in the 2005 survey•	
22% reported one or more electronic attacks in the 2006 survey (AusCERT 2006).•	
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reported that financial loss due to cybercrime in 2004 was 
estimated to have been US$400 billion (McAfee 2005). A more recent survey in the United Kingdom 
(PWC 2006) also indicated that information security breaches cost United Kingdom companies across 
several industry sectors £10 billion per annum.
The most widely reported types of electronic attack or other computer crime over the same time periods 
have been:
insider abuse of internet access, email or computer resources (62% in 2006)•	
laptop theft (58% in 2006)•	
virus, worm or Trojan infection (broken down in 2006 into 45% reporting self-propagating infections •	
such as viruses or worms, and 21% reporting non-self-propagating malware such as Trojan or rootkit 
infection).
Although in the AusCERT (2006) survey, infections from viruses and worms were the most common form 
of electronic attack reported, the financial loss attributed to laptop theft is higher than that attributed to 
infections from viruses and worms. The chart below shows the costs attributed to these three types of 
offences over the four years (CFI no. 134).
Figure 1: Financial losses from technology-enabled crime, 2003–2006 ($m)
P
er
ce
nt
 in
ci
de
nt
s 
in
 lo
ca
tio
n
2.2
7.1
0.6
2.5
3.5
2.3
1.2
1.5
2.2
1.2
2.7
0.9
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Computer facilitated financial fraudLaptop theftVirus, worm, Trojan infection
2003
2004
2005
2006
2006: 389 respondents, 2005: 181 respondents, 2004: 240 respondents, 2003: 214 respondents
Source: AusCERT (2006: 26)
Computer-related offending directed at or affecting households shares some of the same features, but 
few general crime victimisation surveys provide detailed information about particular types of high-tech 
crime. The International Crime Victimisation Survey last conducted in 2004 in Australia included some 
questions about consumers’ experiences of online purchasing. Some 11 percent of those who made 
online purchases, mostly by giving credit card information, reported problems (Johnson 2005; Krone & 
Johnson 2006) such as:
goods/services not as advertised•	
8goods/services not delivered•	
money taken from account at a time other than as agreed•	
more money taken than authorised.•	
Not all of these reported problems necessarily involve criminal conduct. However, it can be concluded 
that a proportion of households using computers are affected by online fraud or other misconduct. Even if 
not directly victimised, this may cause other households to avoid using such services as online banking or 
purchasing for fear of being victimised.
Issues for law enforcement agencies, prosecutors and the courts
The Electronic Crime Strategy developed by the Australasian Police Commissioners in 2000 identified the 
following as key issues (particularly arising from the global nature of much high tech crime) for law 
enforcement:
jurisdiction (whether jurisdiction exists and the problem of concurrent jurisdiction) – see section •	
‘Jurisdictional, prosecution and sentencing issues’
legislative difficulties brought about by differing criminal law regimes (e.g. requirement of dual •	
criminality) 
managing strategic alliances and partnerships and ensuring security, confidentiality and flexibility of •	
response (particularly in relation to the private sector) 
dealing with differing privacy regimes •	
achieving mutual assistance in real time or close to real time •	
heavy reliance on cooperation and assistance from telecommunications providers and internet service •	
providers (ISPs) 
the transborder search of computer data banks and the interception of communications •	
ensuring timely and strategic intelligence assessments •	
managing and coordinating extraditions. •	
As investigations proceed towards prosecution, many of the same issues confront prosecution agencies. 
In addition, prosecutors face the following difficulties:
clarifying elements of new offences and related evidentiary requirements•	
presenting complex and technical evidence in court•	
identifying and using appropriately qualified experts to undertake analysis or give evidence•	
defence challenges to admissibility •	
novel defences and defence arguments.•	
Courts hearing cases involving technology-enabled crimes, or other cases involving electronic evidence, 
face particular issues arising from:
presentation of complex and technical evidence•	
heavy reliance on expert opinion•	
complex and novel arguments relating to admissibility of evidence or the exercise of discretions•	
lack of comprehension of offence elements and evidence by jurors and lawyers•	
novel defences and defence arguments (including in sentencing proceedings)•	
imposing appropriate sentences on convicted offenders.•	
 2 
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International law enforcement response
It has been evident from early in the development of legal responses to technology-enabled crime that 
this type of activity easily crosses jurisdictional boundaries (Grabosky & Smith 1998; Grabosky, Smith & 
Dempsey 2001). Considerable attention has been paid therefore to the international dimensions of the law 
enforcement response, with a focus on three main areas:
harmonisation of substantive computer offences in national legislation•	
harmonisation of procedural provisions relating to investigation and prosecution of technology-enabled •	
crimes
establishment/enhancement of cooperative mechanisms allowing exchange of information, evidence •	
and the extradition of suspects.
Each of these areas has been influenced by the activities of numerous international bodies and 
cooperative arrangements. The following are some of the more significant international developments in 
this regard.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) made an early contribution in a 
1986 report entitled Computer-related crime: analysis of legal policy, which recommended that member 
states pay particular attention to the coverage under their national penal laws of specific knowingly 
committed acts:
the input, alteration, erasure and/or suppression of computer data and/or computer programs made •	
wilfully with the intent to commit an illegal transfer of funds or of another thing of value
the input, alteration, erasure and/or suppression of computer data and/or computer programs made •	
wilfully with the intent to commit a forgery
the input, alteration, erasure and/or suppression of computer data and/or computer programs, or •	
other interference with computer systems, made wilfully with the intent to hinder the functioning of a 
computer and/or of a telecommunication system
the infringement of the exclusive right of the owner of a protected computer program with the intent to •	
exploit commercially the program and put it on the market
access to or interception of a computer and/or telecommunication system made knowingly and •	
without the authorisation of the person responsible for the system, either by infringement of security 
measures or for other dishonest or harmful intentions.
In 1992, the OECD published its Guidelines on information security, which were revised and republished 
in 2002 as Guidelines for the security of information systems and networks: towards a culture of security. 
These guidelines were developed with the following aims (OECD 2002):
promote a culture of security among all participants as a means of protecting information systems  •	
and networks
raise awareness about the risk to information systems and networks; the policies, practices, measures •	
and procedures available to address those risks; and the need for their adoption and implementation
foster greater confidence among all participants in information systems and networks and the way in •	
which they are provided and used
create a general frame of reference that will help participants understand security issues and respect •	
ethical values in the development and implementation of coherent policies, practices, measures and 
procedures for the security of information systems and networks
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promote cooperation and information sharing, as appropriate, among all participants in the •	
development and implementation of security policies, practices, measures and procedures
promote the consideration of security as an important objective among all participants involved in  •	
the development or implementation of standards.
The OECD guidelines then set out principles for participants in the development of security of information 
systems (OECD 2002):
awareness: participants should be aware of the need for security of information systems and networks •	
and what they can do to enhance security
responsibility: all participants are responsible for the security of information systems and networks•	
response: participants should act in a timely and cooperative manner to prevent, detect and respond •	
to security incidents
ethics: participants should respect the legitimate interests of others•	
democracy: the security of information systems and networks should be compatible with essential •	
values of a democratic society
risk assessment: participants should conduct risk assessments•	
security design and implementation: participants should incorporate security as an essential element •	
of information systems and networks
security management: participants should adopt a comprehensive approach to security management•	
reassessment: participants should review and reassess the security of information systems and •	
networks, and make appropriate modifications to security policies, practices, measures and 
procedures.
In 2005, the OECD added to this with a report on The promotion of a culture of security for information 
systems and networks in OECD countries (OECD 2005). This report highlighted the important security 
role of: 
e-government applications and services•	
protection of national critical information infrastructures•	
computer security response teams (CERTs)•	
outreach to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).•	
The approach advocated by the OECD has been followed in Australia with the creation of the Trusted 
Information Sharing Network (TISN) and the cooperative operations of the AHTCC.
G8 countries
The Group of Eight (G8) countries are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United States and 
the United Kingdom. In the mid-1990s, groups of experts were formed from G8 meetings to address 
particular aspects of transnational crime, including a Subgroup on High-Tech Crime which has worked on:
creation of its Network for 24-Hour Points of Contact for High-Tech Crime, currently with 45 members •	
(including the addition of six new members in 2005 (Republic of China 2006)), and an international 
critical information infrastructure protection directory
negotiation of widely-accepted principles and an action plan to combat high tech crime, subsequently •	
adopted by G8 justice and home affairs ministers, endorsed by G8 heads of state, and recognised by 
other international fora
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various better practices documents, including guides for security of computer networks, international •	
requests for assistance, legislative drafting, and tracing networked communications across borders
assessments of threats and impact to law enforcement from new wireless technologies, encryption, •	
and viruses, worms and other malicious code
training conferences for cybercrime agencies from every continent (except Antarctica)•	
conferences for law enforcement and industry on improved cooperation and tracing criminal and •	
terrorist communications, and for all stakeholders on protection of critical information infrastructures.
The G8 countries have recently also turned their attention to the threat of the convergence of cybercrime 
and terrorist activity:
Computers and computer networks have increasingly become both the objects of terrorist and other 
criminal attacks, and the conduit through which terrorists and other criminals communicate to plan and 
carry out their destructive activities. Because many computer networks transcend international 
borders, it is essential that all countries have adequate substantive and procedural laws, and that they 
cooperate successfully to investigate, so as to prevent and punish terrorist and other criminal activities 
perpetuated with the aid of computers and computer networks …
States should review their laws to ensure that abuses of modern technology that are deserving of 
criminal sanctions are adequately criminalized and that problems with respect to jurisdiction, 
enforcement powers, investigation, training, crime prevention, and international cooperation in respect 
of such abuses are effectively addressed (G8 2005).
In their 2005 recommendations, the G8 countries endorsed the Convention on Cybercrime (COE), and 
urged international efforts to combat the sexual exploitation of children on the internet (G8 2005).
United Nations
The United Nations (UN) has been monitoring developments in computer-related crime for over a decade, 
starting with the 8th United Nations Crime Congress in Havana in 1990. This was followed in 1994 by the 
publication of the UN manual on the prevention and control of computer-related crime (UN 1994).
A UN symposium, The challenge of borderless cybercrime, was held in conjunction with the Palermo 
signing conference of the Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime in December 2000 (UN 
2000). The Vienna Declaration on Crime and Justice: Meeting the challenges of the 21st century, was 
adopted by the 10th UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders in April 
2000 (UN 2001). This declaration included a commitment:
… to develop action-oriented policy recommendations on the prevention and control of computer-
related crime, and … working towards enhancing our ability to prevent, investigate and prosecute 
high-technology and computer-related crime.
The connections between organised crime, particularly in the form of terrorism, and cybercrime continued 
as a focus of the 11th UN Crime Congress in 2005. This meeting recognised that:
… besides traditional threats to peace and security, new dangerous threats had emerged on a global 
scale which were interconnected and should no longer be seen in isolation from one another, in 
particular threats related to transnational organized crime, including drug trafficking, but also to 
corruption and terrorism.
In this context, cybercrime and money laundering were described as emerging concerns (UN 2005). A 
UN Working Group on Internet Governance was established to contribute to the World Summit on the 
Information Society which was held in Tunisia in November 2005.
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Council of Europe 
In 1989, the Select Committee of Experts on Computer-Related Crime of the Council of Europe (COE) 
produced a minimum list of computer crimes to be prohibited and prosecuted by international consensus 
(Goodman & Brenner 2002: note 172):
computer fraud: The input, alteration, erasure or suppression of computer data or computer •	
programs, or other interference with the course of data processing, that influences the result of data 
processing thereby causing economic or possessory loss of property of another person with the intent 
of procuring an unlawful economic gain for himself or for another person
computer forgery: the input, alteration, erasure or suppression of computer data or computer •	
programs, or other interference with the course of data processing, in a manner or under such 
conditions, as prescribed by national law, that it would constitute the offence of forgery if it had been 
committed with respect to a traditional object of such an offence
damage to computer data or computer programs: the erasure, damaging, deterioration or •	
suppression of computer data or computer programs without right
computer sabotage: the input, alteration, erasure or suppression of computer data or computer •	
programs, or other interference with computer systems, with intent to hinder the functioning of a 
computer or a telecommunication system
unauthorised access•	 : the access without right to a computer system or network by infringing security 
measures
unauthorised interception: the interception, made without right and by technical means, of •	
communications to, from and within a computer system or network
unauthorised reproduction of a protected computer program: the reproduction, distribution or •	
communication to the public without right of a computer program which is protected by law
unauthorised reproduction of a topography: The reproduction without right of a topography protected •	
by law, of a semi-conductor product, or the commercial exploitation or the importation for that 
purpose, done without right, of a topography or of a semi-conductor product manufactured by using 
the topography.
The COE committee also provided an optional list on which it would be harder to reach international 
consensus (Goodman & Brenner 2002: note 173):
alteration of computer data or computer programs: the alteration of computer data or computer •	
programs without right
computer espionage: the acquisition by improper means or the disclosure, transfer or use of a trade or •	
commercial secret without right or any other legal justification, with intent either to cause economic 
loss to the person entitled to the secret or to obtain an unlawful economic advantage for oneself or a 
third person
unauthorised use of a computer: the use of a computer system or network without right, that either: •	
(a) is made with the acceptance of a significant risk of loss being caused to the person entitled to use 
the system or harm to the system or its functioning; or (b) is made with intent to cause loss to the 
person entitled to use the system or harm to the system or its functioning; or (c) causes loss to the 
person entitled to use the system or harm to the system or its functioning
unauthorised use of a protected computer program: the use without right of a computer program •	
which is protected by law and which has been reproduced without right, with intent, either to  
procure an unlawful economic gain for himself or for another person or to cause harm to the holder  
of the right.
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Many elements of these minimum and optional lists have by now found their way into national computer 
crime legislation, along with significant improvements in criminal investigative powers and procedures 
necessitated by the challenges of prosecuting cybercrime. In Australia, similar minimum requirements 
were formulated in early stages of the development of the Cybercrime Act 2001 (Cth) and its state/
territory counterparts (Thompson & Berwick 1997). This legislation also partly reflects the draft COE 
Convention on Cybercrime, which now provides a model for many legislatures both in Europe and 
elsewhere.
COE Convention on Cybercrime
The Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime was opened for signature in November 2001. 
Signatories include over 40 European countries, as well as (non-member states of the Council of Europe) 
Canada, Japan, South Africa and the United States. The convention required five ratifications to come 
into force, which occurred on 1 July 2004. To date, 15 member countries (all European) have ratified or 
acceded to the convention, while 28 countries have signed but not ratified. After a long period of 
consideration, the United States Senate agreed to ratify the convention on 4 August 2006.
The comprehensive substantive and procedural provisions of the convention are designed to assist with 
the harmonisation process, while affording adequate protection for due process and human rights. 
Categories of cybercrime offences and liability dealt with in Chapter II of the Convention include:
offences against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems:•	
illegal access –
illegal interception –
data interference –
system interference –
misuse of devices –
computer-related offences:•	
computer-related forgery  –
computer-related fraud –
content-related offences:•	
offences related to child pornography –
offences related to copyright infringement and related rights•	
ancillary liability and sanctions:•	
attempt and aiding or abetting –
corporate liability –
sanctions and measures. –
Chapter II goes on to canvass procedural matters such as collection and preservation of evidence, 
production orders, search and seizure, data interception and jurisdictional issues. In particular, the 
procedural provisions cover:
expedited preservation of stored data•	
expedited preservation and partial disclosure of traffic data•	
production orders•	
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search and seizure of stored computer data•	
real-time collection of data traffic•	
interception of content data•	
jurisdiction.•	
Chapter III deals with mechanisms for international cooperation, such as extradition and mutual 
assistance. These provisions supplement existing multilateral and bilateral treaties and arrangements.  
In particular, the following issues are covered:
extradition•	
mutual assistance•	
spontaneous information•	
procedures for mutual assistance in the absence of international agreements•	
confidentiality and limitation on use•	
expedited preservation of stored data•	
expedited disclosure of preserved traffic data•	
mutual assistance regarding accessing of stored data •	
transborder access to stored data with consent or where publicly available•	
mutual assistance regarding real-time collection of traffic data•	
mutual assistance regarding interception of content data•	
24/7 network.•	
There is also an optional protocol to the convention, concerning the criminalisation of acts of a racist and 
xenophobic nature committed through computer systems. This was opened for signature on 28 January 
2003, and has attracted a total of 31 signatories, with seven ratifying or acceding. The protocol came into 
force on 1 March 2006 with its fifth ratification.
Particular provisions of the optional protocol deal with:
dissemination of racist and xenophobic material through computer systems•	
racist and xenophobic motivated threats•	
racist and xenophobic motivated insults•	
denial, gross minimisation, approval or justification of genocide or crimes against humanity•	
aiding and abetting.•	
The protocol’s definition of racist and xenophobic material is:
… any written material, any image or any other representation of ideas or theories, which advocates, 
promotes or incites hatred, discrimination or violence, against any individual or group of individuals, 
based on race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin, as well as religion if used as a pretext for 
any of these factors.
While Australia is not a signatory to the Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime or the protocol, 
the convention’s earlier drafts were influential in shaping the Cybercrime Act 2001 (Cth) and subsequent 
legislation such as the recently enacted telecommunications offences (discussed below), which extend to 
use of the internet for dissemination of offensive content.
3  
Australian legislative framework
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Commonwealth, state and territory legislation
In Australia, criminal law is largely the preserve of the state and territory jurisdictions. Accordingly, there 
are substantive criminal offences relating to many forms of computer misuse in the legislation of each of 
the state and territory jurisdictions. In addition, there is a growing body of Commonwealth law relating to 
computer technology, particularly telecommunications systems. These operate alongside general criminal 
laws, and specific offences under other legislation dealing with such matters as intellectual property 
rights, classification of publications, terrorism and national security.
The following table provides a summary of Australian computer-related offences (Table 1).
Table 1: Main Australian computer-related offence legislation
Main computer-
related offence 
provisions
Introduction/
amendment Maximum penalties
ACT Criminal Code 2002, ss415 
– 421 and ss423
Replacing previous 
computer offences 
under the Crimes Act 
1900
ss415: punishable by imprisonment for five years or longer
ss416 and s417: punishable by a maximum of 1,000 penalty 
units, 10 years imprisonment, or both
ss418 and ss419: punishable by a maximum of 300 penalty 
units, three years imprisonment, or both
ss420 and ss421: punishable by a maximum of 200 penalty 
units, two years imprisonment, or both
ss423: punishable by a maximum of 2,500 penalty units, 25 
years imprisonment, or both
NSW Crimes Act 1900, ss308C – 
308I
Added by Crimes 
Amendment (Computer 
Offences) Act 2001
ss308C: punishable by the maximum penalty applicable if 
the person had committed, or facilitated the commission of, 
the serious indictable offence in this jurisdiction
ss308D and ss308E: punishable by a maximum of 10 years 
imprisonment
ss308F and ss308G: punishable by a maximum of three 
years imprisonment
ss308H and ss308I: punishable by a maximum of two years 
imprisonment
NT Criminal Code Act, ss276B 
– 276E
Added by Criminal Code 
Amendment Act 2001
ss276B – s276D: punishable by the maximum penalty of 10 
years imprisonment
s276E: punishable by the maximum penalty of three years 
imprisonment
Qld Criminal Code Act 1899,  
s408E
Added by Criminal Law 
Amendment Act 1997
ss408E(1): punishable by a maximum of two years 
imprisonment
ss408E (2): punishable by a maximum of five years 
imprisonment
ss408E (3): punishable by a maximum of 10 years 
imprisonment
SA Summary Offences Act 
1953, s44 and s44A
Part 4A of the Criminal Law 
Consolidation Act 1935,  
s86E – 86H 
Added by Summary 
Offences Act 
Amendment Act 1989 
and amended by 
Summary Offences 
(Offensive and Other 
Weapons) Amendment 
Act 1998
Statutes Amendment 
(Computer Offences) Act 
2004
s44: punishable by a maximum of another A$2,500 ($2,500 
or imprisonment for six months imprisonment if ss44(2)(a) 
applies)
s44A: punishable by a maximum of two years imprisonment
s86E and s86F: punishable by the maximum penalty for an 
attempt to commit the principal offence
s86G and s86H: punishable by a maximum of 10 years 
imprisonment
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Table 1: continued
Main computer-
related offence 
provisions
Introduction/
amendment Maximum penalties
Tas Criminal Code Act 1924,  
s257B – 257E
Police Offences Act 1935,  
s43A – 43D
Added by Criminal Law 
Amendment Act 1990
s257B – 257E: Criminal Code Act 1924, s454 also states 
that: ‘Except as is otherwise expressly provided, references 
in any enactment to a sentence of imprisonment passed on 
any person for a term not less than or exceeding a specified 
term are to be construed as including references to a 
sentence of imprisonment passed on that person for the 
term of his or her natural life.’
s43A – 43D: punishable by a maximum of a fine of 20 
penalty units and two years imprisonment 
Vic Crimes Act 1958, ss247B 
– 247H, and ss247K – L
Added by Crimes 
(Property Damage and 
Computer Offences) Act 
2003
ss247B: punishable by the maximum penalty as applies to 
the commission of the serious offence in Victoria.
ss247C and ss247D: punishable by a maximum of 10 years 
imprisonment
ss247E and ss247F: punishable by a maximum of three 
years imprisonment
ss247G and ss247H: punishable by a maximum of two 
years imprisonment
ss247K: punishable by a maximum of 25 years 
imprisonment
ss247L: punishable by a maximum of 15 years imprisonment
WA Criminal Code,  
ss440A(3)(a) – 440A(3)(c)
Added by Criminal Law 
Amendment (Simple 
Offences) Act 2004
ss440A(3)(a): punishable by a maximum of 10 years 
imprisonment
ss440A(3)(b): punishable by a maximum of five years 
imprisonment
ss440A(3)(c): punishable by a maximum of two years 
imprisonment (12 months imprisonment and a fine of 
$12,000 if summary conviction applies)
Sources: Compiled from legislative databases including http://www.comlaw.gov.au/, http://www.legislation.act.gov.au/, http://www.legislation.nsw.gov.
au/, http://www.nt.gov.au/dcm/legislation/current.html, http://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/OQPChome.htm, http://www.legislation.sa.gov.au/index.
aspx, http://www.thelaw.tas.gov.au/index.w3p, http://www.dms.dpc.vic.gov.au/ and http://www.slp.wa.gov.au/statutes/swans.nsf
Although s222 (Unlawfully obtaining confidential information) of the Northern Territory Criminal Code, 
added in 1983 and still in force is not specific to computer-related offences, this offence would apply if the 
person in question ‘unlawfully abstracts any confidential information from any register, document, 
computer or other repository of information ... with intent to publish the same to a person who is not 
lawfully entitled to have or to receive it’. The first prosecution under this provision involved an employee of 
the NT Police who had provided names and addresses from a police database to her de facto husband, 
a private investigator: Snell v Pryce [1990] NTSC 2 (15 February 1990). 
Early state and territory computer offences were aimed largely at unauthorised intrusion into computer 
databases (called computer trespass in a (now repealed) Victorian provision, s9A of the Summary 
Offences Act 1966 (Vic)), considered in cases such as DPP v Murdoch (1993) 1 VR 406. These offences 
were similar to traditional property offences such as theft and criminal damage, with the difference that 
the property being protected was computers and computer data. The key element in such offences was 
unauthorised access to, or use or modification of, data.
The Commonwealth enacted its own computer offences in 1986, in Part VIA (comprising ss76A – 76F) of 
the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). These offences criminalised unlawful access to or impairment of 
Commonwealth computers and data, and carried penalties up to 10 years imprisonment. Persons 
prosecuted under the latter provisions included public servants and contractors who dishonestly used 
their access to Commonwealth computers and data to facilitate unauthorised benefits for themselves or 
other persons (Smith, Grabosky & Urbas 2004).
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As a result of reforms to Commonwealth criminal law commenced in the 1990s under the auspices of the 
Model Criminal Code Officers Committee (MCCOC) of the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General 
(SCAG), the Crimes Act 1914 computer offences were updated and relocated to the Criminal Code Act 
1995 (Cth) with the coming into force of the Cybercrime Act 2001 (Cth). In introducing the Cybercrime 
Bill, the then Attorney-General explained (Second Reading, House of Representatives, 27 June 2001):
More than 3 million Australian households and over 1 billion people worldwide are connected to the 
Internet. With the exponential growth in the Internet population and in electronic commerce over the 
last decade, the integrity, security and reliability of computer data and electronic communication is 
becoming increasingly important.
Cybercrime activities, including hacking, virus propagation, denial of service attacks and website 
vandalism, pose a significant threat to the integrity and security of computer data. Indeed, according  
to recent estimates, cybercrime is costing companies worldwide approximately 3 trillion dollars a year.
Updated laws are vital if authorities are to effectively detect, investigate and prosecute cybercrime 
activities. The proposed new computer offences and investigation powers in this Bill are a significant 
development in the fight against these activities and will place Australia at the forefront of international 
efforts to address the issue of cybercrime.
With the enactment of the Cybercrime Act and more recent telecommunications offences (discussed 
below), the Commonwealth has notably expanded its jurisdictional reach into areas of criminal law that 
have hitherto been the responsibility of the states and territories. It can be expected, therefore, that 
more Australian prosecutions for technology-enabled crimes will be pursued under Commonwealth 
rather than state and territory laws.
Model Criminal Code project and the Cybercrime Act 2001 
In 1990, a project was established by the Model Criminal Code Officers Committee of the Standing 
Committee of Attorneys-General which comprised senior law officers from all jurisdictions. The 
Commonwealth enacted general Model Criminal Code principles of criminal responsibility in Chapter 2 of 
the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), and subsequent amendments have progressively added substantive 
provisions. These now include: 
offences relating to bribery of foreign officials, offences against United Nations and associated •	
personnel, international terrorist activities using explosive or lethal devices, and people smuggling 
(Chapter 4 – The integrity and security of the international community and foreign governments)
treason and espionage, terrorist acts and organisations, financing terrorism, and harming Australians •	
overseas (Chapter 5 – The security of the Commonwealth)
theft, fraud and other property offences, forgery, bribery and offences against Commonwealth public •	
officials (Chapter 7 - The proper administration of Government)
offences against humanity, war crimes, slavery and sexual servitude, trafficking in persons and debt •	
bondage (Chapter 8 – Offences against humanity and related offences)
serious drug offences, dangerous weapons and contamination of goods (Chapter 9 – Dangers to the •	
community)
money laundering, postal, telecommunications, computer and financial information offences  •	
(Chapter 10 – National infrastructure).
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In January 2001, the Model Criminal Code Officers Committee published its Report on Damage and 
Computer Offences (MCCOC 2001). Based on this report, the Cybercrime Bill 2001 was introduced into 
the Commonwealth Parliament on 27 June 2001, and with some amendments after consideration by the 
Senate Legal and Constitutional Committee, was enacted.
The Cybercrime Act 2001 (Cth) came into effect on 1 October 2001, adding new provisions to the 
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) and the Customs Act 1901 (Cth). Thus the 
Cybercrime Act served both to modernise Commonwealth computer offences (previously largely 
contained in the Crimes Act 1914) and to provide a model for the states and territories.
The main provisions that were added to the Criminal Code Act 1995 by the Cybercrime Act 2001 are 
those contained in Part 10.7, in particular in Division 477 – Serious computer offences. In particular:
ss477.1 creates an offence of using a carriage service and causing unauthorised access, modification •	
or impairment with intention to commit any serious Commonwealth, state or territory offence (the term 
carriage service has the same meaning as in the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth), a serious 
offence is one punishable by life or five years imprisonment or more, and the penalty for a s477.1 
offence is as for the serious offence)
ss477.2 creates an offence of unauthorised modification of data to cause impairment, where the data •	
or computer involved are Commonwealth data or computers, or the modification is by means of a 
carriage service (defined as for s477.1), carrying a penalty of 10 years imprisonment
ss477.3 creates an offence of unauthorised impairment of electronic communication, also punishable •	
by 10 years imprisonment.
Division 478 – Other computer offences, also added by the Cybercrime Act, contains a number of less 
serious offences, punishable by two or three years imprisonment.
ss478.1 creates an offence of unauthorised access to, or modification of, restricted data; punishable •	
by two years imprisonment
ss478.2 creates an offence of unauthorised impairment of data held on a computer disk, etc; •	
punishable by two years imprisonment
ss478.3 creates an offence of possession or control of data with intent to commit a computer offence; •	
punishable by three years imprisonment
ss478.4 creates an offence of producing, supplying or obtaining data with intent to commit a •	
computer offence; punishable by three years imprisonment
ss480.4 creates an offence of dishonestly obtaining or dealing in personal financial information; •	
punishable by five years imprisonment
ss480.5 creates an offence of possession or control of thing with intent to dishonestly obtain or deal in •	
personal financial information; punishable by three years imprisonment
With some divergences, the Commonwealth model has been followed in a number of states and 
territories:
The Australian Capital Territory followed with the •	 Criminal Code 2002 (ACT), which incorporates both 
the Model Code computer offences and the general principles of criminal responsibility.
New South Wales added computer offences based on the Model Code provisions with its •	 Crimes 
Amendment (Computer Offences) Act 2001 (NSW), though it has not (yet) enacted the Model Code’s 
general principles of criminal responsibility and so the statutory offences must be interpreted largely 
against a common-law background (Steel 2002, Bronitt & Gani 2003).
In 2002 the Northern Territory also enacted new computer offences in its Criminal Code, based on the •	
Model Code provisions (Bronitt & Gani 2003).
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Victoria followed with its •	 Crimes (Property Damage and Computer Offences) Act 2003 (Vic), largely 
replicating the Model Code offences (Bronitt & Gani 2003).
Finally, South Australia introduced similar legislation the following year: •	 Statutes Amendment 
(Computer Offences) Act 2004 (SA), in force from 30 May 2004.
Recent Commonwealth telecommunications offences
Apart from its role in providing a model set of computer crime provisions for the states and territories, the 
Cybercrime Act 2001 significantly expanded the Commonwealth’s coverage of computer-related crime by 
using the constitutional power under s51(v) of the Constitution with respect to ‘postal, telegraphic, 
telephonic, and other like services’. 
The same constitutional power over the misuse of a carriage service, which effectively includes the 
internet, features in a range of new offences added to the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) by the Crimes 
Legislation Amendment (Telecommunications Offences and Other Measures) Act 2005 (Cth), which  
came into force on 6 July 2005. This added a new Part 10.6 to the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), 
containing new offences prohibiting the misuse of telecommunications networks for a range of illicit 
purposes, including:
with the intention of committing a serious offence (s474.14)•	
to make a threat (s474.15)•	
to make a hoax threat (s474.16)•	
to menace, harass or cause offence (s474.17)•	
to misuse an emergency call service (s474.18)•	
to access or transmit child pornography material (s474.19)•	
to possess, control, produce, supply or obtain child pornography material (s474.20)•	
to access or transmit child abuse material (s474.22)•	
to possess, control, produce, supply or obtain child abuse material (s474.23)•	
to procure a person under 16 years of age for sexual purposes (s474.26)•	
to groom a person under 16 years of age for sexual purposes (s474.27).•	
In addition, a new offence of using a carriage service for suicide related material was added by the 
Criminal Code Amendment (Suicide Related Material Offences) Act 2005 (Cth), with effect from  
6 January 2006.
The main elements of these offences, together with maximum penalties, are set out below (Table 2).
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Table 2:  Main telecommunications offences under Division 474 of the Criminal Code Act  
1995 (Cth)
Section and heading Main elements/defences Maximum penalty
474.4 Interception devices Unauthorised manufacture, sale, possession etc. of 
an interception device
Five years
474.5 Wrongful delivery of communications Causing a communication to be received by a 
person or service other than the person or service to 
whom it is directed
One year
474.6 Interference with facilities Interfering with facility owned by a carrier, carriage 
service provider
If the interference results in hindering normal service 
One year 
Two years 
474.7 Modification of a telecommunications 
device identifier
Unauthorised modification of or interference with a 
telecommunications device identifier
Two years
474.10 Copying subscription-specific 
secure data
Copying such data from an account identifier onto a 
new identifier, etc.
Two years
474.14 Using a telecommunications 
network with intent to commit a serious 
offence
Connecting to or using a telecommunications 
network with intention to commit or facilitate the 
commission of a serious offence under 
Commonwealth, state or territory or foreign law 
(carrying penalty of five years or more)
As for the serious offence
474.15 Using a carriage service to make a 
threat
Threat to kill
Threat to cause serious harm
10 years 
Seven years
474.16 Using a carriage service for a hoax 
threat
Intention of inducing false belief that explosive etc. 
has been left in any place
10 years
474.17 Using a carriage service to menace, 
harass or cause offence
Whether by method of use or content of 
communication, using a carriage service in a way 
that reasonable persons would regard as menacing, 
harassing or offensive
Three years
474.18 Improper use of emergency call 
service
Making false or vexatious calls to emergency 
services number
Three years
474.19 Using a carriage service for child 
pornography material
472.20 Possessing, controlling, producing, 
supplying or obtaining child pornography 
material for use through a carriage service
Intentional use of a carriage service, with 
recklessness as to the transmission etc. of child 
pornography material 
Defences of public benefit such as law enforcement 
and approved research uses are found in s474.21
10 years
474.22 Using a carriage service for child 
abuse material
472.23 Possessing, controlling, producing, 
supplying or obtaining child abuse material 
for use through a carriage service
Intentional use of a carriage service, with 
recklessness as to the transmission etc. of child 
abuse material 
Defences of public benefit such as law enforcement 
and approved research uses are found in s474.24
10 years
474.25 Obligations of internet service 
providers and internet content hosts
Must refer to Australian Federal Police details of any 
material that the ISP or ICH has reasonable grounds 
to believe is child pornography or child abuse 
material
100 penalty units ($11,000 
for an individual or $55,000 
for a corporation)
474.26 Using a carriage service to procure 
persons under 16 years of age
Transmitting a communication with intention of 
procuring a person under 16 for sexual activity
Defences as to belief in age of person etc. are found 
in s474.29
15 years
474.27 Using a carriage service to groom 
persons under 16 years of age
Transmitting a communication containing indecent 
material with intention of making it easier to procure 
a person under 16 for sexual activity
Defences as to belief in age of person etc. are found 
in s474.29
12 years
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Table 2: continued
Section and heading Main elements/defences Maximum penalty
474.29A Using a carriage service for 
suicide-related material
Using a carriage service to access, transmit, make 
available, publish or otherwise distribute material 
that directly or indirectly promotes or provides 
instruction on a particular method of committing 
suicide, intending that another person promote or 
provide instruction on the method or use the 
material to commit suicide
1000 penalty units 
($110,000 for an individual 
or $550,000 for a 
corporation)
Note: One penalty unit is equivalent to $110: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s4AA. The terms carriage service, telecommunications network, internet content 
host , internet service provider and interception device are as respectively defined in the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth), Telecommunications 
Act 1997 (Cth) and Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979 (Cth).
Source:  Compiled from legislative databases including AustLII: http://www.austlii.edu.au/ and Comlaw: http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ 
The drafting of some of these offences is notably broad. For example, s474.14, criminalises the use of  
a telecommunications network to commit a serious Commonwealth, state or territory (or even foreign) 
offence. The maximum punishment is as for the serious offence, which is defined to be any offence 
carrying a penalty of life imprisonment or five or more years. However, unlike s477.1 (discussed above), 
there is no requirement of unauthorised access, modification or impairment – thus, the use of the 
telecommunications network (including the internet) may be authorised and quite legal, but it is still an 
offence if this use is accompanied by an intention through this connection to commit a serious offence.
The explanatory memorandum to the Bill introducing s474.14 described its intended scope as follows:
Proposed subsection 474.14(1) will cover a broad range of preparatory activities that make use of 
telecommunications, undertaken with the intention to commit, or facilitate the commission of, a serious 
offence. Connected, as defined in proposed section 473.1, includes connection otherwise than by 
means of physical contact, for example connection by radiocommunication. This means the proposed 
offence extends to, for example, the wireless connection of a mobile phone or other device to a 
telecommunications network with the requisite intention, as well as the physical connection to a 
telecommunications network of, for example, network maintenance equipment, a telephone or a 
computer.
The proposed offence under subsection 474.14(2) will cover any use of equipment connected to a 
telecommunications network to commit, or facilitate the commission of, an offence. Examples of the type 
of conduct covered by the proposed offence range from the simple making of a telephone call to facilitate 
the commission of a bank robbery to the use of a computer connected to the Internet to electronically 
remove money from a financial institution’s computer system.
It can be expected that s474.14 will largely displace the need to use previously enacted unauthorised 
access offences such as s477.1, discussed above. With these new telecommunications offences, it is 
also likely that Commonwealth authorities will assume a more dominant role in the investigation and 
prosecution of cybercrime offences. For example, in March 2006, the AHTCC reported that a  
Melbourne man had been charged with botnet-related activities after a joint investigation by the  
AHTCC, the Australian Federal Police (AFP), and New South Wales and Victoria Police. Initial information 
was provided by the Belgian Federal Computer Crime Unit following a series of DDoS attacks on IRC 
servers in Australia, which also affected the United States Singapore and Austria. The suspect, a 22-year-
old male, faces charges under s474.14 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), which creates an offence of 
using a telecommunications network (such as the internet) with intention to commit a serious offence  
(AHTCC 2006).
Other offences in Part 10.6 are also capable of application to a range of conduct not previously covered 
by Commonwealth criminal law, such as child pornography and grooming, and racial vilification. These 
are discussed further below.
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Financial information offences
The Crimes Legislation Amendment (Telecommunications Offences and Other Measures) Act (No. 2) 
2004 (Cth) also added Part 10.8 – Financial information offences to the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). 
This contains a range of offences directed at dishonest dealings with personal financial information or use 
of devices (such as credit card skimmers) to obtain such information without consent. The term personal 
financial information means:
information relating to a person that may be used (whether alone or in conjunction with other 
information) to access funds, credit or other financial benefits.
Of these offences, s480.4 is broadly framed to apply where a person dishonestly obtains or deals in 
personal financial information without consent, punishable by imprisonment for five years. This offence 
would apply to phishing activities, as well as many other forms of identity theft or fraud. The offences 
under s480.5 and s480.6 respectively apply to possession or control and importation of devices such  
as credit card skimmers with the intention to dishonestly obtain or deal in personal financial information, 
punishable by imprisonment for three years.
Specific identity crime offences
Stolen, created or lent identities, obtained fraudulently or fabricated, have been used to facilitate other 
crimes such as frauds and terrorism. For example, in the 13 December 2001 terrorist attack on India’s 
parliament house complex in which eight security personnel, one civilian and five terrorists were killed, 
police recovered evidence showing that the laptop had been used to make forged identity cards found  
on the bodies of the terrorists who were killed in the attack:
Six fake identity cards purportedly issued by Xansa Websity, 37, Bungalow Road, New Delhi to 
different students with their address as 120-A, Adarsh Nagar, Delhi and the telephone number as 
9811489429. These identity cards were in the names of Anil Kumar, Raju Lal, Sunil Verma, Sanjay 
Koul, Rohail Sharma and Rohail Ali Shah (which were subsequently found to be fake names of the 
deceased terrorists) (State (N.C.T. of Delhi) v Navjot Sandhu (4 August 2005))
In another more recent example, Gregory A White of Strongsville, Ohio, allegedly ‘opened at least  
35 brokerage accounts via the [i]nternet at Ameritrade and E*Trade, using the names, Social Security 
account numbers, dates of birth and other personal identifying information of other individuals without 
their knowledge, using fraudulent Electronic Funds Transfers from various banks in the Cleveland area, 
and elsewhere’ (US DoJ 2007b). The indictment included allegations that 50 interstate Electronic Funds 
Transfers from various banks to Ameritrade and E*Trade totalling approximately US$3,348,000had been 
made.
Although some of the existing offences under Commonwealth, state and territory laws could be applied 
to identity-related crimes, only Queensland and South Australia currently have provisions that specifically 
criminalise such crime.
Section 408D of the Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) makes it an offence to obtain or deal with another 
entity’s identification information for the purpose of committing or facilitating the commission of an 
indictable offence; punishable by a maximum of three years imprisonment.
The following provisions in Part 5A of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) criminalise the 
following conduct:
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s144B makes it an offence to assume a false identity (including falsely pretending to have a particular •	
qualification or have, or be entitled to act in, a particular capacity) with the intent to commit, or 
facilitate the commission of, a serious criminal offence; punishable by a penalty appropriate to an 
attempt to commit the serious criminal offence
s144C makes it an offence to misuse personal identification information with the intent to commit,  •	
or facilitate the commission of, a serious criminal offence; punishable by a penalty appropriate to an 
attempt to commit the serious criminal offence
ss144D(1) makes it an offence to produce or has possession of prohibited material, with the intent  •	
to use the material, or to enable another person to use the material, for a criminal purpose; punishable 
by a maximum of three years imprisonment
ss144D(2) makes it an offence to sell (or offer for sale) or give (or offer to give) prohibited material to •	
another person, knowing that the other person is likely to use the material for a criminal purpose; 
punishable by a maximum of three years imprisonment
ss144D(3) makes it an offence to has possession of equipment for making prohibited material •	
intending to use it to commit an offence; punishable by a maximum of three years imprisonment.
The following provisions in the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth) 
could also be applied to identity crime.
s137 makes it an offence for a person to provide false or misleading documents; punishable by a •	
maximum of 10 years imprisonment or 10,000 penalty units, or both. 
ss138(1) makes it an offence for a person to make a false document with the intention that the person •	
or another will produce the false document in the course of an applicable customer identification 
procedure and the applicable customer identification procedure is under this Act; punishable by a 
maximum of 10 years imprisonment or 10,000 penalty units, or both.
ss138(3) makes it an offence for a person to knowingly possess a false document with the intention •	
that the person or another will produce it in the course of an applicable customer identification 
procedure; and the applicable customer identification procedure is under this Act; punishable by  
a maximum of 10 years imprisonment or 10,000 penalty units, or both.
ss138(5) makes it an offence for a person to possess equipment for making a false document •	
knowing that a device, material or other thing is designed or adapted for the making of a false 
document (whether or not the device, material or thing is designed or adapted for another purpose); 
and has the device, material or thing in his or her possession with the intention that the person or 
another person will use it to commit an offence against ss138(1); punishable by a maximum of 10 
years imprisonment or 10,000 penalty units, or both.
ss138(6) makes it an offence for a person to make or adapt a device, material or other thing; and •	
knows that the device, material or other thing is designed or adapted for the making of a false 
document (whether or not the device, material or thing is designed or adapted for another purpose); 
and makes or adapts the device, material or thing with the intention that the person or another person 
will use it to commit an offence against ss138(1); punishable by a maximum of 10 years imprisonment 
or 10,000 penalty units, or both. 
To ensure that crimes involving the criminal misuse of identity can be prosecuted in each jurisdiction,  
the Australian Government is considering the introduction of legislation that will criminalise activities 
associated with identity crime (e.g. identity theft and fraud), onselling of identity data, and possessing 
equipment to create identification information (MCLOC 2007).
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Cyberterrorism offences 
In addition to the main computer offence provisions discussed above, there are various other offences 
that may apply to the misuse of computers or criminality directed against telecommunications systems. 
For example, the main terrorism offence under Commonwealth law, s101.1 (Terrorist acts) of the Criminal 
Code Act 1995 (Cth), provides that a person who commits a terrorist act is liable to imprisonment for life. 
A terrorist act is defined in s100.1 (Terrorist acts) of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) – as inserted by the 
Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002 (Cth) – as an action or threat of action causing 
serious harm to persons or property, or endangering life or public safety, accompanied by the intention of 
advancing a political, religious or ideological cause, and done to intimidate an Australian or foreign 
government or the public. The Commonwealth definition of terrorist act was subsequently adopted by 
other states and territories, such as the Terrorism (Extraordinary Temporary Powers) Act 2006 (ACT),  
the Terrorism (Police Powers) Act 2002 (NSW) and the Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act (NT).
Of particular interest is the fact that this definition explicitly covers any act or threat that ‘seriously 
interferes with, seriously disrupts, or destroys, an electronic system including, but not limited to:
(i) an information system 
(ii) a telecommunications system 
(iii) a financial system
(iv) a system used for the delivery of essential government services 
(v) a system used for, or by, an essential public utility 
(vi) a system used for, or by, a transport system.’
Thus, cyberterrorism is covered by the terrorist offence provisions, at least insofar as sabotage of 
telecommunications and similar attacks are concerned. Such acts would fall within the definition of a 
terrorist act if accompanied by the requisite political or similar intentions, and would be punishable by life 
imprisonment under s101.1 (Terrorist acts) of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). In addition, there are 
provisions directed at the suppression of terrorist financing that may well apply predominantly to the 
online fund-raising activities of some groups (Urbas 2005).
Other terrorist offence provisions included in the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) (as amended by the 
Criminal Code Amendment (Terrorist Organisations) Act 2002 (Cth), the Criminal Code Amendment 
(Terrorism) Act 2003 (Cth), and the Anti-Terrorism Act 2005 (Cth)) include:
s101.2 makes it an offence to provide or receive training connected with terrorist acts; punishable by  •	
a minimum of 15 years imprisonment and a maximum of 25 years imprisonment
s101.4 makes it an offence to possess things connected with terrorist acts; punishable by a minimum •	
of 10 years imprisonment and a maximum of 15 years imprisonment
s101.5 makes it an offence to collect or make documents likely to facilitate terrorist acts; punishable •	
by a minimum of 10 years imprisonment and a maximum of 15 years imprisonment
s101.6 makes it an offence to do any act in preparation, or planning, terrorist acts; punishable by life •	
imprisonment
Each of the sections listed in one for which the jurisdiction is extended, by operation of s15.4 (extended 
geographical jurisdiction—category D) of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) to actions wherever they 
occur (not limited to Australia).
Although most terrorism offences are governed by Commonwealth legislation rather than by state and 
territory legislation, terrorism-related acts may constitute offences under existing state and territory law. 
For example, s310J of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) makes it an offence to be a member of a terrorist 
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organisation knowingly. The Terrorism (Police Powers) Act 2002 (NSW), amended by the Terrorism 
Legislation Amendment (Warrants) Act 2005 No. 54, provides powers for NSW police officers to prevent 
and investigate terrorist-related acts. 
Clear examples of cyberterrorism activities are rare, either in Australia and internationally, though any 
instance of technology-enabled crime that exposes vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure security 
indicates the potential for a cyberterrorist attack. An example is the case of Vitek Boden, who used 
wireless access to hack into a Queensland sewage system, causing millions of litres of untreated sewage 
to spill into rivers and parks: R v Boden [2002] QCA 164 (10 May 2002).
More likely, however, are aspects of planning or preparation for terrorist activities that involve some use of 
computer technology. In July 2006, Faheem Khalid Lodhi was convicted of offences including plotting in 
October 2003 to bomb the national electricity grid in the cause of violent jihad. Part of the prosecution 
case was that he had downloaded information including electricity grid maps from the internet. Lodhi was 
sentenced to 20 years in prison on 23 August 2006: Regina v Lodhi [2006] NSWSC 691 (23 August 
2006). Terrorists, for example, could simply use open-source geospatial information to plan attacks on 
military forces stationed overseas (Choo, Smith & McCusker 2007). Terrorists might have used information 
obtained from Google Earth™ to facilitate their planning of physical attacks against British troops in Iraq 
as recently reported:
[d]ocuments seized during raids on the homes of insurgents last week uncovered print-outs from 
photographs taken from Google. The satellite photographs show in detail the buildings inside the 
bases and vulnerable areas such as tented accommodation, lavatory blocks and where lightly armo[u]
red Land Rovers are parked (Harding 2007).
In another technology-enabled example, it was reported that:
from approximately 1997 through at least August 2004, British nationals Babar Ahmad, Syed Talha 
Ahsan, and others, through an organization based in London called Azzam Publications, are alleged to 
have conspired to provide material support and resources to persons engaged in acts of terrorism 
through the creation and use of various Internet Websites, email communications, and other means. 
One of the means Ahmad and his co-conspirators are alleged to have used in this effort was the 
management of various Azzam Publications websites, principally www.azzam.com <file:///\\www.
azzam.com>, which, along with associated administrative email accounts, were hosted for a period of 
time on the servers of a Web hosting company located in the state of Connecticut (US DoJ 2007d)
Intellectual property offences 
Criminal offences for intellectual property infringement are found in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) and 
Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth). Unlike some other countries, Australia does not have offences of patent 
infringement, design infringement, breach of confidence or circuit layouts infringement (Urbas 2000). 
There is also an infringement offence in s74 of the Plant Breeder’s Rights Act 1994 (Cth), punishable  
by a fine only (which appears to have never been used). 
Offences under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) include commercial dealings (such as making for sale or 
hire) an infringing article where it is known, or ought reasonably to be known, that the article is infringing 
(s132). Maximum penalties for most criminal copyright infringement offences are 550 penalty units and/or 
imprisonment for not more than five years, or five times this amount if the infringer is a corporation  
(1 penalty unit currently equals $110). The maximum monetary penalty increases to 850 penalty units 
where the article is infringing because it was made by converting a work or other subject matter from 
analog or hard copy into digital or machine-readable form (s132(6AA)). Thus, there is a premium for digital 
copyright infringement.
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Under amendments made by the Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000 (Cth), there are also 
offences relating to commercial dealings in broadcast decoding devices, with maximum penalties again 
reaching 550 penalty units and/or imprisonment for not more than five years (s135AS). The fault element 
for this category of offences includes recklessness as to whether a device will be used to gain 
unauthorised access to encoded broadcasts.
Factors determining whether a person has infringed Section 101 of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) are 
provided for in by ss36(1A) and ss101(1A) as follows:
the extent (if any) of the person’s power to prevent the doing of the act concerned•	
the nature of any relationship existing between the person and the person who did the act concerned•	
whether the person took any other reasonable steps to prevent or avoid the doing of the act, including •	
whether the person complied with any relevant industry codes of practice.
For there to be an infringement of the Act, the alleged infringing act(s) must be sufficiently connected to 
Australia as provided by ss36(1):
Subject to this Act, the copyright in a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work is infringed by a person 
who, not being the owner of the copyright, and without the licence of the owner of the copyright, does  
in Australia, or authorises the doing in Australia of, any act comprised in the copyright.
Penalties under the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) are somewhat lower (s149): 500 penalty units and/or 
imprisonment for not more than two years (again, a corporation may be fined five times this amount). 
Offences attracting this penalty include falsification of a registered trade mark in the course of trade 
(s145), and selling goods which are falsely marked (s148). The fault element is knowledge or recklessness 
as to the falsification.
There have been few prosecutions for criminal copyright or trademark infringement in Australia involving 
the use of computers or the internet, despite the apparently widespread activity of downloading copyright 
material such as films, music or software programs without permission of the right holder.
One case in 2003 concerned three students at the University of Technology, Sydney, who developed a •	
free music download website using the Motion Picture Expert Group 1, Audio Layer 3 (MP3) 
technology – MP3 WMA land – and made copyright material available on the site. The site was said to 
have received some seven million hits. The charges were heard in the Central Local Court in Sydney in 
December 2003, and all three were convicted, with two sentenced to prison terms of 18 months, 
suspended for three years, and 200 hours community service. The third was assessed as unsuitable 
for a community service order and was fined $5000 (HTCB no. 3).
In the case of •	 Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Cooper [2005] FCA 972 (14 July 2005), the Federal 
Court found that there had been an infringement of copyright by Stephen Cooper (MP3s4free.net), 
Camperdown-based ISP E-Talk Communications (trading as ComCen Internet Services), Liam Francis 
Bal (director of E-Talk/Com-Cen), and Chris Takoushis (employee of E-Talk/Com-Cen) for creating 
hyperlinks to third-party websites that had infringing sound recordings. In this particular case, the 
respondents neither stored nor distributed any infringing sound recordings.
It is also an offence to facilitate or circumvent access control technological protection measure under 
provisions in Divison 2A (Actions in relation to technological protection measures and electronic rights 
management information) of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth).
s116AN makes it an offence for a person to circumvent an access control technological protection •	
measure if (a) the work or other subject matter is protected by an access control technological 
protection measure; and (b) the person does an act that results in the circumvention of the access 
control technological protection measure; and (c) the person knows, or ought reasonably to know,  
that the act would have that result
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s116AO makes it an offence for a person to (i) manufacture a circumvention device for a technological •	
protection measure with the intention of providing it to another person; (ii) import such a device into 
Australia with the intention of providing it to another person; (iii) distribute the device to another 
person; (iv) offer the device to the public; (v) provide the device to another person; (vi) communicate 
the device to another person; and the person knows, or ought reasonably to know, that the device is 
a circumvention device for a technological protection measure; and the work or other subject matter is 
protected by the technological protection measure.
s116AP makes it an offence for a person to provide a service to another person; or offers a service to •	
the public; and the person knows, or ought reasonably to know, that the service is a circumvention 
service for a technological protection measure; and the work or other subject matter is protected by 
the technological protection measure.
For prosecutions involving circumvention devices, it is important to establish whether the copyright work 
was protected by a technological protection measure as illustrated in the case of Kabushiki Kaisha Sony 
Computer Entertainment v Stevens [2002] FCA 906 (26 July 2002). Mr Justice Sackville noted that
[o]n the evidence, I would have held that the chips installed by Mr Stevens had only a limited 
commercially significant use other than circumventing or facilitating the circumvention of the access 
code. Thus, if the access code had been a ‘technological protection measure’, the chips would have 
been circumvention devices. I would also have found that Mr Stevens sold or promoted (through 
advertisements in the Trading Post) the circumvention devices and that he knew that the devices 
would be used to circumvent or facilitate the circumvention of a technological protection measure.
A notable set of legal proceedings involving an Australian resident, though commenced by United States 
rather than Australian authorities, is the attempted extradition of an alleged internet software piracy 
ringleader in New South Wales. He is alleged to have taken a leading role in the global activities of the 
group DrinkOrDie which has been credited with well-publicised activities involving cracking (i.e. stripping 
of technological anti-copying protections) and distribution of commercial computer software (Hayes 
2006). Federal Court appeals against extradition have been unsuccessful, and the High Court has refused 
special leave to appeal: see United States of America v Griffiths [2004] FCA 879 (7 July 2004); Griffiths v 
United States of America [2005] FCAFC 34 (10 March 2005); and Griffiths v United States of America & 
Anor [2005] HCA Trans 666 (2 September 2005). He was extradited from Australia to the United States in 
February 2007 (US DoJ 2007f) and pleaded guilty in April 2007 before U.S. District Judge Claude M. 
Hilton to one count of conspiracy to commit criminal copyright infringement and one count of criminal 
copyright infringement (US DoJ 2007c). On 22 June 2007, Griffiths was sentenced to 51 months 
imprisonment (US DoJ 2007d).
Spam provisions
Spam is the electronic equivalent of junk mail which is unsolicited, usually sent in bulk transmissions of 
thousands or even millions of messages at a time, and significantly impedes the flow of legitimate internet 
traffic around the world. As at April 2005, the spam statistical report released by Symantec (2005) 
indicated that 61 percent of global email is identified as spam. Spam is facilitated by the automated 
harvesting of email addresses from websites, email accounts and – to an increasingly significant extent – 
by spyware and botnets. The unavailability of a major botnet was suspected to have attributed to a 
significant 30 percent drop in the number of spam emails detected in the first week of January 2007 
(Broersma 2007). Some spam advertises harmless though usually unwanted products such as personal 
finance or consumer goods, but some offers adult products and pornography (McCusker 2005).
Because this type of content is unsolicited and is often offensive, internet regulators and legislators have 
begun to place controls on spam activity, such as the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth) and the 
Spam Act 2003 (Cth).
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Schedule 5 of the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth) allows Australian residents, body corporations 
that carry on activities in Australia; or the Commonwealth, a state or a territory to register their complaints 
on the website of the Australian Communications and Media Authority (https://web.acma.gov.au/secure/
complaint_form.htm) about prohibited or potentially prohibited contents (including spam) hosted on the 
internet. For prohibited content hosted in Australia, the relevant internet content host (ICH) will be liable 
for a maximum penalty per day of A$5,500 for an individual and A$27,500 per day for a corporation if the 
ICH fails to comply with a take-down notice by the Australian Communications and Media Authority 
(ACMA 2007).
The Spam Act 2003 (Cth), in force from 10 April 2004 and subsequently amended by the Australian 
Communications and Media Authority (Consequential and Transitional Provisions) Act 2005 (Cth), which 
makes it an offence, punishable by civil penalties such as large fines, to send bulk unsolicited email in 
Australia or to Australian recipients. In one of the first cases to be brought under the Spam Act 2003 (Cth), 
the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) obtained declaratory orders against a Perth-
based business, Clarity1 Pty Ltd, that sent over 200 million unsolicited commercial electronic messages to 
email addresses that had allegedly been harvested using automated software: Australian Communications 
and Media Authority v Clarity1 Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 410 (13 April 2006). A fine of A$5.5 million was imposed 
(Australian Communications and Media Authority v Clarity1 Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 1399 (27 October 2006), 
Lebihan 2006). The Spam Act 2003 (Cth) does not, however, apply to the extent (if any) that it would infringe 
any constitutional doctrine of implied freedom of political communication (Spam Act 2003 (Cth), s44).
The Spam Act 2003 (Cth) also applies to unsolicited commercial messages sent using short message 
services (SMS) and multimedia messaging services (MMS). In 2005, two Australian companies – Global 
Racing Group Pty Ltd and Australian SMS Pty Ltd – were fined A$11,000 and A$2,200 respectively for 
sending unsolicited commercial SMS messages, breaching the Act (ACMA 2005).
The following provisions under the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) may also criminalise spam-related activities 
(DCITA 2006: 15).
s477.1 makes it an offence for a person to illegally access a computer and use the computer to send •	
spam without authorisation, which resulted in the impairment of electronic communication to or from a 
computer (due to the spam activities).
s477.2 makes it an offence for a person to illegally access a computer and use the computer to send •	
spam without authorisation through third party servers – a typical case in many spoofing attacks. 
Some other countries have enacted criminal offences to counteract spamming (e.g. the Spam Control Act 
2007 read in the parliament of Singapore on February 2007 and passed in parliament on 12 April 2007). 
In the United States, several prosecutions have resulted in convictions under the Controlling the Assault of 
Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing (CAN-SPAM) Act, which went into effect on 1 January 2004. 
Within a month of the CAN-SPAM Act’s commencement in 2004, the Federal Trade Commission had 
identified two large-scale spammers from consumer complaints detailing massive numbers of unsolicited 
messages offering such products as diet patches. Subsequent litigation resulted in settlements including 
prohibitions on further spamming activity. In one case, the defendant company was based in Australia, 
and was ordered to disgorge over US$2 million in illicit profits from spamming activities offering human 
growth hormone products (FTC Media release 20 September 2005).
Cyberstalking and harassment offences
A phenomenon that emerged fairly early with the adoption of the internet and email for personal 
communication was the misuse of these media for stalking or harassing others. Activities such as 
obsessively collecting information about a person, sending a person unwanted communications, posting 
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offensive information about a person on the internet, or even hacking into a person’s computer to harass 
them, can all constitute criminal acts under stalking legislation in Australian states and territories (Ogilvie 
2000).
Because the internet spans the globe, it is possible to stalk a person far removed from one’s physical 
location. This has led to some jurisdictional complications in applying the law. For example, in DPP v 
Sutcliffe [2001] VSC 43, the Victorian Supreme Court held that a Melbourne man accused of stalking an 
actress in Canada by means including email was subject to prosecution under s21A of the Crimes Act 
1958 (Vic), which has since been amended to make clear that it extends to cyberstalking which crosses 
jurisdictional boundaries (Maury 2004).
Misuse of the internet to stalk or harass others may also be dealt with under provisions relating to 
offensive communications. For example, s474.17 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) creates an offence 
of using a carriage service to menace, harass or cause offence, which means using the carriage service in 
such a way (whether by the method of use or the content of a communication, or both) that reasonable 
persons would regard as being, in all the circumstances, menacing, harassing or offensive. This provision 
can be applied to such uses of the internet as the posting of pornographic, defamatory or racist material 
on websites.
This potential application of the telecommunications offences marks a departure from the coverage of 
Commonwealth law for many years, which offered only an administrative (non-criminal) complaint 
mechanism under the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) in regard to racist publications including on the 
internet: see, for example, Jones v Toben [2002] FCA 1150; appeal at Toben v Jones [2003] FCAFC 137. 
The potential application of s474.14, which carries a maximum penalty of three years imprisonment, was 
recognised in the explanatory memorandum to the Bill:
Examples of the type of use of a carriage service the proposed offence may cover include use that 
would make a person apprehensive as to their safety or well-being or the safety of their property, use 
that encourages or incites violence, and use that vilifies persons on the basis of their race or religion.
The new offence in s474.29A of using a carriage service for suicide related material, added by the 
Criminal Code Amendment (Suicide Related Material Offences) Act 2005 (Cth) with effect from 6 January 
2006, may also apply to material or discussion that would be regarded as objectionable or offensive by 
many members of the community.
Existing legislation in some jurisdictions criminalises the use of ICT to stalk or harass others – 
cyberstalking – as described in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Summary of cyberstalking offences in Australian states and territories
Provision Maximum penalty
ACT Crimes Act 1900, s35 Five years imprisonment if (i) the offence involved a contravention of an 
injunction or other order made by a court; or (ii) the offender was in possession 
of an offensive weapon; two years imprisonment otherwise.
Qld Criminal Code Act 1899, s359B Seven years imprisonment if, for any of the acts constituting the unlawful 
stalking, the person (a) uses or intentionally threatens to use, violence against 
anyone or anyone’s property; or (b) possesses a weapon within the meaning of 
the Weapons Act 1990; or (c) contravenes or intentionally threatens to 
contravene an injunction or order imposed or made by a court or tribunal under 
a law of the Commonwealth or a state; five years imprisonment otherwise.
NT Criminal Code Act, ss189 Five years imprisonment if (i) the person’s conduct contravened a condition of 
bail or an injunction or order imposed by a court (either under a law of the 
Commonwealth, the territory, a state or another territory of the Commonwealth); 
or (ii) the person was, on any occasion to which the charge relates, in the 
possession of an offensive weapon; two years imprisonment otherwise.
SA Criminal Law Consolidation Act 
1935, s19AA
Five years imprisonment for an aggravated offence or three years imprisonment 
for a basic offence.
Tas Criminal Code Act 1924, s192 Except in capital cases, all sentences are left to the discretion of the judge of the 
court of trial, who may in any case impose a sentence of imprisonment up to 21 
years (Blackwood & Warner 1993).
Criminal Code Act 1924, s454 states that: except as is otherwise expressly 
provided, references in any enactment to a sentence of imprisonment passed 
on any person for a term not less than or exceeding a specified term are to be 
construed as including references to a sentence of imprisonment passed on 
that person for the term of his or her natural life.
Vic Criminal Code Act 1958, s21A 10 years imprisonment.
Source:  Compiled from legislative databases including http://www.legislation.act.gov.au/ and http://www.nt.gov.au/dcm/legislation/current.html
Child exploitation and grooming offences
Australian states and territories have had obscenity and, more recently, child exploitation (e.g. child abuse 
materials and child pornography) laws for many years. Examples include: 
Schedule 5 of the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth) allows Australian residents, corporations that 
carry on activities in Australia; the Commonwealth, a state or a territory to register complaints 
concerning prohibited or potentially prohibited content (including child pornography) hosted on the 
internet on the website of the Australian Communications and Media Authority  
(http://www.acma.gov.au/WEB/STANDARD//pc=PC_90103).
Subsection 233BAB(1)(h) of the Customs Act 1901 (Cth) prohibits the importation of items of child 
pornography or of child abuse material. On 1 August 2007, a visitor from the United Kingdom was 
arrested and charged with importing prohibited goods in contravention of Regulation 4A of the 
Customs (Prohibited Imports) Regulations 1956 (Cth) and Section 233BAB of the Customs Act 1901 
(Cth) for possessing images depicting child pornography in his laptop computer (Australian Customs 
Service 2007a). In another more recent case, Bao Peng Lim, a 22 year-old Australian man, was fined 
A$9,000 after being convicted in Perth Magistrates Court on 13 August 2007 for smuggling child 
pornography (Australian Customs Service 2007b). 
State and territory child pornography laws vary considerably, as do the resources available for their 
enforcement by police and other agencies (HTCB no. 2 and no. 8; Forde & Patterson 1998). This can be 
an impediment to national and international investigations, which have emerged as particularly important 
in disrupting global paedophile networks that operate with a degree of anonymity through internet chat 
rooms (Grant, David & Grabosky 1997; Krone 2005b).
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Commonwealth telecommunications offences include both child pornography and child abuse material 
offences in ss474.19 – 474.25, and child procuring and grooming offences in ss474.26 – 474.29. 
Notably, the definition of a child for the purposes of these provisions varies, with the Commonwealth 
provisions defining child abuse material and child pornography material as involving the depiction of a 
person who ‘is, or appears to be, under 18 years of age’, while the procuring and grooming provisions 
relate to a recipient of communications ‘who is, or who the sender believes to be, under 16 years of age’.
In some jurisdictions, it is a separate offence to use ICT to procure or to groom children for the purposes 
of sexual contact (i.e. procuring offences cover the use of the internet to facilitate a meeting during which 
the child recipient is intended to engage in sexual conduct with the sender, another adult or another child 
in the presence of the sender or another adult, and grooming offences cover the sending of an indecent 
communication to a child with the intention of making it easier to procure the recipient to engage in sexual 
activity, or making it more likely that the child will engage in or submit to sexual activity with the sender or 
another person), as described in Table 4. It is notable that no real child need be involved in the 
commission of this offence, which allows investigators to go online posing as a child (HTCB no. 8). 
Successful prosecutions of cases involving covert sting operations have also been recorded in other 
countries such as the United States (e.g. see US DoJ 2007g). 
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Table 4:  Offences relating to the use of ICT to procure or to groom children for the purposes 
of sexual contact
Jurisdiction Provision Maximum penalty
Definition of a child or 
young person by age
Cth Criminal Code Act 1995, s474.26: Using 
a carriage service to procure persons 
under 16 years of age
15 years imprisonment Under 16 years of age
Criminal Code Act 1995, s474.27: Using 
a carriage service to “groom” persons 
under 16 years of age
12 years imprisonment (15 years 
imprisonment if ss474.27(3) applies)
Under 16 years of age
NSW Crimes Act 1900 (as amended by 
Crimes Amendment (Sexual 
Procurement or Grooming of Children) 
Bill 2007 on 28 November 2007),  
s66EB: Procuring or grooming child 
under 16 for unlawful sexual activity
ss66EB(2)(a): 15 years imprisonment Under 14 years of age
ss66EB(2)(b): 12 years imprisonment Under 16 years of age
ss66EB(3)(a): 12 years imprisonment Under 14 years of age
ss66EB(3)(b): 10 years imprisonment Under 16 years of age
ACT Crimes Act 1900, s66: Using the Internet 
etc to deprave young people
ss66(1): Ten years imprisonment (five 
years imprisonment if this is the first 
offence)
Under 16 years of age
ss66(3): 100 penalty units, five years 
imprisonment or both
Under 16 years of age
Qld Criminal Code Act 1899, s218A: Using 
internet etc. to procure children under 16 
ss218A(1): Five years imprisonment Under 16 years of age
ss218A(2): 10 years imprisonment Under 12 years of age
NT Criminal Code Act, s131: Attempts to 
procure child under 16 years
ss131(1): Three years imprisonment Under 16 years of age
ss131(2): Five years imprisonment Under 16 years of age
Criminal Code Act, s132: Indecent 
dealing with child under 16 years
ss132(2): 10 years imprisonment Under 16 years of age
ss132(4): 14 years imprisonment Under 10 years of age
SA Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935,  
s63B: Procuring child to commit 
indecent act etc.
ss63B(1)(a) and ss63B(3)(a): 10 years 
imprisonment
Under 16 years of age
ss63B(1)(b) and ss63B(3)(b): 12 
years imprisonment
Under 12 years of age
Tas Criminal Code Act 1924, s125D: 
Communications with intent to procure 
person under 17 years, etc.
No statutory maximum penalty -- at 
the discretion of the court with a 
maximum of 21 years imprisonment 
(House of Assembly Hansard 2005)
Under 17 years of age
WA Criminal Code: s204B: Using electronic 
communication to procure, or expose to 
indecent matter, children under 16
ss204B(2): Five years imprisonment Under 16 years of age
ss204B(3): 10 years imprisonment Under 13 years of age
Source: Compiled from legislative databases including (Cth) http://www.comlaw.gov.au/, (ACT) http://www.legislation.act.gov.au/, (Qld) http://www.
legislation.qld.gov.au/OQPChome.htm, (NT) http://www.nt.gov.au/dcm/legislation/current.html, (SA) http://www.legislation.sa.gov.au/index.aspx, (Tas) 
http://www.thelaw.tas.gov.au/index.w3p, (WA) http://www.slp.wa.gov.au/statutes/swans.nsf, and (NSW) http://www.legislation.nsw.gov.au/
Commonwealth legislation can be and has been used to prosecute persons in jurisdictions with no 
specific provision to criminalise online child procurement or child grooming. For example, Richard Gerard 
Meehan was charged with one count of using a carriage service to transmit communications to a person 
under 16 years of age with the intention of procuring that person to engage in sexual activity, contrary to 
ss474.26(1) of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), in the Victorian County Court. On 21 July 2006, Meehan 
was sentenced to 24 months imprisonment, to be released after serving three months of that term in the 
Victorian County Court (Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions 2006, SMH 2006).
In the first investigation under s218A of the Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) after it came into effect on  
1 May 2003, Queensland investigators posed as a 13 year-old girl (becky_boo 13) in an internet relay  
chat room and received emails from a man wanting to engage the girl in sexual activity. They arrested  
a 25 year-old man when he appeared at an agreed meeting point to meet the girl, only to find that he had 
been chatting to police all along. After a guilty plea, the defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for 
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two and a half years, suspended after having served nine months. This was reduced on appeal to an 
18-month term, suspended from the time of the appeal, the defendant having already served 90 days in 
custody (R v Kennings [2004] QCA 162).
In another Queensland case, however, in which police posed as a 14-year old (Kathy_volleyball), a 
conviction under s218A was overturned on appeal on the basis that the provision requires that the 
defendant believed that the person being contacted was under the age of 16 years. In this case, the 
defendant had given evidence that he had held no belief as to the age of Kathy_volleyball, and the Court of 
Appeal held that the jury had been misdirected on the application of s218A(8), which provides that evidence 
that a person (real or fictitious) was represented as being below a certain age is, in the absence of evidence 
to the contrary, proof that the adult believed the person was under that age: R v Shetty [2005] QCA 225  
(24 June 2005). A retrial returned a verdict of acquittal in September 2006.
As noted in Table 3, the Commonwealth has recently enacted similar offences relating to child procuring and 
grooming as part of the recent telecommunications offences added to the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth): 
s474.26 and s474.27. As with the Queensland offence, there is no requirement that a person under the age 
of 16 years actually be the target of procuring activity. Further provisions relating to these offences are 
contained in s474.28 and defences are contained in s474.29 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth).
The explanatory memorandum to the Bill introducing these child grooming provisions stated:
Proposed sections 474.26 - 474.29 contain an offence regime targeting adult offenders who exploit 
the anonymity of telecommunications services (for example, the Internet) to win the trust of a child as  
a first step towards the future sexual abuse of that child. The practice is known as ‘online grooming’. 
There are two steps routinely taken by adult offenders leading up to a real life meeting between adult 
and child victim that results in child sexual abuse:
(i) The adult wins the trust of a child over a period of time. Adults often use ‘chat rooms’ on the Internet 
to do this. They may pose as another child, or as a sympathetic ‘parent’ figure. Paedophiles reportedly 
expose children to pornographic images as part of this ‘grooming’ process. It is proposed to 
specifically criminalize this practice. Specific offences would remove any doubt about whether online 
‘grooming’ of a child before actual contact is ‘mere preparation’ (i.e. not a criminal offence) or an 
unlawful attempt to commit child sexual abuse.
(ii) With the child’s trust won, adults often use telecommunications services to set up a meeting with 
the child. Although this step is more likely to be characterised as an attempt to commit child sexual 
abuse than step (i), it is desirable to provide a firm justification for police action by enacting specific 
‘procurement’ or ‘solicitation’ offences. This is consistent with the underlying rationale for the new 
offences: to allow law enforcement to intervene before a child is actually abused.
Recent instances in which individuals have been charged under Commonwealth, state or territory 
grooming provisions suggest that they provide a valuable tool for early intervention in child exploitation 
activity. For example, a man was charged in March 2007 with ‘child grooming offences after explicit 
photographs and messages were allegedly sent to a teenage boy in the United States via the internet’ 
(NSW Police 2007).
Possession of child pornography has been one of the most frequently prosecuted computer-related 
crimes in recent years (see Smith, Grabosky & Urbas 2004). Recent cases include the arrest of a  
21-year-old Manoora in Queensland and a 46-year-old Leonay in Western Sydney man, both with 
possessing child pornography material, contrary to s228D of the Queensland Criminal Code  
and s91H (3) of the Crimes Act 1900 respectively (AFP 2007). 
The internet has created a number of issues in relation to what now constitutes possession. Traditionally  
a person must have possessed a magazine or a physical photograph that involved child pornography to 
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have committed the offence of possession, but with the use of the internet questions have arisen 
concerning when a person takes possession of images. For example, does the mere act of browsing or 
viewing such material on a computer constitute the act of possession? As Mr Justice Kennedy observed 
in Jones (1999) 108 A Crim R 50 at 51:
In recent times the insidious impact of child pornography has come to be better understood. The 
problem is an international one, which has been significantly aggravated with the advent of the  
[i]nternet.
In determining what constitutes possession, the appeal court in Director of Public Prosecutions v Kear 
[2006] NSWSC 1145 (9 October 2006) NSWSC 1145 examined the question of whether by viewing the 
images the defendant was in possession of a ‘film’ that would, if classified, be categorised as ‘refused 
classification’ under the Classification (Publications, Films and Computer Games) Act 1995 (Cth). The 
case arose out of Operation Auxin, an international police investigation into the purchase of rights to 
access child pornography by internet users. This accused in this case had subscribed to the internet 
website and browsed the site, but had made no identifiable attempt to save the particular material, 
although it was saved in an independent manner as part of the internet browser application to the internet 
cache.
The appeal court explained its finding that the defendant did not have possession of the image as follows:
(1) Jpeg file in temporary Internet cache a ‘film’ for purposes of s 578B Crimes Act (NSW)
The question of whether there was evidence to support the charge was a question of law alone though 
it involved consideration of the meaning of the word film in the section that defines the word for the 
purposes of s 578B Crimes Act (NSW). ‘[F]or the purpose of s 578B a “film” includes “a 
cinematograph,......,and any other form of recording from which a visual image, including a computer 
generated image can be produced”. It is also clear that a “computer generated image” is not a film: it 
is a visual image that is produced from a “film”. A computer generated image is “an image...produced 
by use of a computer monitor......from electronically recorded data”. Therefore, it is the “electronically 
recorded data” in the computer that amounts to a “film” for the purposes of the section.’ ‘‘’[T]he 
electronically recorded data” that produced the ”computer generated image” viewed by the defendant 
was the jpeg file’ sent by the [Allxboys website to the defendant’s computer when he clicked on a 
page and then on an image to view the image(s) on that web page. Before the thumbnail of the image 
or its enlarged version could be viewed] the relevant jpeg file had to be sent to the defendant’s 
computer and stored automatically in the temporary Internet cache. It was the jpeg file, transmitted to 
and stored in the defendant’s computer that created the image that he viewed on the monitor…..[W]
hat the defendant viewed on the monitor was a ”computer generated image”. The jpeg file in the 
temporary Internet cache was a ”film” [for the purposes of s 578B Crimes Act] because it was a ”form 
of recording from which … a computer generated image can be produced”.’ While the defendant had 
film(s) stored on one of his computer hard drives, he did not possess the film(s) because he was 
unaware of their existence. ‘[A] “film” must be a recording. … [A] store of information for subsequent 
reproduction’ irrespective of whether its storage is temporary or permanent…. ‘If the information is not 
stored, there is no recording of the information. .. [the information] when viewed by the defendant on 
the monitor was… merely the retrieval or reproduction of material stored in the jpeg file in the 
temporary Internet cache.’
(2) Visual images on monitor did not amount to a recording and defendant’s viewing of them 
insufficient to found charge of possession
The magistrate’s finding that a film under s578B Crimes Act did not include a jpeg file was incorrect. 
His Honour was however correct in ‘finding that the visual image on the monitor was not itself a 
recording’. On this basis, when the defendant viewed the images he was not ‘by that activity alone  
in possession of a recording.’
4 
Jurisdictional, prosecution  
and sentencing issues
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Jurisdictional issues
Traditionally, courts have accepted jurisdiction if a person against whom legal proceedings are brought is 
physically present in the geographical territory (i.e. country or state) in which the court operates, is a 
citizen of the territory, or if there is some other sufficient ‘territorial nexus’. Such a connection might arise  
if the alleged victim of a crime is in the territory, or some other effect of the crime sufficient to exercise 
jurisdiction is present. For crimes involving physical acts, rules of jurisdiction have largely been relatively 
easy to apply, but the situation is more complicated for online activity.
When a person goes online, he or she may be physically located in country A, using computing networks 
located in country B, sending signals that are routed through country C, and reaching recipients that are 
located in country D, who may reply to the sender in country A and so on. For example, in one incident, 
Romanian hackers sent an email to the South Pole Research Centre, demanding money with the threat 
that they would otherwise send details of life-support systems and other data found on the Antarctic 
facilities’ server to another country to expose their vulnerability. The email was traced to a Bucharest 
internet cafe and two locals were arrested (FBI 2003a).
There have been numerous similar cases involving online fraud, theft of funds, destruction of data, 
stalking, harassment, ransom and defamation – all committed across jurisdictional borders by means  
of the internet.
Most computer-related offences under Australian law are governed by legislation that specifies the 
applicable type of jurisdiction. For Commonwealth computer crimes such as the telecommunications 
offences and other computer offences in the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), the specified category is 
extended geographical jurisdiction – category A. This means that a person can be prosecuted in Australia 
for online conduct if:
the conduct occurred wholly or partly in Australia•	
the conduct occurred wholly or partly on board an Australian ship or aircraft•	
the conduct occurred outside Australia but a result of the conduct occurred in Australia or on board •	
an Australian ship or aircraft
the person is an Australian citizen or a corporation incorporated in Australia•	
the offence is ancillary to another offence which is related to or intended to occur in Australia  •	
(e.g. attempt or conspiracy).
For some other offences that can be committed using computers, other categories of jurisdiction apply. 
For example, in Chapter 3.6 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), the definition of terrorist act includes 
certain types of attack on information, telecommunications, financial and transport systems, but the 
applicable category is extended geographical jurisdiction – category D, which applies:
whether or not the conduct occurs in Australia•	
whether or not a result of the conduct occurs in Australia.•	
Thus, online offending that constitutes cyberterrorism can be prosecuted under Australian law irrespective 
of where it occurs, though of course this is unlikely to occur unless Australian citizens or interests are fairly 
directly affected (Urbas 2005).
Because online offending transcends borders so easily, numerous territories can simultaneously assert 
jurisdiction. This leads to the necessity of choosing the most appropriate forum for proceedings. This 
choice can have important consequences due to the different legal systems and penalties that apply in 
different countries. In a recent online defamation case (Dow Jones v Gutnick (2002) 210 CLR 575), the 
High Court of Australia ruled that a plaintiff in Victoria was able to sue publishers based in the United 
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States because the publication of allegedly defamatory material occurred where the articles were 
downloaded from the internet, rather than where it was uploaded to the publisher’s server. This meant 
that the defamation law of Victoria applied, rather than the more constitutionally circumscribed defamation 
law applying in the defendants’ home state (Beyer 2004).
Another consequence of cross-border online offending is that the jurisdiction in which harm has occurred 
may seek the extradition of an alleged perpetrator from elsewhere. The availability of extradition depends 
on the agreements that countries make, either bilaterally or as signatories to international conventions 
relating to particular areas of criminality (e.g. drug trafficking, money laundering, terrorist activity and 
financing). Australia is signatory to numerous such agreements, and extradition requests have been 
received in relation to persons said to have been involved in online copyright infringement of software  
(US DoJ 2003). Conversely, Australia may also request the extradition from other countries of persons 
who have committed acts online that adversely affect Australian citizens or interests. 
Cross-border cooperation
In Australia, as elsewhere, there are two basic forms of international cooperation relating to technology-
enabled crime. The first, which might be termed investigator-to-investigator assistance, occurs on an 
informal basis. Under these circumstances, investigators share information and provide assistance to 
each other, without reliance on legislation. Such means are appropriate where the information sought is 
publicly available.
Australia is a member of Interpol, and the AFP has liaison offices in over 30 countries around the world. 
Interpol facilitates police-to-police assistance and cooperation even where diplomatic relations do not 
exist between particular countries. The AHTCC hosts a 24/7 network of contacts, enabling nations to 
alert each other in real time to urgent matters. These arrangements, which allow for a fast freeze, slow 
thaw process for the preservation of volatile electronic evidence, have been established pursuant to the 
Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime. The 24/7 arrangements are available not only to formal 
signatories to the convention, but also to sympathetic non-signatory states. Although not a signatory to 
the convention, Australia has formally signed on to these arrangements.
Australia also has a formal regime for mutual assistance in criminal matters, which is governed by the 
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987 (Cth). Formal mutual assistance is invoked when the 
matter in question entails compulsory powers such as the execution of a search warrant in the requested 
country, or the extradition of a suspect to the requesting country (Cuthbertson 2001).
While formal mutual assistance can be requested of any country (even in the absence of diplomatic 
relations), it is usually easier when prior treaty arrangements are in place. Australia has bilateral mutual 
assistance treaties with 25 countries as of May 2007. However, the machinery of formal mutual 
assistance is usually fairly slow. Requests must be processed through a central office in both requesting 
and requested countries, and usually requires approval at a ministerial or other high official level.
Extradition into and out of Australia is governed by the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth). When an individual 
situated in Australia commits, or has committed, an offence against a person or institution located in a 
foreign country, formal extradition machinery may be invoked by the making of an extradition request.  
to satisfy the criterion of dual criminality, the alleged misconduct must constitute an offence under both 
foreign and Australian law.
A recently commenced review of Australia’s mutual assistance and extradition legislation by the Australian 
Government Attorney-General’s Department noted that reforms may be required to deal with increasingly 
sophisticated forms of transnational crime, including technology-enabled crime (AGD 2005):
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Crimes committed with or against computers or communications systems are increasing rapidly and 
traditional crimes such as money laundering and the trafficking of drugs and firearms are being 
facilitated by new technology.
Although to date, there are no examples of Australians having been extradited overseas, or persons 
extradited to Australia, in relation to offences that could be characterised as technology-enabled crimes, 
a British national living in Australia, Hew Raymond Griffiths, has been extradited from Australia to the 
United States to face criminal charges in connection with operating the internet software piracy group, 
DrinkOrDie (US DoJ 2007f). The AHTCC has also been working collaboratively with overseas law 
enforcement agencies in identifying and investigating technology-enabled cases.
Framing appropriate charges
Police and prosecutors usually have some discretion with respect to the most appropriate charges that 
might be brought against suspects involved in technology-enabled crimes. Two types of difficulty can 
arise:
the absence of appropriate offences in legislation•	
the possibility that several charges may be appropriate which leads to choices having to be made •	
between competing charges.
The first problem is exemplified by early cases in which no computer-related offence provisions existed to 
prosecute a suspect. For example, in the case of R v Whiteley [1991] 93 Cr App R 25, an early English 
hacking case, a defendant was prosecuted under the Criminal Damage Act 1971 (UK) and was convicted 
on charges of damaging property. However, he appealed on the basis that unauthorised access to 
computer data did not itself constitute damage to tangible property – a requirement as the legislation 
defined property to mean property of a tangible nature. What had arguably been damaged, through the 
modification and erasure of some files, was information – but this is traditionally not classed as property 
for the purposes of offences such as theft or damage.
The appellate court in R v Whiteley carefully considered the arguments and applicable legislation, and was 
able to uphold the conviction on the basis that the statute required damage to tangible property, not that 
it required the damage itself to be tangible. In this case, there had been damage to tangible property (the 
disks) by way of unauthorised rearrangement of the magnetic particles on them, even though that might 
not have amounted to tangible damage. Moreover, it did not matter that the damage caused could only 
be perceived by operation of the computer to inspect the files, as opposed to physical inspection of the 
computer.
Similarly, in relation to the infamous Love Bug computer virus (or more accurately, virus/worm 
combination) which appeared in Hong Kong in 2000 and rapidly spread throughout the world’s computer 
networks infecting both business and government computer networks, the problem of lack of appropriate 
offence provisions arose. Experts quickly identified the Philippines as the likely source of the code, and an 
investigation by the Philippines National Bureau of Investigation assisted by United States Federal Bureau 
of Investigation agents produced a suspect, a former computer science student. Warrants for a search of 
premises and computer equipment were executed, and enough evidence emerged for the suspect to be 
charged.
However, the prosecution encountered difficulties in selecting appropriate offences under Philippine law, 
as there was no existing offence of disseminating harmful computer viruses. The closest available 
offences involved theft and credit card fraud, but these were dismissed in subsequent legal proceedings 
as inapplicable and unfounded. Moreover, the double-criminality requirement for extradition was also not 
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satisfied, meaning that the suspect could not be prosecuted in jurisdictions such as the United States 
which did have applicable computer crime laws.
Complicity in technology-enabled crimes
Complicity in technology-enabled crimes may arise in the following forms:
aiding and abetting – active assistance or encouragement of a crime by a person who is physically •	
present at its commission.
counselling or procuring – active encouragement of a crime before it occurs.•	
assisting escape or destroying evidence – acts after an offence has been committed which are •	
intended to help the perpetrator avoid detection or capture.
All Australian jurisdictions have statutory provisions embodying these types of complicity, and the general 
rule is that an aider and abettor or other accessory may be punished as though a principal offender. 
Supplementing these provisions are common-law doctrines such as acting in concert, according to which 
two or more offenders who agree to commit a crime and are present at its commission are jointly liable as 
principals, and common purpose, which extends the scope of this liability to criminal acts which were not 
necessarily agreed at the outset but were foreseen as possible outcomes of the joint criminal enterprise. 
Even where an agreement to engage in criminal activity is not carried out or is prevented, those involved 
may be guilty of crimes of conspiracy (Bronitt & McSherry 2005).
The complicity provisions applicable to technology-enabled crimes prosecuted under Commonwealth 
laws are those contained in Part 2.4 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). In particular, s11.2 provides that 
a person who aids, abets, counsels or procures the commission of an offence by another person is taken 
to have committed that offence and is punishable accordingly. Subsection (2) provides:
For the person to be guilty: 
(a) the person’s conduct must have in fact aided, abetted, counselled or procured the commission of 
the offence by the other person; and 
(b) the offence must have been committed by the other person. 
Subsection (3) provides:
For the person to be guilty, the person must have intended that: 
(a) his or her conduct would aid, abet, counsel or procure the commission of any offence (including its 
fault elements) of the type the other person committed; or 
(b) his or her conduct would aid, abet, counsel or procure the commission of an offence and have 
been reckless about the commission of the offence (including its fault elements) that the other person 
in fact committed. 
Numerous cases involving technology-enabled crime have involved multiple offenders and accessories, 
whether assisting before, during or after the event. Examples include groups of hackers, internet fraud 
scammers and child pornography rings (Smith, Grabosky & Urbas 2004). The most common examples  
of complicity in technology-enabled crimes generally arise in relation to the provision of hardware, 
software or expertise that assists in online criminality.
Examples of potential accessories to such crimes include:
members of the public recruited to receive funds into their bank accounts before transferring the •	
money overseas using wire transfer services, minus a certain commission payment and thereby 
facilitating money laundering (HTCB no. 16)
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business or government employees who disclose passwords, security codes, database details or •	
personal information obtained from work computers/databases to others and thereby intentionally  
or recklessly facilitate unauthorised access
software crackers who strip business or entertainment computer programs of their copyright and •	
information management protections and distribute these through ‘warez’ websites
providers of illegal signal decoding hardware or similar circumvention devices that allow users to •	
obtain unauthorised free access to pay TV and similar subscription services
creators and manipulators of malicious software (malware) such as viruses, worms, bots and spyware •	
that can be used to steal confidential information or hijack computer functions in furtherance of 
financial or other crimes
users of card skimming or similar devices that can surreptitiously capture personal and financial details •	
and facilitate identity fraud and financial crimes
computer experts in encryption, steganography or data removal that can assist in concealing criminal •	
activities or removing evidence that may incriminate offenders
members of hacker communities sharing security information that allows others to obtain unauthorised •	
access to computers or data
members of hacker communities building their own encrypted programs (e.g. CarderIM) to establish •	
secure encrypted communication that facilitates them to sell confidential information (e.g. credit card 
numbers and email addresses), part of an underground economy dealing in financial data.
In all of these cases, those assisting may be liable for primary offences themselves as well as complicit in 
the crimes of other perpetrators. There are numerous statutory provisions that directly cover such acts as 
the supply of copyright-infringing software or circumvention devices (Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), s132), 
using the internet to commit or facilitate other crimes (Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), s474.14) and using a 
device to dishonestly obtain personal financial information (Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), s480.5). Use of 
the internet to commit or facilitate sabotage or terrorist attacks is encompassed in the Criminal Code’s 
definition of terrorist act in s100.1 (Urbas 2005). In addition, there are offences relating to terrorist 
organisations that may extend to website activities intended to promote or facilitate the activities of 
particular groups (Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), s101.5, s102.4 and s102.7).
There are also recent provisions that impose obligations on internet service providers (ISPs) and internet 
content hosts (ICHs) to alert police about suspected online child pornography and child abuse material 
(Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), s474.25), and enforcement powers to compel persons with knowledge  
of passwords or computer security protections to assist investigators (Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s3LA and 
Customs Act 1901 (Cth), s201A). As organised crime groups move to greater use of the internet and 
other computer-related technologies, particularly in committing fraud and financial crimes, it can be 
expected that computer experts who assist by providing their tools of trade will face accessorial liability  
in relation to these activities. Highly skilled crackers in software piracy groups, for example, have been 
prosecuted for their role in criminal conspiracies to infringe copyright in the United States and other 
jurisdictions (US DoJ 2005).
The requirement that a person be physically present at a crime to be liable for aiding and abetting poses 
some conceptual difficulties in the online environment. The cross-jurisdictional reach of the internet has 
the consequence that persons located in Australia may, for example, be able to engage in online conduct 
that has effects on the other side of the world. In some cases, the legal doctrine of constructive presence 
may be used to explain how people may be liable for offences committed elsewhere, or it may be 
possible to connect them with an international conspiracy that extends beyond their particular physical 
location (US DoJ 2005). In some cases, it is conceivable that two or more offenders might be seen as 
jointly complicit or acting in concert online even if not physically located in the same place.
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Recent arrests of participants in international child pornography rings, including some Australians, have 
produced evidence of the highly disturbing practice of live child sexual abuse video being streamed to 
internet chat rooms, with the actual perpetrator responding in real time to commands from other 
participants viewing the images (US DoJ 2006). Using a doctrine of constructive presence, it may be 
possible for such co-offenders to be prosecuted not only in relation to child pornography distribution, but 
also as accomplices in the sexual assaults. In some jurisdictions, there are offences of aggravated sexual 
assault in company (e.g. Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s61JA, with a penalty of imprisonment for life), that 
might be applicable to situations involving such groups of online perpetrators. However, these possibilities 
await prosecutorial consideration and legal exploration in Australian courts.
Defences and defence arguments
Defences may be either complete, in that if they are successful an acquittal follows, or partial, which if 
successful can only result in conviction for a lesser offence. Traditionally, a distinction is also made 
between justifications, being circumstances that render an act lawful that would otherwise be criminal, 
and excuses, which are circumstances peculiar to the accused person that may lessen culpability. 
Generally recognised defences include necessity, duress, provocation, self-defence, automatism, insanity 
and diminished responsibility (Bronitt & McSherry 2005).
Alongside these legal defences there is a range of defence arguments or strategies that may operate in  
a similar way. Thus, while intoxication is not strictly speaking a defence, the fact that a defendant was 
affected by alcohol or drugs at the time of committing an offence may negate the specific intent 
necessary for a particular crime, and so the result may be conviction for a lesser offence. The denial of an 
element of an offence or a challenge to the admissibility of certain evidence may also have a result similar 
to a successful defence.
Some cybercrime offence provisions incorporate specific defences that exclude liability for certain persons 
or situations. For example, internet child pornography offences (ss474.19 and ss474.20) and child abuse 
material offences (ss474.22 and ss474.23) in the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) are qualified by public 
benefit defences (ss474.21 and ss474.24) which are limited to law enforcement investigations and 
approved scientific, medical or educational research. Similarly, offences of using the internet or email to 
procure or groom persons under 16 years of age (ss474.26 and ss474.27) have a defence of belief that 
the person involved was not under 16 years (ss474.29). Given that many cybercrime offences are broadly 
drafted and carry substantial maximum penalties, such defences are a necessary protection against 
over-criminalisation. 
More generally, those engaged in protecting computer networks from intrusion or defending their interests 
online may be able to raise general defences such as necessity or self-defence for unauthorised access 
to data or damage to computers. It is understood that reverse hacking (e.g. victims resorting to illegal 
hacking-back remedies) is sometimes committed in response to threats to data or computer security 
(Hutchinson & Warren 2001). Self-defence may extend to defence of property in some situations, so that 
owners of intellectual property might be able to raise such a defence where their response involves 
closing down pirate websites. Counter-measures to terrorist and other security threats may also involve 
action against website propaganda or networks used by potential offenders.
Some defence arguments specific to technology-enabled crimes have started to emerge, such as 
challenges to the admissibility of electronic evidence, assertions that computers were under the control  
of other parties (commonly known as the Trojan defence), and claims that online behaviour was merely 
role-playing. Defendants charged with technology-enabled crimes such as denial of service attacks have 
sometimes argued that their computer was infected with malicious software (malware) such as a bot 
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malware that made it perform functions beyond their control and knowledge (Brenner, Carrier & 
Henninger 2004). To further substantiate their arguments, it is also possible for criminals to deliberately 
infect their computers with malware prior to committing the crimes, although it may be difficult to remove 
entirely evidence of this having occurred (Choo, Smith & McCusker 2007). Similar arguments have 
sometimes been raised when child pornography is discovered on personal computers. In some cases, 
these arguments may be without merit, but unless the prosecution can convincingly exclude the 
hypothesis of external infection beyond reasonable doubt, the defendant may be acquitted.
Another defence strategy is to challenge the legality of electronic searches conducted by law enforcement 
officers to obtain evidence of high tech crimes. Many jurisdictions require a search warrant based on 
reasonable suspicion of the existence of evidentiary material relevant to a crime before private premises 
can be searched, and this principle extends to contents of computers. Defendants can challenge the 
basis on which it was decided that a computer should be searched or seized, and similarly for the specific 
contents of the computer such as files, directories or records of internet activity. If the search is 
insufficiently related to the purposes for which the warrant was issued, this may raise a basis for excluding 
the evidence as improperly or illegally obtained.
Defendants might also challenge the presumption of reliability (presuming that computer forensic software 
such as EnCase reliably yields accurate digital evidence) particularly if open source forensic tools that 
have not been cross-validated (cross-checking the results of one software tool against the results of 
another based on industrial baselines) were used to extract the digital evidence.
… The reliability of a particular computer system or process can be difficult to assessProgrammers are 
fallible and can unintentionally or purposefully embed errors in their applications. Also, complex 
systems can have unforeseen operating errors, occasionally resulting in data corruption or catastrophic 
crashes. Possibly because of these complexities, courts are not closely examining the reliability of 
computer systems or processes and are evaluating the reliability of digital evidence without considering 
error rates or uncertainty (Casey 2002).
Defence arguments raised in response to child pornography or child grooming prosecutions have 
included the fantasy defence, according to which the sender of messages to underage children claims  
to have really believed that the person with whom they were dealing was an adult, and that all concerned 
were merely role-playing or engaging in sexual fantasies (Smith, Grabosky & Urbas 2004). Of course, in 
some cases such a belief would be accurate, as a number of successful investigations in Australia and 
overseas have involved law enforcement officers posing as children online and engaging in chat room 
conversations with predators. 
Although in some jurisdictions, the defence of entrapment might succeed in such situations if it can be 
argued that the defendant did not seek to engage in criminal activity but was merely enticed into doing so 
by a sting operation, the court might have little sympathy for the accused person as illustrated in the case 
of R v Ferguson [2006] 3 DCLR(NSW) 70 (9 March 2006). Ferguson responded to an advertisement 
posted by an undercover officer on the internet selling child pornography magazines offering to make 
videos with his stepdaughter, and write scripts for the same activity. Although no children were ever likely 
to be victimised in this case, Ferguson was sentenced to a term of two years and two months 
imprisonment with a non-parole period of one year and four months. 
Some defendants have also argued, usually unsuccessfully, that engaging in such behaviour was 
therapeutic or was part of a research project (see Smith, Grabosky & Urbas). It was noted that:
[i]ssues commonly introduced by the defense in undercover cases, such as entrapment, role-playing 
or fantasy, and the crime as a factual or legal impossibility, are common but seem to be ineffective 
(Mitchell, Wolak & Finkelhor 2005).
Seeking professional help (e.g. psychiatric or psychological treatment and counselling) has also been 
raised as an indication of remorse and a mitigating factor. For example, in the case of R v Kennings [2004] 
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QCA 162 (14 May 2004), the judge found the original sentence to be ‘manifestly excessive in all the 
circumstances, including the fact that no real child was the recipient of the applicant’s communications, 
the applicant’s remorse and cooperation with the authorities and his ongoing treatment and prognosis’.
Denial of improper purpose has also been a feature of some unauthorised access (hacking) cases, where 
it is claimed that the defendant was merely pursuing the altruistic aim of exposing the vulnerabilities of 
computer systems and databases (Smith, Grabosky & Urbas 2004).
Sentencing issues
Even where a person is convicted of the offence charged, a wide range of factors may be taken into 
account at sentencing to mitigate the penalty imposed. Mitigating factors generally may include a 
defendant’s youth, absence of prior offending, remorse or reparation, personal difficulties or financial 
circumstances, lack of malicious motive, presence of altruistic motive, absence of harm caused to 
victims, and so on. Even if a factor such as reduced mental capacity or lack of intent is insufficient for  
a defence, it may still be taken into account in mitigation of sentence (Fox & Freiberg 1999).
Recent studies by Kshetri (2006) and Jen, Chang & Chou (2006) indicated that a sizeable percentage of 
cybercriminals in Russia and Taiwan belong to the educated Y generation group (HTCB no. 13). Given the 
relatively young ages of some offenders, frequently advanced mitigating factors such as youth or lack of 
prior criminal offending arise often in cybercrime cases. Young offenders are also more likely to be 
considered capable of rehabilitation, so expressions of remorse or lack of malicious intent are readily 
accepted as mitigating the severity of punishment.
Addiction to computers (internet addiction) encompasses a wide-range of behaviours and impulse control 
problems. Young (1999) categorised computer addiction into cybersexual addiction, cyberporn, net 
compulsions (e.g. obsessive online gambling and shopping, information overload (e.g. excessive web 
surfing) and computer addiction (e.g. excessive online gaming). In some cases, claims of internet 
addiction disorder have been raised to explain particular forms of computer misuse such as hacking, and 
on occasions have been sympathetically received by sentencing courts. For example in the 1997 case 
involving Wandii’s trial, computer addiction was submitted by the defence with Wandii being acquitted of 
computer conspiracy charges by the jury (Dreyfus 1997).
Consideration of a significant number of sentences handed down for computer-related crimes in Australia 
and other countries reveals that there are certain recurring factors that affect sentencing (Smith, Grabosky 
& Urbas 2004). Mitigating factors include:
good character or no previous convictions•	
belief that conduct was/should be legal•	
absence of harm to victim or public/personal gain to offender•	
offender health problems including mental health•	
addiction to computers or the internet•	
prank – no malicious intent•	
expression of genuine remorse•	
cooperation with police investigation•	
young age of offender•	
repaid some or all of loss•	
good prospects for rehabilitation•	
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had intended to alert victims to risks of computers.•	
By contrast, aggravating factors include:
large financial loss or repair costs•	
large number of counts or extent of illegality•	
breach of government agency’s security or computers•	
prior convictions or repeat offender•	
breach of trust as employee•	
abhorrent crime (e.g. child pornography)•	
victim company forced into liquidation•	
offences committed while on parole•	
environmental harm•	
presence of special skills•	
lack of remorse•	
potential of harm to victims.•	
The review of cybercrime sentencing cases carried out by Smith, Grabosky & Urbas (2004) concluded by 
observing:
Sentencing practices in cases of cyber crime are, however, continuing to develop, and arguably some 
sentences may seem overly lenient. Cyber crime is seen as a novel phenomenon, with some types of 
conduct only recently having been proscribed. On the other hand, courts have been required to 
emphasise the need for deterrence, and have actively made an example of those who break new 
laws….. Generally, it is the ability of those who misuse computers to inflict extensive damage upon 
multiple victims that makes these crimes so serious. The difficulty that courts face in sentencing is  
to impose an appropriate punishment that will have some deterrent effect while at the same time 
balancing the often compelling mitigating factors (Smith, Grabosky & Urbas 2004: 149).
5 
Law enforcement and evidentiary issues
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Law enforcement and technology-enabled crime
Law enforcement operates at three broad levels involving the prevention, investigation and prosecution of 
crime. Public agencies have a limited role in the prevention of technology-enabled crimes, in part because 
the design of the personal computer and the global adoption of the internet have largely been in the 
hands of private sector forces with less focus on security than on functionality. Accordingly, the burden of 
protection against misuse of technology has fallen largely on individual users. There is a flourishing 
industry of computer security products and services, such as anti-virus software, anti-malware software, 
anti-computer forensics software and devices, intrusion detection devices, intrusion prevention devices 
and encryption tools, servicing the increasing desire of individuals and businesses to protect themselves 
against computer-related threats.
Nonetheless, there is a significant public role in the regulation of telecommunications, the protection of 
critical infrastructure and the minimisation of opportunities for criminal misuse to spread to new areas of 
activity. At the policy level, a range of Australian government agencies have a role to play:
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation•	
Australian Secret Intelligence Service•	
Office of National Assessments•	
Attorney-General’s Department•	
Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) at the Department of Defence•	
Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy (DBCDE)•	
 Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (DEEWR)•	
Department of Innovation, Industry, Science and Research (DIISR)•	
Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA).•	
Various government initiatives bring together these public agencies and private sector entities in 
responding to technology-enabled crime and security threats. For example, the Trusted Information 
Security Network (TISN) overseen by the Attorney-General’s Department comprises the above 
departments and several others, as well as business groups, with a focus on protecting critical 
infrastructure including telecommunications, transport, banking and finance.
Law enforcement agencies have also developed specialisations and organisational units directed at 
technology-enabled crime. For example, the AFP has recognised the area of Information and 
Communications Technology (ICT) as providing criminal opportunities (AFP website: e-crime):
ICT impacts on law enforcement because of the way in which it can facilitate both lawful and unlawful 
activities. Information technology, and specifically networked communications, provide users with the 
capacity to conduct business or other affairs with speed and volume, over distance and at relatively 
low cost, with the option of remaining virtually anonymous if so desired.
Together with other police services in Australia, the AFP in 2000 developed an Electronic Crime Strategy 
with a focus on five key areas:
prevention•	
partnerships•	
education and capability•	
resources and capacity•	
regulation and legislation.•	
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The focus on partnerships, education and law enforcement capability was boosted in 2003 with the 
establishment of the AHTCC, hosted within the AFP and incorporating representatives of state and 
territory police, private industry and government departments. The stated role of the AHTCC is to:
provide a national coordinated approach to combating serious, complex and multi-jurisdictional •	
technology-enabled crimes, especially those beyond the capability of single jurisdictions
assist in improving the capacity of all jurisdictions to deal with technology-enabled crime•	
support efforts to protect the National Information Infrastructure (NII) comprising the information •	
technology and communications, banking and finance, water, energy and utilities, transportation, 
mass gatherings, food, and emergency services sectors. 
The functions of the AHTCC relating to this role are:
coordination of technology-enabled crime matters between Australian law enforcement, federal •	
government and international agencies
investigation of serious and complex matters either by the AHTCC or through cooperation or referral •	
to a partner agency
intelligence services that contribute to a better understanding of the technology-enabled crime •	
environment
liaison with government agencies, industry groups, businesses and other organisations on technology-•	
enabled crime matters, including technical, investigative, business and policy
knowledge of technology-enabled crime issues such as preventative measures, best practice •	
investigative tools and techniques, expert advice, training and education.
The AHTCC includes as a part of its operations the Joint Banking and Finance Sector Investigation team 
(JBFSIT), which consists of federal, state and territory police, as well as investigators from the major 
banks including the Commonwealth Bank, ANZ, National Australia Bank, Westpac and Suncorp Metway. 
The focus of JBFSIT is on technology-enabled financial crimes such as internet bank fraud, phishing and 
deceptive recruiting within the banking and finance sectors.
Collection, examination, analysis and reporting of electronic 
evidence
Law enforcement officers, usually assisted by trained computer forensic analysts with specialist skills in 
computer investigations, play a critical role in relation to electronic evidence. The strict evidentiary 
requirements for criminal prosecutions mean that there must be a demonstrable chain of custody in relation 
to any evidence collected, so that no reasonable doubt can be raised in relation to the authenticity and 
integrity of the data presented to court. to establish a chain of custody, organisations should ideally: 
create an evidence copy of an electronic record. Such copies can be created by various means •	
including reproducing the electronic record as a printed document or copying the electronic record to 
storage media (e.g. backup tape).
maintain a custody log of the evidence copy, recording details such as who accessed the evidence, •	
when the evidence was accessed and returned (if evidence was removed) and why the evidence was 
accessed.
In particular, verification is needed that the contents of a computer have not been created, deleted or 
modified during search, seizure and subsequent analysis. In this regard, it is critical that the analysis be 
undertaken by appropriately trained and skilled computer forensic analysts (the process of forensic 
copying is described further below). 
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Digital evidence differs from traditional evidence. The former is intangible and often transient in nature, 
and can easily be duplicated, copied, shared, disseminated, modified and damaged. A recent case 
involving Jim Selim of the now-defunct Pan Pharmaceuticals (SMH 2007) is an indication of how easily 
electronic data can be destroyed to prevent investigators from acquiring digital evidence.
To address the specific and articulated needs of law enforcement and to ensure (digital) evidentiary 
admissibility, computer forensic researchers and practitioners have developed various models for the 
computer forensic process. Computer forensics can be defined as the science of identification, collection, 
examination, and analysis of data while preserving the integrity of the information and maintaining a strict 
chain of custody for the data (NIST 2006a).
Although models for the computer forensic process differ primarily in how granular each phase of the 
process is and in the terms used for specific phases, they reflect the same basic principles and the same 
overall methodology (NIST 2006b) particularly proper documentations for the chain of custody. The basic 
model adopted by NIST (2006b) is described in Figure 2.
Figure 2: A basic computer forensic process
 
Collection Examination Analysis Reporting
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Source: NIST (2006a): 3-1
Collection – The identification of digital evidence is typically the first step in the forensic processes for •	
computer forensic models. Knowing what evidence is present, where it is stored and how it is stored 
is vital to determining which processes are to be employed to facilitate its recovery. Computer forensic 
examiners must be able to identify the type of information stored in a device and the format in which it 
is stored so that the appropriate technology can be used to extract it.
Examination – Given the likelihood of judicial scrutiny in a court of law, it is imperative that any •	
examination of the electronically stored data be carried out in the least intrusive manner. There are 
circumstances where changes to data are unavoidable, but it is important that the least amount of 
change occurs. In situations where change is inevitable it is essential that the nature of, and reason for, 
the change can be explained.
Analysis – The analysis of digital evidence includes the extraction, processing and interpretation of •	
digital data. This is generally regarded as the main element of forensic computing. Analyses should be 
performed on the evidence copy and care taken not to alter the original copy of the evidence. Once 
extracted, digital evidence usually requires processing before people can read it.
Reporting – The presentation of digital evidence involves the actual presentation in a court of law.  •	
This includes the manner of presentation, the expertise and qualifications of the presenter and the 
credibility of the processes employed to produce the evidence being tendered.
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Accreditation of computer forensic examiners and forensic 
laboratories and validation of computer forensic tools
Increasingly, forensic analysis of computers for law enforcement purposes is being undertaken by well-
organised groups of computer forensic examiners working in government facilities or private sector 
workplaces such as leading consulting practices. Only specially trained and authorised computer forensic 
examiners should process and examine electronic evidence, as evidence not retrieved by a computer 
forensic expert may result in the reliability of the evidence itself being called into question and potentially 
being ruled inadmissible in court. To ensure that the results of computer forensic examinations can be 
used in judicial proceedings, accreditation of individual examiners (see Table 5) and validation of computer 
forensic analysis tools is desirable.
Accreditation of computer forensic examiners
In Australia, there is neither a formal accreditation system for computer forensic examiners nor a 
requirement for expert witnesses to be members of professional societies (e.g. Australian Computer 
Society, Engineers Australia and National Institute of Forensic Science). There are, however, plans for  
a formal accreditation system for computer forensic examiners to be introduced shortly under the 
auspices of the National Accreditation of Testing Authorities (NATA).
Having a national accreditation program for expert witnesses in computer forensics would assist the 
courts in testing the qualifications of expert witnesses, although they would still be subject to cross-
examination regarding their expertise in any given case. There are parallels here with the sometimes 
contentious introduction of other forensic techniques such as DNA profiling, facial imaging and other 
biometric techniques that are now generally accepted as useful sources of evidence in Australian courts.
Accreditation may help to avoid situations such as that which occurred in the United States where a 
so-called computer forensics expert hired to testify at two child pornography court cases pleaded guilty 
to federal perjury charges for falsifying his resumé and lying in open court, presumably about his 
credentials (Goodin 2007, US DoJ 2007a). The indictment alleged that ‘[a]t the time Edmiston worked  
on the child porn cases, he had already been qualified as an expert witness in computers and submitted 
court testimony in several jurisdictions, including the federal court in California, and in courts in at least 
two California counties’.
Table 5: Examples of computer forensic certification organisations
Certifications Organisation (Website)
Certified Computer Examiner (CCE) International Society of Forensic Computer Examiners  
(http://www.isfce.com/)
Certified Forensic Computer Examiner (CFCE) International Association of Computer Investigative Specialists  
(http://www.iacis.com/iacisv2/pages/home.php)
Computer Analysis Response Team (CART) Program United States Federal Bureau of Investigation  
(http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/org/cart.htm)
CyberSecurity Forensic Analyst (CSFA) CyberSecurity Institute  
(http://www.cybersecurityinstitute.biz/)
GIAC Certified Forensics Analyst (GCFA) SANS Institute  
(https://www.sans.org/)
Validation of computer forensic tools
In the United States in December 2005, the Computer Forensic Tool Testing (CFTT) project was 
established, supported by the United States Department of Justice’s National Institute of Justice (NIJ), 
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federal, state, and local law enforcement, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). 
The goal of the CFTT project was to ‘establish a methodology for testing computer forensic software 
tools by development of general tool specifications, test procedures, test criteria, test sets, and test 
hardware. The results provide the information necessary for toolmakers to improve tools, for users to 
make informed choices about acquiring and using computer forensics tools, and for interested parties  
to understand the tools capabilities’ (see http://www.cftt.nist.gov). 
To reduce the risk of computer forensic evidence being called into question in judicial proceedings, only 
validated forensic analysis tools (e.g. EnCase software) that have been accepted by courts in Australia 
and other common-law jurisdictions should be used to gather and analyse evidence.
The importance of carrying out forensic examinations of hard drives carefully is demonstrated in the case 
of Peach v Bird 159 A Crim R 416 [2006] NTSC 14 (21 February 2006). In that case, the defendant had 
been acquitted of charges of possessing child pornographic images. An appeal under s163(3) of the 
Justices Act 1928 (NT) was lodged. Although no images of child pornography were able to be recovered 
from the hard drive, the forensic examiner, using EnCase software found various incriminating file names 
as well as evidence that the hard drive had been erased and overwritten in an attempt to remove 
evidence. The forensic examiner reported that:
[T]he hard drive of the computer contained a word document named ‘untitled document.wps’ (‘the 
untitled word document’). The document was found in the computer folder, C:\\My Documents. The 
word document contained a number of links to or addresses of websites, including the link, ‘http:// 
mx.photos.yahoo.com/pishanito2002’ (the pishanito website). The hard drive of the computer also 
contained a directory of 70 images and one temporary storage file of a word document that had been 
stored in the C:\\My Documents\\My Pictures folder of the computer. The 70 images and the one word 
document contained in the directory had been overwritten or erased with the use of eraser programs 
on the computer. This meant that the 71 files could no longer be recovered. All that could be seen was 
the name of each file that had been saved to the C:\\My Documents\\My Pictures folder of the hard 
drive; the date that each file was created and the date that each file was overwritten or erased. Unlike 
a file which has been merely deleted, a file which has been overwritten or erased cannot be recovered. 
The erasing programs on the computer had been run on the files/images rather than the whole of the 
folder including the directory of file names of the 70 images and one word document. One of the files 
of the 70 erased images in the directory was named 8087053lg0.jpg. A jpg file is an image or picture 
file as opposed to a text file. The file named 8087053lg0.jpg was created on 17 March 2003 and 
overwritten or erased on 18 March 2003.
Based on this evidence, the acquittal was set aside and a retrial ordered. On 28 August 2006, an appeal 
was also dismissed (see Bird v Peach [2006] NTCA 7 (28 August 2006)).
Accreditation of computer forensic laboratories
Unlike other disciplines, accreditation of computer forensics laboratories is not currently included in the  
16 categories of accreditation for facilities and laboratories by NATA in Australia. In the United States, 
accreditation of computer forensics laboratories was included by the American Society of Crime Lab 
Directors, Laboratory Accreditation Board (ASCLD-LAB) in 2005. The United States Defense Computer 
Forensics Lab (DCFL) was the first such laboratory to be accredited by ASCLD-LAB in recognition of ‘the 
DCFL’s rigorous and reliable processes and ability to successfully meet the growing demands of cyber 
crime prevention’ (USAF 2005). To further strengthen law enforcement’s computer forensic capabilities 
throughout the United States, the Regional Computer Forensics Laboratory (RCFL) program supporting 
the ASCLD/LAB accreditation was established by FBI’s Operational Technology Division (OTD). Adopting 
a similar approach of accreditation for computer forensics laboratories in Australia (e.g. AS ISO/IEC 
17025-2005 accreditation and the equivalent of the RCFL program accredited by ASCLD/LAB) will be an 
important step in the evolution of the discipline.
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Search and seizure powers 
The Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) contains various provisions concerning search and seizure of evidence in 
federal criminal matters. There are specific provisions relating to electronic searches, including powers to 
bring equipment such as laptops with forensic imaging programs to specified premises (s3K) and to use 
electronic equipment found at premises such as computers and printers (s3L).
Section 3LA of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) and s201A of the Customs Act 1901 (Cth) make it an offence 
for persons with knowledge of computers or computer networks of which computers form a part, or 
measures applied to protect data held in, or accessible from, computers, to fail to provide any information 
or assistance that is reasonable and necessary to allow access to data held in, or accessible from, a 
computer that is on warrant premises, to copy the data to a data storage device, or to convert the data 
into documentary form. Failure to comply carries a maximum penalty of six months imprisonment. These 
are important provisions designed to overcome the efforts of accused persons to conceal data through 
the use of passwords or encryption.
Where there are defects with warrants, or the search conducted exceeds the scope of the warrant, a 
defendant may seek to have the evidence obtained as a result of the search ruled inadmissible under  
s138 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). It is therefore important to ensure that warrants are properly drafted, 
obtained and executed for the results of searches to be admitted into evidence.
Subsection 3E(1) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) provides that:
An issuing officer may issue a warrant to search premises if the officer is satisfied by information on 
oath that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that there is, or there will be within the next 72 
hours, any evidential material at the premises.
The warrant must state a number of listed matters, including ‘the kinds of evidential material that are to be 
searched for under the warrant’ (s3E(5(c)). The term evidential material is defined to mean ‘a thing relevant 
to an indictable offence or a thing relevant to a summary offence, including such a thing in electronic 
form’ (s3C). Thus, the contents of computers or other electronic storage devices may be searched under 
warrants.
Evidential material may be seized if it is specified in the warrant or if the executing officer believes on 
reasonable grounds that it is evidential material in relation to the offence to which the warrant relates or 
another indictable offence (s3F). Thus, computers and electronic devices may be seized, but only if they 
have been sufficiently examined for the requisite belief to be formed.
Division 2 of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) imposes certain limitations on the ability of investigators to 
conduct in depth searches of computers to examine their contents. For example, data examination 
involves assessing and extracting the relevant pieces of information from the collected data. The latter is 
by no means easy due to increased data storage capacities. An acquired storage medium is likely to 
contain hundreds of thousands of data files. Identification of data files containing information of interest is 
both time consuming and be daunting. Moreover, identified data files of interest may contain extraneous 
information that needs to be filtered. With the advent of more complex data storage and dissemination 
technologies, computer forensic examiners face an increasingly difficult task. Developments in data 
storage and dissemination technologies can impede computer forensic examiners and prevent police 
from acquiring digital evidence and analysing digital content forensically within the time-frame specified in 
the Act. In particular, section 3L(6) provides that computer equipment can only be held for up to 24 hours 
unless an application is made for an extension. The use of data copying techniques, however, make this 
period of time generally sufficient for copying data, although considerably longer periods are needed for 
analysis of the copied data.
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There is a danger that, unless searches are able to be carried out methodically, the contents of files may 
be deleted or altered. Therefore, a number of special provisions were added to the Crimes Act 1914 by 
the Cybercrime Act 2001 (Cth), facilitating computer searches. These are found in ss3L – 3LB (analogous 
provisions were introduced into the Customs Act 1901 (Cth) by the Cybercrime Act, and there is a similar 
provision to s3LA also in the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) relating to spam investigations.
Subsection s3K(1) of the Crimes Act provides that the executing officer may ‘bring to the warrant 
premises any equipment reasonably necessary for the examination or processing of a thing found at the 
premises to determine whether it is a thing that may be seized under the warrant’. Subsection (2) 
provides that a thing found at the warrant premises ‘may be moved to another place for examination or 
processing to determine whether it may be seized under a warrant’ if the owner of the premises consent 
in writing, or if two conditions are satisfied: 
(i) it is significantly more practicable to do so having regard to the timeliness and cost of examining  
or processing the thing at another place and the availability of expert assistance; and
(ii) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the thing contains or constitutes evidential material.
There are notice requirements under subsection (4), and a time limit of 72 hours applies to the 
examination process under subsection (ss3K(3A)), extendible if ‘the executing officer believes on 
reasonable grounds that the thing cannot be examined or processed within 72 hours or that time as 
previously extended’ (ss3K(3B). Subsection (4) provides that the executing officer ‘may operate 
equipment already at the warrant premises to carry out the examination or processing of a thing found  
at the premises to determine whether it is a thing that may be seized under the warrant if the executing 
officer or constable believes on reasonable grounds that: 
(a)  the equipment is suitable for the examination or processing; and 
(b) the examination or processing can be carried out without damage to the equipment or the thing.’
Section 3L further provides that equipment found at warrant premises may be operated (subject to the 
similar conditions as in s3K(4) above) ‘to access data (including data not held at the premises)’. This is 
potentially a powerful provision in that it may allow remote searches of computers connected via a 
network (possibly even across jurisdictional boundaries). The term data is defined to include information  
in any form and any program (or part of a program). The data may be copied to a disk, tape or other 
associated device (whether brought to the premises or, with consent, found on the premises) under  
s3L(1A). If data on premises other than warrant premises are accessed, there are obligations to notify  
the owner of those premises as soon as practicable (s3LB).
Finally, s3LA provides a power to compel, by order of a magistrate, any person suspected of having 
committed offences to which the warrant relates, or the owner or lessee of the computer or an employee 
of such a person, to provide assistance that is reasonable and necessary to allow the officer to do one or 
more of the following: 
(a) access data held in, or accessible from, a computer that is on warrant premises
(b) copy the data to a data storage device
(c) convert the data into documentary form.
Failure to comply with such an order is punishable by up to six months imprisonment. The scope of this 
provision has yet to be tested in the courts, but is arguably of wide scope and application, which has 
created a degree of apprehension among some legal and computer professionals (see James 2004).
Although not all Australian jurisdictions have a specific warrant for the search and seizure of electronic 
evidence, existing legislation and procedures allow members of state and territory police services to apply 
to an authorised officer for search warrants to search the premises and to seize any such thing if found, 
and to take it before a justice to be dealt with according to law (see Table 6).
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Table 6:  Summary of main Australian search and seizure legislation applicable to electronic 
searches
Provisions
Cth Crimes Act 1914, s3E – 3F and 3K – 3LB 
Customs Act 1901, s198 – 199 and s200 – 201B
ACT Crimes Act 1900, s200 (Use of electronic equipment at premises)
NSW Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002, s47 (Power to apply for warrant for particular 
offences) and s49 (Seizure of things pursuant to warrant)
NT Police Administration Act, s117 (Search warrants) and s119 (Searches and emergencies)
Qld Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, s150 (Search warrant application) and s154 (Order in search 
warrant about information necessary to access information stored electronically)
SA Summary Offences Act 1953, s67 (General search warrants) and s68 (Power to search suspected vehicles, 
vessels, and persons) 
Tas Search Warrants Act 1997, s11 (Use of electronic equipment at premises)
Vic Crimes Act 1958, s465 (Issue of search warrant by magistrate), s86VB (Power to enter public authority 
premises) and s86VC (Power to seize documents or things at public authority premises)
WA Criminal Code, s711 (Search warrant)
Source: Compiled from legislative databases including http://www.comlaw.gov.au/, http://www.legislation.act.gov.au/, http://www.legislation.nsw.gov.
au/, http://www.nt.gov.au/dcm/legislation/current.html, http://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/OQPChome.htm and http://www.austlii.edu.au/
In addition, Division 4 of the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) – amended by the Spam (Consequential 
Amendments) Act 2003 (Cth) – provides inspectors (as defined by Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth), 
Section 533) with powers to enter and search premises if a breach of the Spam Act 2003 (Cth) is 
suspected.
It is also likely that during the course of an investigation, sources of evidence may be identified which are 
located overseas. Examples arise in botnet-related cases where infected computers – zombie computers 
– used to launch distributed denial-of-service attacks are located in other countries. In such cases, the 
relevant country should be contacted for assistance by means such as the 24/7 network of contacts 
hosted by the AHTCC (see section ‘Cross-border cooperation’).
Cases on search and seizure provisions
The search and seizure provisions of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) have been considered in a number of 
cases involving computer searches. The first case to examine the question of the seizure of computer 
equipment was Bartlett v Weir and Ors (1994) 72 A Crim R 511. In that case, police seized computer 
equipment to examine floppy disks named in the warrant. The presiding judge decided that the execution 
of the warrant in the case was unlawful for the following reasons.
…. consider that the execution of the warrant in its entirety was fundamentally flawed for the reasons 
which I have stated, namely, that the second respondents seized items without knowing whether they fell 
within the terms of the warrant, intending to examine them later, and without having held, at the time of 
seizure, the requisite reasonable belief that the goods seized might afford evidence of the commission of 
a crime. Accordingly, I am of the opinion that the execution of the warrant at … was unlawful.
I am of the same opinion in relation to the seizure of items from the applicant’s home…. There was no 
consideration of the content of the computer files which were seized at those premises at the time of 
execution of the warrant. In those circumstances, there could have been no reasonable basis for the 
second respondents to reasonably believe, in respect of each item seized, that it would afford 
evidence of the commission of the offences specified in the warrant or of any other offence.
In Hart v Commissioner, AFP [2002] FCAFC 392 (5 December 2002), the Federal Court found that  
s3K(2) did not authorise AFP officers to copy computer files to storage devices brought to the premises 
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and then to move these devices to another place for analysis. This was because s3K in its terms allows 
things to be brought to premises for the purposes of analysis, and it allows things found at premises to 
be seized and taken away, but it does not explicitly allow things brought to the premises to be used to 
download evidential material and then taken away again for analysis. This drafting imposes a significant 
limitation on how searches may be conducted if relying on s3K.
Of course, s3L does enable copying of data onto devices which may be taken away, and it was held in 
the case of Kennedy v Baker [2004] FCA 562 (6 May 2004). The later case of ASIC v Rich [2005] NSWSC 
62 (16 February 2005) confirmed that this constitutes seizure of the data for the purposes of s3F 
warrants, as (per Austin J at [238]):
[I]n the case of evidential material which is an electronic thing, there is seizure of the electronic copy of 
the electronic thing through removal of the storage device after the downloading or copying is 
completed, regardless of whether the storage device is brought to the premises or found there, and 
regardless of whether it is used with or without the occupier’s consent.
These cases raise the practical question of whether searches that purport to rely on one of the provisions 
in the Crimes Act, in particular as between s3K and s3L, preclude reliance on another. In a recent case, it 
was held that no such limitation is imposed by the legislation, and that ‘there is nothing in the Act to 
suggest that the availability of one option precludes the choice of another’: Egglishaw v Australian Crime 
Commission [2006] FCA 819 (30 June 2006).
It should be noted that agreement can be reached between investigating officers and other parties, in 
relation to the way in which computers (whether at warrant premises or removed) will be forensically 
examined. This may include restrictions on the material to be examined, such as those in which claims  
of legal professional privilege is claimed, and such agreements may be enforceable by the court: Oke v 
Commissioner of the AFP [2005] FCA 1363 (20 September 2005).
In general, drafting and executing of search warrants that relate to the search and seizure of digital 
evidence are similar to other investigations. Issues to be considered include:
the criminal offence being investigated (e.g. possession and distribution of child pornography material)•	
the venue of the search (e.g. physical address)•	
the types of evidence expected to be found (e.g. computers and storage devices)•	
the relevance of the evidence to the criminal offence (e.g. instrumentality of the crime).•	
A recent case that illustrates problems concerning the drafting and execution of search warrants in 
relation to computers and their contents, and how they may be challenged by the defence, was R v PJ 
[2006] ACTSC 37 (2 May 2006). In this case, a search warrant was obtained by the AFP in relation to a 
house in the ACT that was believed might contain evidence relating to the possession of child 
pornography. Information had been received by the AHTCC from an overseas country’s law enforcement 
agency, identifying a phone number as having been involved in downloading child pornography material, 
and a list of names of files had been forwarded to the AFP’s Sexual Assault and Child Protection Unit. The 
names on the list indicated that they referred to sexual activity involving young children. The warrant that 
was obtained authorised AFP officers to enter the premises and search for and seize evidential material, 
described thus:
First Condition: 
Things which are: 
(a) video cameras, cameras, photographs video tapes, film, undeveloped film, paper, documents or 
anything else containing pornographic or sexually implicit or explicit images any child or underage person. 
(b) any and all computer equipment or other electronic storage devices capable of storing electronic 
data regarding above items, including magnetic tapes, floppy discs, hard drives, viewing screens, disc 
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or tape drives, central processing units, printers, and all software necessary to retrieve electronic date, 
including operating systems, database, spreadsheet, work processing and graphics programs, all 
manuals for operation of computer and software together with all handwritten notes or printed 
confidential password lists to enter secured files. Also any printouts throughout location or trash re 
above items. 
Second Condition: 
Things which relate to any one or more of the following: 
(a) [full name of accused] born [correct date of birth] 
(b) [correct street and suburb] 
(c) any bills or correspondence from [stated telecommunications service provider] for the telephone 
number [stated correct number]. 
Third Condition: 
Things as to which there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that they will afford evidence as to the 
commission of the following offences(s) against the laws of the Australian Capital Territory: 
(a) possession of child pornography contrary to section 65 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT).
The search that was conducted pursuant to the warrant involved a forced entry to the house, which was 
unoccupied at the time, and the analysis of the contents of a computer found inside. Sexually explicit 
images were revealed on the computer during this analysis, which was confirmed afterwards when the 
computer was removed from the premises and forensically imaged and examined at the AFP’s computer 
laboratory. The search further uncovered videotapes in a locked cupboard in the garage, which was also 
found to contain a bag with computer disks. These were also examined later, and were found to contain 
sexually explicit images, which were also the subject of a charge of possessing child pornography under 
s65 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT). At trial, the defence sought to have the evidence excluded on a 
number of grounds, all of which failed, including:
irregularities in the search warrant (which had transposed the block and section numbers of the •	
premises)
execution of the warrant (as items such as the computer disks were seized without it having first been •	
established that they contained evidential material)
admissibility of a record of interview (conducted after the search and seizure of the defendant’s •	
premises).
Mr Justice Connolly of the ACT Supreme Court referred to the application of the Human Rights Act 2004 
(ACT) to the case. While acknowledging that the latter statute may have a bearing on the interpretation of 
legislation authorising search and seizure (such as the Crimes Act provisions under which the warrant 
was obtained), this in fact made little difference in terms of admissibility. The main reason is that the 
Human Rights Act defines as human rights (s5) those rights recognised under the International 
Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). However, ICCPR rights are already to be taken into 
account under s138(3)(f) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), which applies in federal and ACT courts, in 
assessing whether evidence has been illegally or improperly obtained.
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Forensic copying
The process of copying of evidence in a forensically sound manner is a fundamental element of the 
forensic computing process. The evidence (data) can be acquired from device using either physical 
acquisition or logical acquisition.
Physical acquisition – A bit-by-bit copy of an entire physical storage device and allows deleted files •	
and any data remnants present in the storage devices such as unused file system space to be 
examined.
Logical acquisition – A bit-by-bit copy of the logical storage objects such as directories and files •	
residing on a logical store (e.g. a file system partition).
Electronic data held on computer hard disks and digital media are very volatile forms of evidence. This 
evidence can be easily altered or destroyed if left unprotected or without proper handling. As in the case 
of traditional evidence, the proponent of evidence normally carries the burden of offering sufficient support 
to authenticate electronic evidence. A mechanism therefore to preserve or reproduce the data in a 
non-volatile format is required. Physical acquisition (disk imaging) allows an entire hard disk drive to be 
reproduced or analysed without the need to access the original hard disk. This process provides a safe 
mechanism to analyse, test and interact with data, while still providing the most accurate reproduction  
of the original. In this case the data copied can be said to be an exact duplication of the original, a more 
exact duplication than, for example, a photocopy of a page, as a disk image allows the recovery of 
deleted and ambient data.
Computer forensic examiners frequently use a number of methods to ensure the validity of the data 
copied including creating a digital signature (called a mathematical hash) of the data as it is read from  
the hard disk drive so that the signature can be compared to the copied data. The mathematical hashing 
algorithm (e.g. MD5 and SHA-1) allows an examiner to detect if data have been altered or an error has 
occurred in the copy process. A number of commercial forensic acquisition products even embed the 
mathematical hash into an electronic container that holds the forensic image.
In the case where only a file or files are copied (logical acquisition), as opposed to a copy of the entire 
hard disk (physical acquisition), a similar digital signature processes is applied. In such cases a 
mathematical hash of each individual file is created of the original at the time of copying.
The advantage of this copying and digital signature process is that it allows for multiple exact duplicates 
of data to be reproduced and certified (verified). These processes are used by law enforcement and 
commercial forensic computing providers.
The process of interacting with a computer subject to a judicial process can irreversibly damage data, 
even turning a computer on can subsequently alter many of the files that may be useful in the forensic 
examination. To this end examiners will employ some specific write-protection devices, either hardware  
or software that will eliminate the inadvertent or deliberate alteration of data on a computer hard disk 
drive. This process is essential if the original evidence needs to be interacted with in some way, such  
as producing a forensic copy, or performing a preview of the data to determine reasonable grounds to 
believe a thing (the computer) will afford evidence in the investigation.
Computer forensic analyst reports
The results of forensic analysis are routinely set out in a report prepared by the computer forensic analyst. 
This should state the nature of all examinations conducted, the personnel involved, and the basis for 
decisions made as to the relevance of material found. There is no standard form required for such reports 
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to be tendered, and admissible, in Australian courts. Although requirements for such reports differ in 
jurisdictions, the expert witness code of conduct is adopted in most states and territories. For example,  
in the Supreme Court of NSW, the expert witness code of conduct in Schedule 7 of the Uniform Civil 
Procedure Rules 2005 under the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) requires the following details to be 
included either in the body of the report or in an annexure: 
the expert’s qualifications as an expert on the issue the subject of the report•	
the facts, and assumptions of fact, on which the opinions in the report are based (a letter of •	
instructions may be annexed)
the expert’s reasons for each opinion expressed, if applicable, that a particular issue falls outside the •	
expert’s field of expertise
any literature or other materials utilised in support of the opinions•	
any examinations, tests or other investigations on which the expert has relied, including details of the •	
qualifications of the person who carried them out
in the case of a report that is lengthy or complex, a brief summary of the report (to be located at the •	
beginning of the report).
Similar expert witness code of conduct guideline is also adopted by the Federal Court of Australia  
(e.g. see Black 2007).
In general, the writer of the report will be called to give evidence in any contested proceeding in which  
the contents of the report are adduced as evidence. In addition to a computer forensic analyst’s written 
report and testimony, evidence from computers may be tendered directly as documentary evidence. The 
requirements for documentary evidence, and for witnesses giving expert opinion evidence, are discussed 
below.
Evidentiary rules and presumptions
The law of evidence contains a number of rules and presumptions that may facilitate the admission of 
electronic evidence. Although both the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) and the Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) mirror 
the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), there are some differences between these Acts (ALRC 2005). Evidence Acts 
based on the Commonwealth Act (known as the uniform Evidence Acts) apply to all proceedings in 
federal courts, or courts of the Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales and Tasmania. By virtue of 
section 79 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), proceedings in state and territory courts will be governed by 
the relevant state and territory evidence Act and the applicable rules of court:
Evidence Act 1995•	  in New South Wales
Evidence Act•	  in the Northern Territory
Evidence Act 1977•	  in Queensland
Evidence Act 1929•	  in South Australia
Evidence Act 2001•	  in Tasmania
Evidence Act 1958•	  in Victoria
Evidence Act 1906•	  in Western Australia
There are, however, some miscellaneous provisions in the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) that apply in all courts 
within Australia. The following discussion briefly describes a selection of these as contained in the 
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), which applies in all federal courts and courts of the Australian Capital Territory. 
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Electronic Documents
Part 2.2 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) deals with documentary evidence, which includes evidence in 
electronic form since the definition of document in the Dictionary to the Act defines the term so as to 
include ‘anything from which sounds, images or writings can be reproduced with or without the aid of 
anything else’ (in conformity with the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth)). Section 48 allows a party to 
proceedings to tender as proof of the contents of a document, among other things:
the document itself•	
a copy produced by a device that reproduces the contents of documents (such as a photocopier)•	
‘if the document in question is an article or thing on or in which information is stored in such a way •	
that it cannot be used by the court unless a device is used to retrieve, produce or collate it—tendering 
a document that was or purports to have been produced by use of the device’ (ss48(1)(d))
a document that ‘forms part of the records of or kept by business (whether or not the business is still •	
in existence)’ (ss48(1)(e)).
Thus, a computer printout may be tendered as evidence of the contents of a computer file, a fax printout 
may be tendered as evidence of the contents of a faxed letter, and so on. For complex or voluminous 
documents, the court may direct that a summary be produced (s51), and the original document rule 
under common law (which restricted the admissibility of copies) is abolished (s51).
The operation of ss48(1)(d) and (e) in relation to the tender of a printed copy of an Excel spreadsheet in 
civil proceedings was considered in Edmunds-Jones Pty Ltd v Australian Women’s Hockey Association 
Inc [1999] NSWSC 285 (19 March 1999), at [12] – [14], where it was considered that the provisions 
covered the tender of an edited version of the document where only formatting and deletion of irrelevant 
material were involved in preparation of the document (though the point was decided by invoking s190, 
allowing waiver of the rules of evidence).
In addition, there are provisions in Part 4.3 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) that facilitate the admission of 
electronic evidence by embodying presumptions as to the operation of processes, machines and other 
devices. Section 146 provides that, where a party tenders a document or thing produced by a device or 
process, then ‘[i]f it is reasonably open to find that the device or process is one that, or is of a kind that, if 
properly used, ordinarily produces that outcome, it is presumed (unless evidence sufficient to raise doubt 
about the presumption is adduced) that, in producing the document or thing on the occasion in question, 
the device or process produced that outcome’. The note to s146 gives the following example: ‘It would 
not be necessary to call evidence to prove that a photocopier normally produced complete copies of 
documents and that it was working properly when it was used to photocopy a particular document’. 
Section 147 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) is in similar terms, but relates to documents which are part of 
business records (whether or not the business is still in existence), and it provides that ‘it is presumed 
(unless evidence sufficient to raise doubt about the presumption is adduced) that, in producing the 
document on the occasion in question, the device or process produced that outcome’. The only 
difference from the s146 wording is that the reasonably open precondition is omitted.
Sections 146 and/or 147 have been applied in a range of cases in which the admissibility of certain 
documents was considered – for example, in relation to computer-generated vehicle journey reports 
(Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales v Tetley [2004] NSWSC 925 (8 October 2004)), 
automated teller machine records (R v Magoulias [2003] NSWCCA 143 (26 May 2003)), and bank 
statements (ASIC v Rich [2005] NSWSC 417 (5 May 2005)).
It is important to observe, however, that additional testimony will usually be needed to authenticate the 
document as coming from the source claimed (National Australia Bank Ltd v Rusu (1999) 47 NSWLR 
309) – though note that the Evidence Act does allow a court to draw any reasonable inference from a 
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document or thing, ‘including an inference as to its authenticity or identity’ (s58, and see also s183).  
In ASIC v Rich [2005] NSWSC 417, at [120], Austin J explained how the court would be able to draw 
inferences as to the source and identity of a computer-generated document using the Evidence Act 
provisions:
If, hypothetically, ASIC tenders a document which on its face, purports to be a budget for the One.Tel 
Group for 2001, and adduces provenance evidence showing that the document was printed out from 
a computer hard-drive copied by the liquidators from One.Tel’s hard-drive, and establishes a file path 
through the finance directory to a subfile called Budget 2001, the court would be able to conclude on 
the balance of probabilities (see s142) that the document had been adequately authenticated. Such 
evidence does not show who created the document (although the properties page, if in evidence, 
might assist in that respect), or how the document was used within the organisation, or even whether 
it is the only version or might have been a draft. But it is sufficiently well authenticated to be received, 
provided it is properly tendered under s48 and is admissible. There is evidence, not confined to 
inferences from the document itself, showing on the balance of probabilities (see s142) that the 
document came from One.Tel’s financial records where it was classified as a 2001 budget, which is 
what it purports to be.
Other provisions in Part 4.3 of the Act facilitate proof of the contents of postal articles (s160), telexes  
(s161), lettergrams and telegrams (s162) and letters sent by Commonwealth agencies (s163). In general, 
there is extended application of provisions relating to documents where these are or were part of 
Commonwealth records (s182).
Relevance and exclusionary rules 
In order to be admissible, evidence about the contents of documents (whether electronic or otherwise) 
must be relevant and not excluded by any of the remaining evidentiary rules (such as the hearsay, opinion, 
or tendency and coincidence rules), by the claim of legal or other forms of privilege, or by the exercise of 
judicial discretion to exclude (due to unfair prejudice, or impropriety and/or illegality). In general, the 
hearsay rule does not apply to output that is generated automatically by the computer following previously 
programmed instructions without further human intervention and data independently recorded by a 
computer without significant human involvement. For example, Section 95 of the Evidence Act 1929 (Qld) 
provides an exception to the hearsay rule for statements produced by computers where:
that the document containing the statement was produced by the computer during a period over •	
which the computer was used regularly to store or process information for the purposes of any 
activities regularly carried on over that period, whether for profit or not, by any person (see ss95(2)(a))
that over that period there was regularly supplied to the computer in the ordinary course of those •	
activities information of the kind contained in the statement or of the kind from which the information 
so contained is derived (see ss95(2)(b))
that throughout the material part of that period the computer was operating properly or, if not, that any •	
respect in which it was not operating properly or was out of operation during that part of that period was 
not such as to affect the production of the document or the accuracy of its contents (see ss95(2)(c))
the information contained in the statement reproduces or is derived from information supplied to the •	
computer in the ordinary course of those activities (see ss95(2)(d)).
The key requirement for admissibility is relevance, either to facts in issue or at least to the credibility of a 
witness (s55). Therefore, any (electronic or other) evidence will be excluded as inadmissible if not relevant 
in a proceeding (s56). The Evidence Act defines evidence which is relevant in a proceeding as ‘evidence 
that, if it were accepted, could rationally affect (directly or indirectly) the assessment of the probability of 
the existence of a fact in issue in the proceeding’ (s55(1)). Evidence may also be admitted as provisionally 
relevant (s57).
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An interesting example of evidence related to machine-produced documents that was considered not to 
be relevant appears in the High Court case of Smith v The Queen [2001] HCA 50 (16 August 2001). At 
trial, the prosecution had tendered bank security camera photos purportedly identifying the accused as 
present at the scene of a robbery, and had called police officers familiar with the accused to identify him 
as the person in the photos. The High Court held that this evidence had been wrongly admitted, as it 
could not rationally affect the jury’s assessment of whether the photo matched the physical appearance 
of the accused, who was present in court.
Evidence which is otherwise relevant may be excluded as hearsay, which means it is evidence of a 
previous representation (typically in communications at or following the events which are the subject of 
the proceeding) and which is tendered to try to prove the truth of the representation. Such evidence is 
excluded unless an exception applies (s59). Various exceptions are set out in the Evidence Act, which 
may apply also to electronic evidence, but three exceptions are worth particular mention.
Section 69 provides a general exception to the hearsay rule in s59 in relation to business records. These 
are defined as documents that form ‘part of the records belonging to or kept by a person, body or 
organisation in the course of, or for the purposes of, a business’, and the term business is further broadly 
defined (Part 2 of the Dictionary) as ‘a profession, calling, occupation, trade or undertaking’, or 
Parliamentary or governmental business, whether conducted for profit or not, or carried out in or outside 
Australia. Documents such as cash register rolls, transactional statements and customer lists will usually 
be accepted as business records, but it should be noted that not every document associated with a 
business will necessarily constitute a business record – for example, in the case of Roach & Ors v Page & 
Ors (No.27) [2003] NSWSC 1046 (13 November 2003) the contents of corporate websites were not 
admitted under s69. Another example appears in the New South Wales case of Roads and Traffic 
Authority of New South Wales v Tetley [2004] NSWSC 925 (8 October 2004). Duplicates of driver 
logbooks and journey report (computer-generated print-out derived from a Global Positioning System/
vehicle monitoring information system) were ruled inadmissible under s69 of the Evidence Act.
The books of accounts provisions in subsections 83–91 of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) may provide  
a general exception in relation to business records (QLRC 2005). Where the business records are held 
electronically, Section 95 of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) may also apply if business records are held 
electronically.
Section 70 provides an exception to the hearsay rule (s59) for tags, labels and similar writing that is or has 
been placed on an object (including a document) during the course of business ‘for the purpose of 
describing or stating the identity, nature, ownership, destination, origin or weight of the object, or of the 
contents (if any) of the object’. This may in some circumstances apply to electronic evidence, for example, 
in relation to the file directory and similar details that added automatically in the footer space of some 
documents.
Section 71 provides an exception to the hearsay rule (s59) for representations in documents ‘recording a 
message that has been transmitted by electronic mail or by a fax, telegram, lettergram or telex’ that relate 
to identity of sender or recipient, destination or time. This exception is supplemented by Division 3 of Part 
4.3 of the Act, which deals with such forms of communication.
In addition to the hearsay exclusionary rules, there is a range of other exclusions that may relate to 
electronic evidence. These include the opinion rule (s69), rules about evidence of judgments and 
convictions (s91), the tendency (s97) and coincidence (s98) rules, the credibility (s102) and character 
(s110) rules, and identification rules (ss114 and ss115). For all of these rules, there are exceptions that 
may operate. To give just one example, electronic evidence of a defendant’s internet browsing habits may 
be adduced to try to prove that the defendant had a particular interest in a type of material (such as child 
pornography). This evidence (if considered relevant) might be excluded as tendency evidence (s97) unless 
it is of significant probative value, but even if it meets this test, must still be excluded (s101) as 
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prosecution evidence unless ‘the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighs any prejudicial 
effect it may have on the defendant’ (see R v MM [2004] NSWCCA 364).
Evidence which is otherwise admissible may still be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger that the evidence might be unfairly prejudicial, be misleading or confusing,  
or cause or result in undue waste of time (s135). In criminal proceedings, prosecution evidence must be 
excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant (s137). 
Unfair prejudice may arise where there is a danger that evidence will be misused or misunderstood by a 
jury, or where a party is unable to cross-examine the maker of a statement that has been admitted into 
evidence (see Roach & Ors v Page and Ors (No. 11) [2003] NSWSC 907). The use of evidence may also 
be limited by the court (s136). 
Discretionary exclusion also applies in the case of improperly or illegally obtained evidence (s138), which 
is most likely to be raised in the context of electronic evidence where a valid search warrant has not been 
obtained prior to forensic examination of a computer, or the search goes beyond what is authorised by 
the warrant (ASIC v Rich [2005] NSWSC 62 (16 February 2005); R v PJ [2006] ACTS 37 (2 May 2006), 
discussed above).
Opinions based on specialised knowledge
Under s79 (an exception to the exclusionary opinion rule in s76) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), a court 
may admit opinion evidence from a witness who has specialised knowledge: 
If a person has specialised knowledge based on the person’s training, study or experience, the opinion 
rule does not apply to evidence of an opinion of that person that is wholly or substantially based on 
that knowledge.
The requirements that the witness’s specialised knowledge be ‘based on the person’s training, study or 
experience’ and that the opinion in turn be ‘wholly or substantially based on that knowledge’ are 
important limitations in the circumstances in which specialist opinion evidence may be admitted. Unlike 
the United States, Australian law does not require proof of expertise in a recognised field of scientific 
knowledge (as per the test in Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals 509 US 579 (1993)), but rather 
allows a person’s training, study or (non-academic) work experience to ground a specialist opinion. The 
Daubert test, a widely accepted legal test to determine the validity of scientific evidence and its relevance 
to the case at issue, examines the following criteria:
Tested•	  – Has the scientific theory or technique been tested?
Peer reviewed – Has the scientific theory or technique been subjected to peer review (by other experts •	
in the field) and publication?
Error rate – What is the known or potential error rate (i.e. type I and type II error)? •	
Standards and Acceptance – What is the expert’s qualifications and stature in the scientific •	
community? And does the technique rely upon the special skills and equipment of one expert, or can 
it be replicated by other experts elsewhere?
However, it has been held that opinion based on specialist expertise does not necessarily fall within the 
terms of s79 if it involves an extension of existing expertise to a new field of inquiry not substantially linked 
to the person’s specialist training: see R v Hien Puoc Tang [2006] NSWCCA 167 (24 May 2006), a case 
concerning computer-assisted facial and body mapping.
The following statement is widely accepted as definitively setting out the requirements of s79 of the Evidence 
Act, per Heydon JA in Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles [2001] NSWCA 305 (14 September 2001):
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In short, if evidence tendered as expert opinion evidence is to be admissible, it must be agreed or 
demonstrated that there is a field of ‘specialised knowledge’; there must be an identified aspect of that 
field in which the witness demonstrates that by reason of specified training, study or experience, the 
witness has become an expert; the opinion proffered must be ‘wholly or substantially based on the 
witness’s expert knowledge’; so far as the opinion is based on facts ‘observed’ by the expert, they 
must be identified and admissibly proved by the expert, and so far as the opinion is based on 
‘assumed’ or ‘accepted’ facts, they must be identified and proved in some other way; it must be 
established that the facts on which the opinion is based form a proper foundation for it; and the 
opinion of an expert requires demonstration or examination of the scientific or other intellectual basis  
of the conclusions reached: that is, the expert’s evidence must explain how the field of ‘specialised 
knowledge’ in which the witness is expert by reason of ‘training, study or experience’, and on which 
the opinion is ‘wholly or substantially based’, applies to the facts assumed or observed so as to 
produce the opinion propounded. If all these matters are not made explicit, it is not possible to be sure 
whether the opinion is based wholly or substantially on the expert’s specialised knowledge. If the court 
cannot be sure of that, the evidence is strictly speaking not admissible, and, so far as it is admissible, 
of diminished weight.
In the context of computer forensics, there is no particular level of training, study or experience that must 
be established for a person to be able to give evidence in proceedings. The witness’s qualifications will 
usually be a matter for the court to assess on a voir dire (s189 of the uniform Evidence Act), and the usual 
matters taken into account include degrees or diplomas held, specialist courses undertaken, workplace 
training, and practical experience (in Victoria see s391A of the Crimes Act 1958), Experts are also 
required to comply with the procedures of the court, such as providing a certificate of expert evidence 
required under Section 177 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth).
In contested criminal proceedings involving computer-related offences, the prosecution will often call its 
own expert witnesses, and the defence may call opposing experts to try to cast doubt on parts of the 
prosecution case. Where both prosecution and defence experts have given evidence on technical 
matters, the weight to be given to the opinions presented is a matter for the jury or other fact-finder (R v 
Lisoff [1999] NSWCCA 364 (22 November 1999)).
Juror comprehension and the use of courtroom technologies
Particular challenges can arise in technology-enabled crime cases where juries are involved. Juries will 
usually be present in contested trials for more serious criminal offences (i.e. indictable rather than 
summary offences) and less commonly in civil litigation. Geisler (2004: 32) explains the challenge for the 
security expert in communicating technical information to jurors thus:
The expert witness must be able to outline, as clearly and succinctly as possible, how his/her 
conclusions were reached and the underlying methodology for those conclusions. The security expert 
must educate the jury by providing it with the information needed to ultimately decide the disputed 
facts, together with a framework in which to process the information. It is not enough to merely state 
conclusions backed up with only the expert’s credentials and expertise.
Security experts must be able to clearly articulate ‘why’ and ‘how’ their conclusions were reached, in a 
way that is clear, simple and direct. However, this process involves more than an organized analytical 
framework; it requires the expert to first understand the jury’s expectations and to deliver the 
information accordingly.
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Similar concerns have been raised by researchers. For example Sprague (2006) suggested that:
[c]omputer crime prosecutions very often are, or can be forced into being, a form of ‘complex 
litigation,’ chock full of confusing technological terms and concepts. The average juror is generally 
ignorant of both the theory and practice of computer science. Even ‘computer savvy’ jurors are unlikely 
to have the training or experience to comprehend complex issues involving networking, security theory 
and practice, computer architecture, operating systems, system administration, or programming. A 
conscientious juror may well (and should) have a problem concluding that all reasonable doubt has 
been eliminated by evidence that he or she does not fully understand (Sprague 2006: 145).
The judge in the Federal Court of Australia case of Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment v 
Stevens [2002] FCA 906 (26 July 2002) also indicated that ‘[t]he Court should not be left in a position 
where it has to guess as to the operation of technological processes and how those processes might 
satisfy the statutory language’. Such (technical) information that needs to be communicated to the 
judiciary by the security experts includes: 
the possibility for a wide variety of evidence to be extracted from an increasing diversity in sources  •	
of computer or electronic exhibits (e.g. GPS devices, engine management systems, CCTV systems, 
digital cameras and mobile phones)
the use of mathematical hash algorithms in computer forensics as a means of evidence authentication •	
to be able to trust the hash values that uniquely identify electronic evidence
the use of filtering to reduce data volumes including the use of hash sets or targeted searching as their •	
use or non-use may have significant impact on processing time, and accuracy of the results
visualising the actual size of digital data as it has been noted that in a number of court case trials, •	
judges, prosecutors and unassisted defence lawyers have asked for all data on a computer exhibit to 
be printed out. In many technology-enabled cases, a printout of all data produced as a result of an 
examination will be infeasible. For example, the amount of information gathered during the 
investigation in Operation Firewall by the United States Secret Services is estimated to be 
approximately two terabytes – the equivalent of an average university’s academic library (USSS 2004). 
Moreover, hardcopy printout of an electronic document does not necessarily include all the information 
stored in the computer or electronic exhibit (e.g. data held in memory) (see Armstrong v Executive 
Office of the President 1 F 3d 1274 (DC Cir 1993)).
Lederer (2004) suggested that ‘[h]igh-tech trials are predominantly visual trials. For that to be true, images 
must be able to be seen. Most high-tech courtrooms provide the judge, witness, and counsel with small 
flat screen (LCD) monitors’. State-of-the-art courtroom technologies (e.g. visual communication 
technologies including videoconferencing, presentation software, computer animations and simulations 
and digital video) in technology-enabled crime prosecutions can, therefore, be an efficient tool in judiciary 
comprehension of electronic evidence (Lederer 2002). For example, document cameras allow users to 
place documents or objects on the presenter, take a photo of the document or objects and transmit the 
image to a screen. The ability to highlight and zoom-in on critical parts of the document will be helpful in 
simplifying complex concepts to the judiciary. It was also noted that 
… the new visual technologies and current trends in the mass mediazation of culture offer advocates 
especially powerful ways to evoke fictional models for events and behavior and to increase the 
likelihood that jurors and judges will use those models (uncritically) in reaching their decisions 
(Feigenson & Dunn 2003: 122).
In Australia, courtroom technologies are being built into or retrofitted into courtrooms as appropriate.  
A summary of available courtroom technology in Australia’s higher courts is described in Table 7.
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Table 7: Summary of available courtroom technology in Australia’s supreme courts 
Supreme 
Court
Document 
camera
Projector 
and 
screen
Digital 
audio 
facilities
Computers/
laptops Internet
Plasma/
LCD 
monitors
Individual 
monitors 
for jury 
and/or 
witness
Cth √ √ √ √ √ √
ACT √ √
NSW √ √ √ √ √ √ √
NT √ √
Qld √ √ √ √ √ √ √
SA √ √ √ √ √
Tas √ √ √ Available to 
judges only
√
Vic √ √ √ √ √
WA √ √ √ √ √
a. Personal communication, Dorothy Shea (Librarian of the Supreme Court of Tasmania) to Australian Institute of Criminology (2 May 2007)
Source: Adapted from De Wilde (2006: 325-326). Information was correct as at January 2006.
Legal and other privileges
Another basis on which the admission of electronic evidence may be challenged is with a claim of legal or 
other type of privilege. The main types of privilege dealt with under the uniform Evidence Acts are:
client legal privilege (known in common law and some other legislation as legal professional privilege), •	
found in Division 1 of Part 3.10 of all three Acts (also in s19D of the Evidence Act 1958 (Vic))
professional confidential relationships privilege, found in Division 1A of the NSW Act only •	
sexual assault communications privilege, found in Division 1B of the NSW Act only•	
medical communications privilege, found in s127A of the Tas Act only (also in s12(2) of the •	 Evidence 
Act (NT) and ss28(2)–(5) of the Evidence Act 1958 (Vic))
communications with a counsellor by a victim of a sexual offence privilege, found in s127B of the  •	
Tas Act only (also in s67F of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA), ss56–56G of the Evidence Act (NT) and 
Division 2A of Part II Evidence Act 1958 (Vic))
privilege against self-incrimination, found in s128 of all three Acts.•	
Although the privilege against self-incrimination is also dealt with under s10 Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), it  
is abrogated, in part, by ss15(1), which provides that an accused in a criminal proceeding shall not be 
entitled to refuse to answer a question or produce a document or thing on the ground that to do so 
would tend to prove the commission by the person of the offence with which the person is there charged.
In addition, there is range of other privileges in Divisions 3 of Part 3.10 of the uniform Evidence Acts, 
which deals with evidence excluded in the public interest. This includes:
evidence of reasons for judicial and similar decisions (s129)•	
evidence of matters of state (s130)•	
evidence of settlement negotiations (s131).•	
It should also be noted that other legislation may restrict the ability of parties to adduce, or to be given 
access to, security sensitive or otherwise restricted information in some proceedings. For example, the 
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National Security Information (Criminal Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth) provides mechanisms whereby such 
information may be used in criminal proceedings without risk of public disclosure.
The court must also be satisfied that witnesses are aware of their rights in relation to privileges as 
provided by s132 of the uniform Evidence Acts.
Client legal privilege
Under the uniform Evidence Acts, evidence is not to be admitted if, on objection from a client, the court 
finds that adducing the evidence would result in the disclosure of confidential communication made 
between lawyer and client or a confidential document prepared for the dominant purpose of advising the 
client (s118) or preparing for litigation (s119). It should be noted that advice privilege does not extend to 
third party communications under s118. For example, in the New South Wales case of Westpac Banking 
Corporation v 789TEN Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 321 (19 September 2005), an appeal against the judgment 
by the trial judge, Mr Justice Bergin, that the letters were not privileged under s118 as the ‘provision 
relevantly protected documents prepared for the dominant purpose of a lawyer providing legal advice to a 
client’ was dismissed.
Claims of client legal privilege may particularly arise where lawyers’ offices or computers, or those of other 
professionals, are being searched for evidence. Because electronic communications technologies such 
as fax, email and instant messaging are increasingly used for business and other dealings, it is to be 
expected that claims of client legal privilege will increasingly focus on such communications: see, for 
example, In the matter of Bauhaus Pyrmont Pty Ltd (in liq) [2006] NSWSC 543 (6 June 2006).
Despite the prevalence of computers and other electronic devices in communications, there is some 
uncertainty about how potential claims of client legal privilege are to be dealt with in the execution of 
search warrants covering computer contents. The AFP and the Law Council of Australia (LCA) in 1990 
agreed a set of guidelines on AFP searches where claims of legal professional privilege arise, which were 
revised in 1997, but these do not make any reference to computer records (LCA 1990).
At present the procedures to be followed relate only to physical documents rather than computer 
contents or records of electronic communications (par 24–25):
Where the lawyer or Law Society agrees to assist the search team the procedures set out below 
should be followed:-
(a) in respect of all documents identified by the lawyer or Law Society and/or further identified by the 
executing officer as potentially within the warrant, the executing officer should, before proceeding to 
further execute the warrant (by inspection or otherwise) and to seize the documents, give the lawyer or 
Law Society the opportunity to claim legal professional privilege in respect of any of those documents
(b) if the lawyer or Law Society asserts a claim of legal professional privilege in relation to any of those 
documents then the lawyer or Law Society should be prepared to indicate to the executing officer the 
grounds upon which the claim is made and in whose name the claim is made
(c) in respect of those documents which the lawyer or Law Society claim are subject to legal 
professional privilege, the search team shall proceed in accordance with the guidelines as follows. In 
respect of the remaining documents, the search team may then proceed to complete the execution of 
warrant.
.…
All documents which the lawyer or Law Society claims are subject to legal professional privilege shall 
under the supervision of the executing officer be placed by the lawyer and/or his/her staff, or the Law 
Society and/or its representatives, in a container which shall then be sealed.
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Similar LCA guidelines have been agreed in relation to Australian Taxation Office (ATO) access to lawyers’ 
premises (LCA 1991). However, these remain unamended since being issued in 1991. As with the AFP 
Guidelines, such policies should be updated to reflect their application to computer contents and 
electronic communications, and in particular to refer to the search warrant provisions under 
Commonwealth law introduced into the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) and Customs Act 1901 (Cth) by the 
Cybercrime Act 2001 (Cth). 
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ABN Australian Business Number - a single registrable numerical identifier for dealings with 
government departments and agencies
ABN - DSC A digital certificate linked to an entity’s ABN which identifies an individual with an associated entity 
that has an ABN
ABR Australian Business Register - established under the A New Tax System (Australian Business 
Number) Act 1999 (Cth), this is a comprehensive register of information provided by businesses 
when they register for an ABN
ActiveX Control Software technology developed by Microsoft that allows programmed capabilities or content to 
be delivered to Windows-based personal computers via the World Wide Web (notable for its lack 
of security controls; computer security experts discourage its use over the internet)
Address An internet address or IP (internet protocol) address is a unique computer (host) location on the 
internet
A web-page address - also called a Uniform Resource Locator (URL) – is expressed as the 
defining directory path to the file on a particular server
An email address is the location of an email user (expressed as an email user name followed by 
the @ sign and then the user’s server domain name
Address book A feature of some email applications that stores names and email addresses in an accessible 
format (and one that can be exploited by some viruses which replicate by sending out copies of 
themselves via email)
Application A self-contained program that performs a well-defined set of tasks under user control, as 
opposed to a system program (for example, web browsers, mail readers, and FTP clients are 
applications commonly used on the internet)
Archive file A file that contains other files (usually compressed files), used to store files that are not used often 
or that may be downloaded from a file library by internet users
AFP Australian Federal Police – established by the Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth) as the 
agency with main responsibility for the investigation of crimes against Commonwealth laws, and 
with community policing responsibility for the Australian Capital Territory
AHTCC Australian High Tech Crime Centre – hosted by AFP and established in 2004 as national agency 
dealing with technology-enabled crime investigations
AIC Australian Institute of Criminology – an independent Commonwealth government body 
established by the Criminology Research Act 1971 (Cth)
ARPAnet The original forerunner of the internet, designed for the United States military as a system able to 
withstand nuclear attack (though not human interference)
ASIC Australian Securities and Investments Commission - an independent Commonwealth government 
body established by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 1989 (Cth)
ATO Australian Taxation Office – established as the administrative agency for Australian government 
revenue collection, headed by the Commissioner for Taxation under the Taxation Administration 
Act 1953 (Cth)
Attachment A file that is embedded into an email message, and which requires a separate action to open 
(and which may also contain harmful code)
Audit trail A chronological sequence of audit records containing evidence directly pertaining to and resulting 
from the execution of a business process or system function, which is useful for maintaining 
security and for recovering lost transactions. Audit trail may be admitted as evidence to establish 
or dispute the integrity or authenticity of an electronic record.
Authentication A process of verifying the identity of a person or the identity of an entity (e.g. an individual).
B2B Business to business – online communication between business entities
B2C Business to consumer – online communication between business entities and consumers/
individuals
B2G Business to government – online communication between business entities and government
Backdoor An undocumented method of bypassing normal authentication or securing remote access to a 
computer
Backup A copy of all information held on a computer in case something goes wrong with the original 
copy, produced as a result of either an automatic or manual command
Bandwidth The amount of information or data that can be sent over a network connection in a given period 
of time, usually stated in bits per second (bps), kilobits per second (kbps), or megabits per 
second (mps)
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BIOS Basic input/output system – a program stored on the motherboard that controls the basic startup 
operations for the machine, which searches for the processor, memory, IDE (Integrated Drive 
Electronics) devices and ports, completes POST (Power on Self Test) checks and compares 
results with CMOS (Complementary Metal-Oxide Semi-Conductant), and assists the computer 
with booting of the computer.
Bit (binary digit) A bit is either on or off and is represented by 1 or 0 (bits are put together to form a byte)
Bluetooth A telecommunications industry standard which allows mobile phones, computers and personal 
digital assistants (PDAs) to connect using a short range wireless connection
Bookmarking The process of storing the address of a website or internet document on your computer so that 
you can find it again easily
Boot To start a computer, more frequently used when referring to the operating system that controls 
the computer.
Boot disk A floppy disk that contains the files needed to start an operating system
Bot malware Codes that typically takes advantage of system vulnerabilities and software bugs or hacker-
installed backdoors that allow malicious code to be installed on computers without the owners’ 
consent or knowledge.
Bot program Codes that operate automatically as agents for a user or another program. The first bot program 
was probably Eggdrop, created by Jeff Fisher, which originated as a useful feature of internet 
relay chat (IRC) in the early 1990s. Early bot programs were designed to allow IRC operators to 
script automated responses to IRC activities. 
Bots Individual computers infected with bot malware – are then turned into zombies.
Botnet A collection of software robots, or bots, which run autonomously and which the botnet’s 
originator or botmaster can control remotely, usually through a means such as internet relay 
channel (IRC), and usually for nefarious purposes such as distributed denial of service attacks 
(DDoS)
Browser A software application that displays and allows users to interact with text, images, and other 
information typically located on a web page at a website
Brute force attack A tedious problem-solving technique which systematically enumerates all possible candidates for 
the solution and checking whether each candidate satisfies the problem’s statement. For 
example, in a brute force attack, one defeats an encryption program by exhaustively working 
through all possible keys to decrypt a message
Buffer An area of memory often referred to as the cache used to speed up access to devices. It is often 
used for temporary storage of data read from or waiting to be sent to a device such as a hard 
disk, CD-ROM, printer or tape drive.
Bulletin Board System (BBS) A computer system equipped for network access that serves as an information and message 
passing centre for remote users, generally focused on special interests, such as science fiction, 
movies or computer software (may be free or fee-based)
Byte (short for binary term) In most computer systems, a unit of data consisting of eight bits, which is the smallest 
addressable unit that can represent a single character, such as a letter, digit or punctuation mark
Cache Browsed web pages are stored in the browser’s cache directory on a PC’s hard disk, so that 
when the page is revisited the browser can get it from the cache rather than the original server, 
saving time and the network the burden of additional traffic - two common types of cache are 
cache memory and disk cache
Carriage service Defined in s7 of the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth), and for telecommunications offences in 
the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), as ‘a service for carrying communications by means of guided 
and/or unguided electromagnetic energy’ 
CDF Channel data format, a system used to prepare information for webcasting
CD Compact disc with a standard size of 700 megabyte
CD-R Recordable compact disk – a disc to which data can be written but not erased
CD-ROM A format and system for recording, storing and retrieving electronic information on a compact 
disk that is read using laser optics rather than magnetic means
CD-RW Rewritable compact disc – a disc to which data can be written and erased
CERT Computer Emergency Response Team (http://www.cert.org/)
Certification Authority (CA) A body that generates, signs and issues Public Key Certificates which bind Subscribers to their 
Public Key
Chat A form of interactive online communication that enables typed conversations to occur in 
real-time, with messages are instantaneously relayed to other members in the chat room 
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Chat room Available through online services and some electronic bulletin boards, allowing the real-time 
exchange of messages between users of a particular system (may be open or secure chat 
rooms) 
Checksum A mathematical calculation applied to the contents of a packet before and after being sent 
(indicating errors in the transmission if the ‘before’ and ‘after’ calculation does not match) 
Circuit board A thin plate with chips, devices and other electronic components installed on the plate
CMOS Complementary metal-oxide semi-conductant. This is a low-power memory chip that holds basic 
functionality data such as the power on password, time and date, drive search sequence and 
hard drive types. This is often confused with the BIOS chip. Basically the BIOS chip gets the 
computer up and running and compares what it finds against the settings saved the last time in 
the CMOS.
Communications data Transmission of information from one computer/device to another
Compression See file compression
Compromise A violation (or suspected violation) of a system such that unauthorised disclosure of sensitive 
information may have occurred
Computer A programmable machine that allows manipulation of data according to a pre-recorded list of 
instructions known as a program.
Configuration file A file that contains initial configuration information/settings for a particular program
Cookie A small message written in a user’s browser by a server when a website is connected to, 
enabling traffic to the website to be monitored (note that cookies can be turned off, but some 
websites will fail to appear properly without cookies activated and a message will appear on the 
screen with this information)
CPU Central processing unit – the most powerful chip in the computer, the brain that performs all the 
computer’s arithmetic, logic and control functions
Cracker A person who uses his or her skill to break into computer programs or DVDs protected by 
copyright and other protections such as key encryption systems, and who usually then makes 
the cracked software or DVD available for free or at a reduced cost (see also warez traders)
CRC Cyclic redundancy check – a common technique for detecting data transmission errors
Cryptography Cryptography is the expertise of scrambling plaintext (ordinary text, sometimes referred to as 
cleartext) into ciphertext (a process called encryption), then back again (decryption) – this enables 
securing of private information sent through public networks by encrypting it in a way that makes 
it unreadable to anyone except the person or persons holding the mathematical key or 
knowledge to decrypt the information
Cybercrime A general term encompassing crime committed by means of, directed at, or otherwise using or 
facilitated by, computers or associated technologies (also cyber crime or cyber-crime)
Cyberspace The ‘place’ where computer networking hardware, network software, and people using them 
converge 
Cyberstalking The use of computers or associated technologies to stalk or harass a person
Cyberterrorism The use of computers or associated technologies to commit an act of terrorism
Daemon A program that runs in the background and provides system services on an ongoing, indefinite 
basis for one or more client applications, such as printing files on a shared printer
Database Structured collection of data that can be accessed for uses including address links, invoicing 
information, statistical records, etc. (common database programs include Dbase, Paradox, 
Access)
Date and time stamps A piece of data that enables the identification of the existence of a digital content at the particular 
date and time
Deleted files Files sent to a PC’s recycle bin, with the consequent removal of the file’s root directory link (note, 
however, that depending on how the files are deleted, in many instances a forensic examiner is 
able to recover all or part of the original data)
Decryption The reverse process to encryption
Denial of Service attack (DoS) An attack aimed at specific websites by flooding a webserver with repeated messages, tying up 
the system and denying access to legitimate users – see also Distributed Denial of Service attack 
(DDoS)
Dictionary attack A technique used to defeat an encryption or authentication mechanism by trying to determine its 
decryption key, password or passphrase by searching through predefined databases or 
dictionaries – see also brute force attack.
Digital certificate An electronic document signed by the Certification Authority which identifies a Key Holder and 
the business entity he or she represents, binds the Key Holder to a Key Pair by specifying the 
Public Key of that Key Pair, and contains the information required by the Certificate Profile
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Digital signature An electronic signature created using a private signature key
Digital video (DV) Video captured, manipulated and stored in a digital format
Directory An entity in a file system which is used to organise files and/or files into a hierarchical structure
Disc space The space on the web hosting a company’s server/computers that a website’s content is allowed 
to utilise
Disk A medium for which data can be encoded and there are either magnetic disks or optical disks
Disk cache A portion of memory set aside for temporarily holding information read from a disk
Distributed denial of service 
attack (DDoS)
A denial of service attack using multiple sources of messages, usually from a large number of 
computers connected to the internet 
DNS Domain Name System – identifies each computer as a network node on the internet using an 
internet protocol address system to translate from domain names to IP numbers and vice-versa
DNS server The facility that operates the DNS to allow connection between computers on the internet
DVD Digital Versatile Disk - similar in appearance to a compact disk, but can store larger amounts of 
data including video
Dynamic IP address Dynamic IP address is issued to identify non-permanent devices that takes place at the moment 
when needed rather than in advance (see also IP address)
Electronic Funds Transfer 
(EFT)
The paperless act of performing financial transaction electronically through a computer network
Electronic signature A data element associated with a message, which identifies a person and indicates his or her 
approval of the contents of the message
Email (or e-mail) Electronic mail – emails come in two parts, the body and the header
Email header Normal header information gives the recipient details of time, date, sender (automatically added) 
and subject (as typed by sender), while extended headers include information added by email 
programs and transmitting devices which may show other information about the sender enabling 
tracing to an individual computer on the internet
Email server A mail transfer agent (MTA) or a system of MTAs that enable routing of electronic mail (email) and 
act as a server, by storing email and supporting client access
EnCase Commercially available forensic software product, produced by Guidance Software
Encryption The process of scrambling, or encoding, information in an effort to guarantee that only the 
intended recipient can read the information 
Expansion board A printed circuit board that can be inserted into a computer to add capabilities such as increased 
memory
Expert evidence/expert 
opinion 
Evidence in the form of an expert’s opinion which is admitted in court proceedings despite the 
general prohibition on opinion evidence, must be wholly or substantially based on the witness’ 
training, study or experience (e.g. see s79 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth))
FAQ Frequently asked questions – many websites have such a list of questions and answers
File compression A technology that reduces the size of a file, saving both time and bandwidth in transmission (e.g. 
WinZip and UNIX compress are compression programs)
File extension Part of the name of a file that determines its type and function: examples include .doc, .exe and 
.bat 
File sharing program Computer codings that enable electronic transfer of files from one computer to another over the 
internet, over a smaller Intranet, or across simple networks
File signature (See Digital signature)
Filtering Internet filtering systems prevent or block user’s access to unsuitable material. 
Firewall A network security system used to restrict external and internal traffic
Floppy disk These are square, flat disks that hold information magnetically, with two main types: 3 ½inch (in a 
stiff case) and 5 ¼inch (flexible and more easily damaged)
Folder An object containing multiple documents and are used to organize information (See Directory)
Forensic computer examiner A specialist who examines computer systems to determine whether they are or have been used 
for illegal or unauthorized activities
Free space Can contain clusters that are not currently used by the operating system but contain deleted files 
or data
Gigabyte (GB) A measure of memory capacity, roughly one thousand megabytes or a billion bytes (1 gigabyte = 
1024 megabytes)
Google A particularly popular search engine: http://www.google.com/
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Hacker A person who uses his or her skill to break into computer programs, obtaining unauthorised 
access to data and/or the functionality of a computer and systems to which it is connected
Hacking The activity of a hacker, which may be done with honest motives (e.g. testing a system’s security) 
or with dishonest aims (e.g. obtaining confidential information or causing damage to a computer 
or system)
Hard disk/Hard drive The hard disk or hard drive is usually inside the personal computer and stores information in the 
same way as floppy disks but can hold far more 
Hardware The physical parts of a computer – those that can be kicked
Hash A mathematical algorithm that creates a small digital fingerprint from any kind of data
Host machine In forensic examination, a host machine is one which is used to accept a target hard drive for the 
purpose of forensically processing it
HTML Hypertext markup language (a subset of the Standard Generalized Markup Language (SGML) 
first invented to display legal texts and now the world standard for large documentation projects) 
- the text markup language used to insert tags which allow a web browser to correctly display a 
hypertext document (HTML1, HTML +, HTML 2 and HTML 3 are versions of HTML in use)
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol – An internet protocol that manages the transfer of hyper-text (web 
pages) and multimedia documents over the internet 
HTTPD Hypertext Transfer Protocol Daemon – a computer program which manages the transfer of 
hypertext and multimedia documents over the internet
Hypertext Text which contains links to other text – internet web pages are an example of documents that 
contain such links.
Hypermedia Electronic documents which combine hypertext links and multimedia elements
IT/ICT Information and Information technology (IT) or information and communications technology (ICT) 
is the technology required for information processing – in particular the use of electronic 
computers and computer software to convert, store, protect, process, transmit, and retrieve 
information 
Identity theft/identity fraud The act of surreptitiously obtaining identifying details of a person (by means including hacking, 
phishing, credit card skimming, etc.) and misusing this in criminal ways including fraudulent 
misrepresentation
IDS Intrusion detection system (IDS) is designed to detect malicious network traffic and to monitor 
computer usage that cannot usually be detected by a conventional firewall
Imaging The process of obtaining all of the data present on storage media, whether active data or in free 
space, to allow it to be examined by a forensic examiner
Instant messaging A form of electronic communication that is carried out in real-time between two or more people 
over a network such as the internet.
Internet The collective electronic network of computers and computer networks which are inter-
connected throughout the world – started with the ARPAnet
Internet Relay Chat (IRC) A virtual meeting place where people from anywhere in the world can meet and talk online about 
a diversity of human interests, ideas and issues
IP address A unique number that is used for identification by devices to communicate with each other on a 
computer network utilising the internet protocol (IP) standard
IP spoofing Creation of internet protocol (IP) packets with a forged source IP address
Internet Service Provider (ISP) A business or organisation that offers fee-paying or subscribed users access to the internet and 
related services – most telecommunications operators are ISPs and provide services such as 
internet transit, domain name registration and hosting, dial-up access, leased line access and 
co-location
IPPs Information Privacy Principles - the principles set out in s 14 of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth)
IPRs Intellectual Property Rights – including copyright and neighbouring rights, patents, plant breeder’s 
rights (PBR), registered and unregistered trademarks, registered designs, confidential information 
(including trade secrets), circuit layouts, and other rights resulting from intellectual activity in the 
industrial, scientific, literary or artistic fields, protected by a range of legislation and common law 
actions
Java An object-oriented programming language developed at Sun Microsystems in the early 1990s
Jaz A high capacity removable hard disk system
Jumper A conductor, consisting of a plastic plug that fits over a pair of protruding pins, is generally used 
to set up or adjust printed circuit boards
Keyboard A device with many keys (usually marked with the letters of the alphabet, the numerical digits, 
and various extra keys) that allows user to input data into a computer
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Keystroke logger (monitor) A diagnostic computer program that is to capture the user’s keystrokes
Kilobyte (KB) A measure of memory capacity (1 kilobyte = 1024 bytes)
Linux An operating system initially designed to provide users with a free alternative to Unix and 
Microsoft. Because of its many free distribution versions this OS is now used in a wide range of 
commercial products and is typically seen in servers and network architecture rather than at user 
level. Linux is a favoured tool of experienced hackers as it allows them to control to a very high 
degree all interaction from their machine to the victim machine. It also allows them to circumvent 
security measures in DOS based systems with relative ease
Logic bomb A piece of malicious code, intentionally inserted into some computer system, that sets off a 
malicious function when specified conditions are met
Login The process of gaining access to a computer system by entering the required identification, such 
as a password
Macro A shortcut, such as a symbol, name or key, representing a list of commands, actions, or 
keystrokes
Macro virus A virus attached to instructions (called macros) which are executed automatically when a 
document is opened
Magnetic media A disk, tape, cartridge, diskette, or cassette that is used to store data magnetically.
Malware Short for malicious software – software designed specifically to damage or disrupt a system, 
such as a virus or a Trojan horse
MD5 hash A mathematical algorithm created in 1991 by Professor Ronald Rivest that is used to create 
digital signatures of storage media such as a computer hard drive (when the algorithm is applied 
to a hard drive then it creates a unique value, so that changing the data on the disk in any way 
will change the MD5 value)
Megabyte (MB) A measure of memory capacity (1 megabyte = 1024 kilobytes)
Memory Often used to denote random access memory (RAM), which is the electronic holding place for 
instructions and data that a computer’s microprocessor can reach quickly (RAM is located on 
one or more microchips installed in a computer)
Meta data Data that is used to describe other data
Microsoft Windows A family of operating systems developed by Microsoft
Modem Modulator/demodulator. A device that connects a computer to a data transmission line (typically 
a telephone line). Most people use modems that transfer data at speeds ranging from 1200 bits 
per second (bps) to 56 Kbps. There are also modems providing higher speeds and supporting 
other media. These are used for special purposes – for example to connect a large local network 
to its network provider over a leased line
Monitor The screen on which a PC displays information
Mouse A device that, when moved relays speed and direction to the computer, usually moving a desktop 
pointer on the screen
MS-DOS Microsoft DISK Operating System – the operating system marketed by Microsoft, the most 
common operating system in use on desktop PCs, which automatically loads into the memory of 
a computer when the computer is switched on
Multimedia Electronic documents which contain text, sound, graphics and video elements that are all 
capable of being displayed to the user
Newsgroups A repository that is used for messages posted from many users at different locations
NTFS New Technology File System (NTFS) is the standard file system used in Windows NT, Windows 
2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003 and Windows Vista
Open source A software development model that allows public assess to the production and development of 
programs (see http://www.opensource.org/)
Operating system (OS) This software is usually loaded into the computer memory upon switching the machine on and is 
a prerequisite for the operation of any other software
ORB A high-capacity removable hard disk system. ORB drives use magnetoresistive (MR) read/write 
head technology
Packet A formatted block of information carried by a computer network
Packet filtering A means of controlling access to a computer network by analysing the incoming and outgoing 
packets and letting them pass or halting them based on the IP addresses of the source and 
destination
Packet sniffer A program/device that monitors data packets travelling over a computer network
Partition Dividing a computer’s hard disk into several independent parts or dividing a computer into several 
independent virtual computers
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Password A word, phrase or combination of keystrokes used as a security measure to limit access to 
computers or software (many people choose an easy-to-remember sequence such as 123456 or 
their own name, making the hacker’s job far easier)
Payload Payload of a virus or worm is any action it is programmed to take other than merely spreading 
itself
PCMCIA cards Similar in size to credit cards, but thicker, which are inserted into slots in a laptop or palm-held 
computer and provide many functions not normally available to the machine (modems, adapters, 
hard disks)
Personal computer (PC) A term commonly used to describe IBM and compatible computers, but more generally, any 
computer useable by one person at a time
Personal organiser or 
personal digital assistant 
(PDA)
These are pocket-sized machines usually holding phone and address lists and diaries as well as 
other information, making them an attractive target for theft (both for the device and the 
information contained)
Pharming Seeks to obtain confidential/sensitive information through domain spoofing.
Phishing Assuming the identity of a legitimate organisation or website using forged email or fraudulent 
websites to convince others to provide information – usually personal financial, such as credit 
card numbers, account user names and passwords, social security numbers – for the purpose of 
using it to commit fraud
Phreaking Exploiting telephone systems or the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) for the purposes 
of making free phone calls
Pirate software Software that has been illegally copied
Pop up A form of online advertising and works when certain websites are opened, a new web browser 
window displaying the advertisements will be opened
Port This is where information goes into or out of a computer, such as the serial port on a personal 
computer where a modem is connected
Port scanner A program that is designed to search a network host for open ports
Post Office Protocol (POP) An application-layer internet standard protocol, that is used by email client machines to retrieve 
email from a remote server over a TCP/IP connection
Protocol A set of rules governing electronic communication between computer devices
Proxy server A dedicated computer within a computer network service that allows other client machines to 
make indirect network connections to other network services
Public domain software Free programs, also known as freeware, offered as an alternative to commercial products (for 
example, the Linux operating system)
Public key infrastructure (PKI) A setting that allows a trusted third party to vet and vouch for user’s identity which allows binding 
of users to public keys. The latter is typically embedded in digital certificates
Query To search or ask. In particular, to request information on a search engine, index directory or 
database
RAM Random access memory is the PC’s short-term memory. It provides working space for the PC to 
work with data. Information stored in the RAM is lost when the PC is turned off
Remote access The ability to connect to a network from a distant location, usually requiring a computer, a 
modem and remote-access software to allow the computer to connect to the network over a 
public communications network (such as a phone or cable network)
Removable media Items, e.g. floppy disks, CDs, DVDs, cartridges, tape that store data and can be removed easily
Removable media cards Small-sized data storage media which are more commonly found in other digital devices such as 
cameras, PDAs and music players. They can also be used for the storage of normal data files 
which can be accessed and written to by computers. There are a number of these: smartmedia, 
compact flash, SD expansion card, Ultra-compact flash, memory stick, multimedia card. The 
cards are non-volatile they retain their data when power to the device is stopped and they can be 
exchanged between devices
Root kit Cloaking technologies that are usually employed by other malware programs to abuse 
compromised systems by hiding files, registry keys and other operating system objects from 
diagnostic, anti-virus and security programs
Server A dedicated computer that provides services to other computers or the software that runs on it
Shareware Software that is distributed free on a trial basis with the understanding that if it si used beyond 
the trial period, the user will pay. Some shareware versions are programmed with a built-in 
expiration date
Slack space The unused space in a disk cluster. The DOS and Windows file systems use fixed-size clusters. 
Even if the actual data being stored requires less storage that the cluster size, an entire cluster is 
reserved for the file. The unused space is called the slack space
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Smartcard Plastic cards, typically with an electronic chip embedded that contain electronic value tokens. 
Such value is disposable at both physical retail outlets and online shopping locations
Software The pre-written programs designed to assist in the performance of a specific task such as 
network management, web development, file management, word processing, accounting or 
inventory management
Spam Junk mail (such as commercial advertising, often for dubious products, get-rich-quick schemes, 
or quasi-legal services) delivered by email or text messages, costing the sender very little to send 
as most of the costs are paid for by the recipient or the carriers rather than by the sender, 
regulated in Australia (with heavy civil penalties for spamming) by the Spam Act 2003 (Cth) 
Spamming The act of flooding the internet with many copies of the same message, in an attempt to force 
the message on people who would not otherwise choose to receive it (see spam)
Spim An alternative name for spam using instant messaging
Spyware Any software that covertly gathers user information through the user’s internet connection without 
his or her knowledge, usually for advertising purposes – spyware applications are typically 
bundled as a hidden component of freeware or shareware programs that can be downloaded 
from the internet, which, once installed, monitors user activity on the internet and transmits that 
information in the background to someone else, and may also gather information about email 
addresses, passwords and credit card numbers
Steganography An information hiding technique that usually embeds messages within other, seemingly harmless 
messages or files
Streaming One-way (either point-to-point or broadcast to multiple receivers) transmission of video and audio 
content over the internet or advanced wideband wireless networks
System unit Usually the largest part of a PC, the system unit is a box that contains the major components – it 
has the drives at the front and the ports for connecting to the keyboard, mouse, printer and other 
devices at the back
Tape A long strip of magnetic-coated plastic, usually held in cartridges (similar in appearance to video, 
audio or camcorder tapes) but can also be held on spools (similar to reel-to-reel audio tape), 
used to record computer data, usually a back-up of the information on the computer
TCP/IP A set of protocols covering the network and transport layers of the seven-layer Open Systems 
Interconnection (OSI) network model. TCP/IP was developed during a 15-year period under the 
auspices of the U.S. Department of Defense. It has become a dominant standard in enterprise 
networking, particularly at higher-level OSI layers over ethernet networks
Terabyte (TB) A measure of memory capacity, roughly one thousand gigabytes or a billion kilobytes (1 terabyte 
= 1024 gigabytes)
Terminal A computer terminal is a device, such as a combination of keyboard and display screen, allowing 
the user to communicate with a computer or computer system
Thumbdrive A form of USB flash drives that allows portable storage of data
Thumbnail Reduced-size versions of digital pictures
Tracert (traceroute) A computer network tool that is used to determine the network route taken by data packets 
across an IP network
Traffic data (See Data packets)
Trojan horse A type of malicious program used to establish remote access to a victim’s machine, typically 
disguised as innocent attachments to email but when executed install software that allows the 
attacker to remotely access and control some or all of the primary functions of the victim’s 
computer. Trojans can also be remotely installed by exploiting faulty code, so that the victim may 
only need to visit a website for their computer to become infected
Trojan horse defence A defence argument sometimes raised to put forward an alternative explanation for the presence 
of illegal content or incriminating data on a computer, relying on the hypothesis of a third party 
attack by means of malicious code
Unallocated file space Unallocated file space (also known as free space) is the unused portion of the hard drive and 
often potentially contains intact files, remnants of files and subdirectories and temporary files 
which were transparently created and deleted by computer applications and also the operating 
system
Unix A popular operating system, used mainly on larger multi user systems (Unix-based systems 
control the majority of primary functions on the internet and represent 50% of the web servers in 
use today)
Unauthorised access, 
modification or impairment
An element of several computer offences under the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) and similar 
legislation in the states and territories, where access to, modification or impairment of data or 
electronic communications is unauthorised if ‘the person is not entitled to cause that access, 
modification or impairment’ (s476.2)
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URL Uniform Resource Locator – the global address of documents or web pages on the World Wide 
Web, with the first part of the URL (most often http://) indicating the protocol to be used and the 
remaining part (such as www.organisation.au) identifying the webpage to be displayed
USB storage devices Small storage devices accessed using a computer’s USB ports that allow the storage of large 
volumes of data files and which can be easily removed, transported and concealed (also called 
datakeys and thumbdrives)
Username The unique identifier for each user on a network, usually required with a unique password for 
logging on
Usenet The computer network which carries newsgroups – arranged in hierarchies based loosely on 
subject matter
Video backer A program that allows computer data to be backed up to a standard video. When viewed the 
data is presented as a series of dots and dashes
Video conferencing A live connection between people in separate locations for the purpose of communication usually 
involving audio and often text as well as video
Virus A piece of programming code which is inserted into other programming code for the purpose of 
causing some unexpected and (for the victim) usually undesirable event, ranging from relatively 
harmless screen messages to highly destructive programs that erase or alter data – viruses can 
be transmitted by downloading programs from other sites or from portable storage media, and 
may include self-replicating functions and mechanisms for further distribution (e.g. via address 
books attached to email facilities)
Voice Over Internet Protocol 
(VOIP)
A technology that allows users to make telephone calls over the internet instead of the traditional 
analog phone line
War driving A technique used to search for Wi-Fi wireless networks using a Wi-Fi-equipped computer in a 
moving vehicle
Webcam A webcam is a camera connected to the internet that can be used to stream moving images. (A 
live picture, or snapshot is uploaded to a website from the camera at regular intervals, typically 
every few minutes for a webcam located at a fixed location such as a city centre.)
Weblog (blog) A form of online diary or journal, consisting usually of short, frequently updated posts, arranged 
chronologically with the most recently posted item appearing at the top of the page (blogs may 
also contain photos, images, sound, archives and related links and can incorporate comments 
from visitors)
Web server A server that runs services which process requests for web content – see also server
Website A collection of files accessed through a web address, covering a particular theme or subject, and 
managed by a particular person or organization. Its opening page is called a home page. A 
Website resides on servers connected to the internet and is able to format and send information 
requested by worldwide users 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Websites typically use 
Hypertext markup language (HTML) to format and present information and to provide navigational 
facilities that make it easy for the user to move within the site and around the Web.
Whois A widely used (domain name lookup) technique to query a domain name database to determine 
the owner of a domain name or an IP address on the internet
Windows 95, Windows 98, 
Windows ME etc.
Operating system marketed by Microsoft for use on desktop PCs
Wired equivalent privacy 
(WEP)
A feature used to encrypt and decrypt data signals transmitted between Wireless LAN (WLAN) 
devices. An optional 802.11 feature (e.g. 802.11), WEP provides data confidentiality equivalent to 
that of a wired LAN that does not employ advanced cryptographic techniques to enhance 
privacy. WEP makes WLAN links as secure as wired links.
Wireless data communication A form of communication that uses the radio spectrum rather than a physical medium. It may 
carry analog or digital signals and may be used on LANs or WANs in one or two-way networks.
Windows NT Operating system from Microsoft aimed at the business market. Multiple layers of security are 
available on this system.
Word processor Used for typing letters, reports and documents - common programs are Wordstar, Wordperfect, 
Microsoft Word
World Wide Web (WWW or 
W3)
The name given to the collection of computers which serve information in hypertext format to the 
internet – invented by Dr Tim Berners-Lee, at the European Center for Nuclear Research (CERN), 
who wrote the first hypertext transfer protocol daemon (HTTPD) and the first hypertext markup 
language (HTML) browser, as a way to allow nuclear physicists to exchange working papers over 
the computer networks
Worm Like a virus but is capable of moving from computer to computer over a network without being 
carried by another program
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Wireless network card An expansion card present in a computer that allows cordless connection using radio signals 
between that computer and other devices on a computer network, replacing traditional network 
cables
Yahoo! A popular search engine: http://www.yahoo.com/ 
Zip drive/disk A 3.5 inch removable disk drive. The drive is usually bundled with software that can catalogue 
disks and lock files for security.
Zip A popular data compression format. Files that have been compressed with Zip format are called 
zip files and usually end with a .zip extension.
Zombie (see also bot and 
botnet)
 A recently introduced term to denote a computer that has had some of its functions brought 
under remote control, usually without the owner’s knowledge or consent, by means of a virus or 
other malicious software. An army of zombies forms a botnet.
